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ABSTRACT 
Interorganizational Performance Comparisons 
Using Quality Assurance Audit Results 
by 
Raymond E. Keeler 
Dr. Christopher Stream, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Public Affairs 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 requires 
government agencies to conduct performance measurements of their contractors for 
purposes of evaluation and comparison. To be most meaningful, performance 
comparisons need to consider all relevant characteristics that are of importance to the 
agency. Yet, bounded rationality theory states that managers of complex programs may 
have insufficient time and resources to consider all potentially relevant factors. 
Therefore, metrics used for decision making need to incorporate all relevant factors 
before the information is provided to decision makers. 
Over the last several decades, government agencies have increasingly identified 
Quality Assurance compliance as a characteristic of concern for government contractors. 
Nevertheless, government agencies, such as the United States Department of Energy 
(DOE), infrequently conduct quantitative performance comparisons of their contractors 
with respect to quality assurance compliance. When agencies do conduct the 
comparisons, the agencies generally use results from quality assurance audits. However, 
while audit results are quantitative and readily available, they generally do not address all 
relevant factors. Providing these incomplete data to decision makers increases the risk of 
making less than optimal decisions. 
iv 
This research investigated the feasibility of using statistical regression techniques 
to transform raw audit results into more meaningful data that government decision 
makers could use to meet the intent of the GPRA’s performance comparison 
requirements. The research used existing data from 398 DOE audits of 60 government 
contractors to develop fixed-effects models of quality assurance compliance. 
The research results show that using raw audit results for contractor performance 
comparisons may lead to inappropriate ranking of contractors. In order to ensure more 
accurate ranking of contractors, comparison metrics that use audit results must account 
for audit-specific variables that increase the depth of the audit. Audit-specific variables 
such as audit duration, audit team size, number of audit modules, and the time between 
successive audits contribute to the number of issues found during an audit and need to be 
accounted for in relative performance metrics.
 v 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
As part of the New Public Management (NPM) movement of the 1990s, 
advocates successfully introduced a number of public policy reforms that were “founded 
on themes of disaggregation, competition, and incentivization” (Dunleavy, Margetts, 
Bastow, & Tinkler, 2005, p. 476). Compared to previous reform measures, these reforms 
“generally put a greater emphasis on strategic planning; on performance measurement, 
especially the measurement of program outcomes; on customer satisfaction as one of the 
desired outcomes; [and] on results-oriented objectives” (Swiss, 2005, p. 592). These 
reforms were intended to make government more efficient and effective. 
The NPM reforms of the 1990s included the Government Performance and 
Results Act of 1993 (GPRA). This legislation required government agencies to produce 
annual performance plans that included “performance indicators to be used in measuring 
or assessing the relevant outputs, service levels, and outcomes of each program activity” 
and to “provide a basis for comparing actual program results with the established 
performance goals” (GPRA, 1993). On January 4, 2011, President Barak Obama signed 
into law the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (2011a) amending the GPRA and 
requiring “quarterly performance assessments of Government programs for purposes of 
assessing agency performance and improvement.” 
These laws compel government agencies to identify the important aspects of their 
programs and to measure and evaluate performance indicators for each program activity. 
However, some important aspects of program activities are inherently difficult to 
measure. In these situations, the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (2011b) provides an 
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exemption if it “is not feasible to express the performance goals for a particular program 
activity in an objective, quantifiable, and measurable form.” Nevertheless, in keeping 
with the stated purpose of the law, federal agencies have a responsibility to establish 
suitable metrics for evaluating the performance of the agency and its activities, 
contractors, and suppliers. 
The assumption that public officials and administrators behave as rational actors 
underpins GPRA reform measures. The classical rational actor model assumes decision 
makers use their cognitive abilities to evaluate information and make optimal decisions 
(Doucouliagos, 1994, p. 877). Thus, if government agencies are to function efficiently 
and effectively, the decision makers of those agencies must have all necessary, pertinent 
information available to them. The intent of the GPRA was to ensure that decision 
makers had the requisite information. In theory, if managers have the requisite 
performance information, they can conduct benchmarking or performance comparisons 
between competing contractors to ensure receiving the best value for budget expenditures 
(Thompson, 1994). 
However, University of Connecticut researchers  Kravchuk and Schack (1996) 
contended that the requirements of the GPRA combined with the complexities of many 
government organizations caused government decision makers to move away from the 
traditional rational actor role. Kravchuk and Schack contended that “the more… 
administrators come to rely upon formal measurement devices and systems, the more 
they will tend to operate in a cybernetic-decision mode, rather than a rational-actor 
mode” (p. 349). “To buffer themselves from the overwhelming complexity of the internal 
and external environments, decision makers establish mechanisms to screen out certain 
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information selectively, in advance (whether or not potentially pertinent). This implicitly 
violates the rational actor's assumption of sensitivity to all pertinent information” (p. 
352). Thus, paradoxically, the provisions of the GPRA were intended to improve the 
decision-making process, but may have actually undermined the integrity of the process. 
Nevertheless, the performance comparison requirements of the GPRA will likely 
remain. As prominent researchers such as Patrick Dunleavy have acknowledged, “NPM 
practices are extensively institutionalized and will continue” (Dunleavy, et al., 2005, p. 
476). As such, public administrators and agency officials are sometimes faced with the 
challenge of implementing past NPM innovations (such as GPRA-mandated performance 
comparisons) even though “their strongest advocates now expect [the innovations] to 
have little impact on altering the overall effectiveness of government” (Dunleavy, et al., 
2005, p 468). The challenge, therefore, is for government agencies to implement the 
performance measurement requirements of the GPRA in such a way that agency officials 
operating in cybernetic decision-making mode (Kravchuk & Schack, 1996) have 
sufficient information to make good decisions. 
Effective management requires a system of measurement that provides a 
balanced, multifacteted [sic] view of performance, yet slices through the noise 
and complexity pulsing through the channels of measurement, to indicate when 
real change is occurring … Ultimately, a system of performance measures does 
no good if it does not inform decision makers. Worse, it can do great harm if it 
misrepresents, misleads, or introduces perverse behavioral incentives. Decision 
makers must understand and take account of the limitations of measurement 
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systems when interpreting the reported results. (Kravchuk & Schack, 1996, p. 
349) 
The requirement for a measurement system to provide a balanced, multifaceted 
view of performance necessitates metrics for all major objectives of the organization. 
“The highly structured nature of performance-feedback channels will mean that, unless 
preprogrammed into the channel, many factors that might otherwise affect decisions 
substantially will have little or no effect on the decision process” (Kravchuk & Schack, 
1996, p. 352). In other words, a single measure, such as cost, is not sufficient to 
determine the relative value of a product or service when isolated from other critical 
measures, such as quality, timeliness, or functionality. 
The difficulty of evaluating performance is compounded when the agency goes 
outside its own organization to assess its contractors. To compare two or more 
contractors, like data need to be available from each of the assessed contractors. For 
example, if an agency desires to compare cost and schedule performance of two of its 
contractors, the agency needs both cost data and schedule data from each contractor. The 
agency cannot effectively compare the two contractors if one provides only cost data and 
the other provides only schedule data. 
Problem Statement 
Government agencies and their stakeholders have many goals and objectives, and  
one organizational objective is quality. As used herein, quality refers to the “condition 
achieved when an item, service, or process meets or exceeds the user’s requirements and 
expectations” (DOE Quality Assurance Requirements, 2001). In this sense, quality is a 
nearly universal goal of all government agencies. The prominence of quality is such that 
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government agencies frequently mandate quality requirements in contracts, grants, and 
cooperative agreements (DOE 414.1D). 
Given the prominence of quality in government programs and contracts, 
Kravchuk and Schack’s (1996) research suggested that quality may be an important 
factor to include in the performance-feedback process. Yet, including quality in the 
performance measurement process can be problematic because quality is, by its very 
nature, a qualitative characteristic, whereas performance measurement programs tend to 
favor quantitative measurements (Hatry, 2006). Moreover, challenges measuring quality 
increase when the government agency needs to use the information to compare the 
relative performance of multiple organizations, such as when the agency must evaluate 
the relative performance of multiple competing contractors. 
The problem, therefore, is to identify a means to measure quality performance 
quantitatively in such a way that the measurement results are meaningful for effective 
decision makers operating in bounded rationality-induced, cybernetic-decision mode. To 
be meaningful, the results must not misrepresent, be misleading, or provide perverse 
incentives to the decision maker, government agency, or evaluated contractor (Kravchuk 
& Schack, 1996). The results must also be timely—“the more timely the feedback, the 
more useful it is for program managers and staff” (Hatry, 2006, p. 140)—and defensible; 
the data must be “complete, accurate, and consistent enough to document performance 
and support decision making” (Wholey, 2006, p. 269). 
This exploratory study used data from one government agency to determine if a 
method for quantitatively measuring quality could be developed that allowed for 
interorganizational comparisons of government contractors. In accordance with Kravchuk 
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and Schack’s (1996) framework, the method needed to slice through the noise and 
complexity of quality compliance data in order to express real differences between 
contractors. Moreover, the method needed to work within the existing realities of 
complex government agencies. 
Organization-Specific Challenges 
One government agency that has experienced challenges conducting effective 
performance comparisons of its contractors is the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). 
According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the DOE is the largest 
civilian contracting agency of the federal government: “Approximately 90 percent of 
DOE’s [$26 billion] budget is spent on contracts and large capital asset projects” (GAO, 
2013, p. 218). As such, measuring and monitoring contractor performance is crucial for 
the DOE. Yet, the DOE has repeatedly faced challenges monitoring contractor 
performance. Since 1990, the GAO has designated the DOE program elements as high-
risk because the DOE’s “record of inadequate management and oversight of contractors 
has left the department vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement” (GAO, 
2013, p. 218). Although the GAO’s 2013 report to Congress acknowledged that the DOE 
had made improvements in contract management, the GAO stressed that the DOE needed 
to sustain these improvements by “receiving and validating accurate and reliable 
information from contractors that can be used to make decisions and to hold [the 
contractors] and the department accountable for performance” (p. 222). 
The DOE has numerous field offices and prime contractors that subcontract with 
numerous analytical laboratories throughout the United States. These laboratories 
conduct a wide range of chemical, radiological, and industrial hygiene analyses. In 
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accordance with the recommendations of the GAO and the requirements of the GPRA, 
the DOE’s contracting organizations need to evaluate the performance of these contracted 
laboratories. 
Each contracting organization establishes its own requirements and priorities for 
contracted laboratories. Requirements may include analysis turn-around-time (TAT), 
cost, analytical capacity, certifications, technical capabilities, or quality. Contracting 
organizations may easily quantify some of these requirements for the purpose of 
performance comparisons. Prices are established, TATs can be measured, and 
certifications can be verified and counted. However, quality requirements are much more 
difficult to quantitatively measure. 
Quality holds different meanings. The DOE has defined quality as the “condition 
achieved when an item, service, or process meets or exceeds the user’s requirements and 
expectations” (DOE Quality Assurance Requirements, 2001). The DOE mandates quality 
requirements for a wide range of program activities. The DOE document Quality Systems 
for Analytical Services (QSAS) is a quality standard designed for and imposed upon 
analytical laboratories that conduct work for DOE projects. The DOE defines quality for 
these laboratories as the degree to which the laboratories comply with the QSAS. 
Compliance with the QSAS is generally determined by conducting audits or 
assessments of a laboratory or the laboratory’s work products. The DOE has a 
consolidated audit program (DOECAP) that regularly assesses commercial and 
government laboratories against the requirements of the QSAS. The only metrics 
available for benchmarking laboratories in terms of compliance to quality standards are 
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the results from these audits. However, raw audit results are not especially useful for 
quantitative comparisons of interlaboratory performance. 
Audits are snapshots in time and examine only a sample of a laboratory’s work 
products. As such, the number of incidents found during an audit is just a fraction of the 
total number of nonconformances within the laboratory. The total number of 
nonconformances is unknown, and the detected fraction may vary from audit to audit. 
Moreover, the detected fraction may depend heavily on audit-specific factors such as 
how, when, and how frequently the audits are conducted. Thus, audit results are not 
readily useable for interlaboratory comparison of quality compliance because factors not 
directly related to a laboratory’s conformance to requirements can greatly influence the 
results of an audit. It simply is not justifiable to conclude that a laboratory that has more 
detected issues during an audit is less complaint than a laboratory with far fewer detected 
issues. 
To illustrate the problem, consider the following. Suppose two nearly identical 
laboratories violated requirements 100 times each in a given period. Furthermore, 
suppose that a three-person audit team audited one laboratory over a two-day period and 
detected six issues; in addition, a six-person audit team audited the other laboratory over 
a four-day period and detected 24 issues. Based on audit results alone, one might assume 
that the first laboratory was more compliant with quality requirements because it had far 
fewer detected issues. Yet in reality, the difference in numbers reflected how effectively 
the audit detected issues, not how many issues there actually were. 
Providing raw audit results to a cybernetic-decision maker can be 
counterproductive. Quantitative metrics used for benchmarking multiple contractors 
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against one another must reflect the contractors’ performance, not the assessing agency’s 
performance. Raw audit results used for benchmarking do not account for the agency’s 
contribution to the observed results. As such, the uncorrected composite data could  
mislead decision makers. 
Historically, the DOE and its prime contractors have not had a method to 
quantitatively compare their laboratory contractors against each other based on 
conformance to the quality requirements in the QSAS. Without an effective method, 
performance comparisons can be misleading. Moreover, the DOE and its prime 
contractors are not the only organization with this challenge. Many government agencies 
and private organizations audit or assess contractors and vendors to quality standards. 
Identifying a method to account more accurately for audit-specific factors could benefit 
multiple organizations. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to investigate whether a quantifiable relationship 
existed between audit-specific factors and the number of issues detected during an audit. 
If the relationship between audit-specific factors could be quantified, then the 
contribution to the number of detected findings attributable to the contracted organization 
could be more accurately estimated. More accurate estimations should permit audit 
results to be used more accurately for performance comparisons of organizations with 
respect to quality requirements. 
Significance of Study 
Audits have long been used to evaluate compliance, “Quality audits are prominent 
and proven management tools for assessing compliance and effectiveness of quality 
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systems” (Karapetrovic &Willborn, 2000, p. 679). Quality audits have proven to be 
“powerful management tool[s] for quality improvement” (Karapetrovic &Willborn, 2000, 
p. 679), and trends in data from quality audits have effectively detected changes or 
perturbations in quality systems (Taylor, 1997). This study adds to the body of public 
administration and quality assurance (QA) literature by demonstrating that government 
and private contracting agencies can use QA audit results from different organizations as 
quantitative metrics for performance comparisons by accounting for nonuniformity in the 
audit process. 
Prior to this study, audit results had been used for performance comparisons. 
However, these performance comparisons used raw audit results, which implicitly 
assumed that audit-specific factors did not have a significant impact on the number of 
issues detected. However, results from a preliminary pilot study of results from 113 
government audits indicated that as much as 30% of the observed variation in the number 
of detected audit issues may be attributable to only three audit-specific factors: (a) the 
length of the audit, (b) the number of auditors, and (c) the number of audit questions. 
These preliminary results cast considerable doubt on the appropriateness of using raw 
audit results for benchmarking of quality performance. 
One DOE prime contractor that had subcontracts with two analytical laboratories 
illustrates the problem of using raw audit results. Records indicated that the first 
laboratory averaged 23.2 detected issues per audit since 2001. The second laboratory 
averaged 19.1 issues per audit during the same period since 2001. Ignoring audit-specific 
factors, the second laboratory appeared to have a better record of compliance based on 
the raw scores alone. However, records showed that audits of the first laboratory were, on 
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average, 14% longer in duration and 16% greater in scope; in addition, audits were 
conducted by teams that were, on average, 80% larger. It is quite possible that the first 
laboratory had 21% more detected issues because the audits were more efficient and not 
because the existing issues were more numerous. 
The results of the current study indicated it was overly simplistic to assume that 
all variation in the number of detected audit issues was attributable to the laboratory’s 
performance. Nevertheless, audit results could be used for interorganizational 
performance comparisons of quality provided the statistical analyses accounted for key 
audit-specific variables such as audit scope, audit team size, and audit frequency. 
Although the research focused on data from laboratory contractors to the DOE, the 
challenges faced by the DOE are not unique. Other government agencies, prime 
contractors, and nongovernment agencies with similar audit programs may adapt this 
same technique for their own use.  
Background of Study 
Five years after the passage of the GPRA, the DOE commissioned the National 
Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies of Science to “conduct a study to 
review the policies, procedures, and practices used by DOE to identify, plan, design, and 
manage its portfolio of projects” (NRC, 1999, p. v.). In 2004, members of the NRC 
special committee reported the results of their three-year study. That report concluded the 
“DOE [did] not have a uniform set of objective measures for assessing the quality of 
project management” (NRC, 2004, p. 31). In 2005, the NRC issued a follow-up report 
titled “Measuring Performance and Benchmarking Project Management at the 
Department of Energy” (NRC, 2005). This follow-up report stressed the need for 
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collecting and using data “to assess, compare, and analyze performance” (NRC, 2005, p. 
2). Moreover, the report emphasized that performance data are more useful if collected 
and “used at the project level” rather than at the senior management level (NRC, 2005, p. 
4). 
In an effort to implement the NRC’s recommendations, the DOE began directing 
its contractors to provide performance data that could be used for benchmarking 
contractors against one another. The DOE issued a revision to its contractor oversight 
order, the Implementation of Department of Energy Oversight Policy, which required 
contractors to have an assurance system that included “[m]etrics and targets to assess the 
effectiveness of performance, including benchmarking of key functional areas with other 
DOE contractors, industry, and research institutions” (DOE, 2011a). This requirement 
effectively put the burden on DOE contractors to provide the DOE with data for 
performance comparisons. However, the order did not specify what data the contractor 
should provide or how the contractor or government administrator should conduct the 
performance comparisons. 
The DOE and its numerous prime contractors manage programs and projects that 
require the services of analytical laboratories. These programs include toxic and 
radioactive waste management studies, environmental restoration efforts, facility 
decommissioning, and environmental monitoring. These studies often require laboratories 
to analyze soil, water, vegetation, air, and material samples for composition or 
contamination. 
Numerous laboratories provide analytical services to the DOE and its contractors. 
Some of these laboratories have highly specialized capabilities, perhaps analyzing only a 
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single chemical, while others analyze multiple chemicals or offer a broad range of 
radiological services. Some laboratories are government-owned, while others are for-
profit private businesses; some are small “mom and pop” businesses, while others are 
multinational corporations. 
The DOE requires many of its contractors to adopt and comply with formal QA 
requirements. Applicable QA requirements are generally stipulated in contracts or 
procurement documents (DOE, 2011b). Compliance with these requirements is a 
condition of funding. Contractually mandated compliance with standards necessitates 
audits. Because many DOE field offices and contractors subcontract analytical services, 
individual laboratories may have contracts with multiple DOE projects. Each of these 
projects requires compliance audits. In the past, these QA requirements resulted in 
inefficiencies. Each field office and prime contractor audited laboratories separately. 
Moreover, there was not a consistent QA standard applied. This meant that a single 
laboratory might have to implement multiple QA programs and might be audited by 
several DOE organizations in a single year. 
To reduce redundant audits, DOE established the DOE Consolidated Audit 
Program (DOECAP). 
The DOECAP is a program of annual audits of environmental analytical 
laboratories and commercial waste treatment, storage and disposal facilities 
(TSDFs). First formulated in the mid-1990s and currently administered by the 
[DOE] Office of Health, Safety and Security, Office of Corporate Safety 
Programs (HS-23)[,] the intent of this corporate Departmental program is to 
eliminate redundant audits previously conducted independently by DOE field 
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element sites throughout the Department’s Complex, and achieve standardization 
in audit methodology, processes and procedures. (DOE, 2013, ¶1) 
The DOECAP provides laboratories with a single QA standard for all DOE work and a 
single audit program, which eliminates redundancies. 
DOECAP’s QA standard is the QSAS, an upper-level requirement document for 
all DOE contracted laboratories. The QSAS follows a total quality management approach 
addressing a wide range of issues that could potentially impact the quality of a 
laboratory’s products or services. These include technical requirements such as sample 
handling, equipment calibration, and method evaluations as well as managerial or 
administrative requirements such as document control, organizational lines of authority, 
and customer complaints. 
DOECAP audits assess laboratories’ compliance with the requirements of the 
QSAS. Typically, the DOECAP conducts one audit annually at each laboratory facility. 
Auditors may be federal employees or contractors, and audit teams may have as many as 
15 auditors or as few as one. Although the typical DOECAP audit is conducted over three 
consecutive days, other audits may range from one to seven days and need not be 
consecutive. 
The audit team usually  produces a draft audit report on the last day of the on-site 
portion of the audit. Over the weeks following the on-site portion of the audit, the 
DOECAP operations team, the audit team members, and the audited organizations review 
and finalize the audit report. Once the audit report is finalized, the DOECAP operations 
team extracts the audit results and enters them into a database along with key audit-
specific factors,. The DOE’s Oak Ridge Office (ORO) maintains the database and makes 
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the data available on-line for all DOE organizations that participate in DOECAP. ORO 
currently maintains the audit results and metadata from all the DOECAP audits 
conducted during and after federal fiscal year (FY) 2000. 
Theoretical Framework 
Traditional economic theory treats decision makers as rational actors. The 
primary characteristics of the classical rational actor are: “(1) maximizing (optimizing) 
behavior; (2) the cognitive ability to exercise rational choice; and (3) individualistic 
behavior and independent tastes and preferences” (Doucouliagos, 1994, p. 877). More 
neoclassical conceptions of the rational actor incorporate concepts, such as bounded 
rationality, which acknowledges that the economic actor’s ability to optimize outcomes is 
constrained because of limited time information, etc…Therefore, rational actors are 
constrained to “use heuristics, rules of thumb and simplifications; they rely on traditions, 
organizational routines and formal hierarchies” (Grossler, 2004, p. 320). 
The research of Kravchuk and Schack suggested that the constraints of the GPRA 
and the complexities of government organizations bind the rationality of decision makers 
to such an extent that the heuristics, organizational routines, and formal hierarchies 
dominate the decision-making process (1996). As such, if vital information is not 
preprogrammed into the metrics and feedback channels, it will not be included in the 
decision-making process. Therefore, if quality is a characteristic of concern for the 
agency, the agency must formally include quality evaluations or measurements in the 
decision feedback mechanisms. The feedback mechanisms should employ quantitative 
means for assessing quality performance, but the metrics must not mislead or 
misrepresent. Moreover, if the goal is to rank or compare two or more organizations, the 
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quantitative means must be either an absolute measure or a relative, interorganizational 
measure. A relative, intraorganizational measure may be useful for measuring changes 
within an organization, but it cannot be used for comparing organizations. 
This study demonstrated a feasible means for quantitatively measuring quality 
across organizations by using quantitative results from quality assurance audits. The 
quantitative method employed was a fixed-effects statistical model. In addition to 
independent variables outside the control of the assessed organization, the fixed-effects 
model also included dummy variables to account for the audited organizations' unknown 
contributions to the dependent variable of interest. Thus, the model results were less 
likely to mislead or misinform an agency decision maker operating in cybernetic-decision 
mode. 
Analytical Approach 
For comparison purposes, this study used two distinct quantitative analytical 
methods. Both approaches used statistical regression techniques to rank government 
contracted analytical laboratories based on the results of quality performance audits. One 
approach assumed that variations in the way an audit was conducted did not significantly 
impact the audit results and, therefore, could be omitted from the statistical analyses. This 
traditional approach served as the control case. 
The other approach used in this study assumed the impacts of audit-specific 
factors were not negligible and had to be accounted for in the model. This approach 
incorporated audit-specific variables into fixed-effects, ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression models. Approaches using least squares regression analyses have been a staple 
of QA analyses since the early days of Deming and Juran (Martin, 2000). Least squares 
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regression analyses are used to “estimate average systematic error (bias) and its 
confidence interval in method-comparison studies” (Martin, 2000, p. 100). 
The fixed-effects approach for this work followed the approach that Naveh and 
Erez (2004) used for previous quality assurance effectiveness research. Naveh and Erez 
investigated the causal relationship between quality assurance practices and outcomes in 
18 different organizations over a 20-month period. Given that unknown factors unique to 
each of the 18 organization could have influenced outcomes, Naveh and Erez had to 
account for variation between the 18 distinct organizations. Consequently, they assumed 
that the unknown influential characteristics of the 18 organizations were relatively 
constant over the period of the investigation. This assumption allowed them to use a 
fixed-effects statistical approach. Specifically, in this approach, the researchers used an 
OLS regression model that incorporated a separate dummy independent variable for all 
but one of the organizations of interest. The organization without a dummy variable was 
the reference organization. The fixed-effects model produced a slope coefficient for each 
of the dummy variables. Each slope coefficient represented the additional contribution to 
the results that were attributable to the corresponding organization. 
Although this dissertation study used the same basic approach that has been used 
by QA researchers such as Naveh and Erez, (2004) and Palmer et al. (1996), the purpose 
for the approach was quite different. Incorporating dummy variables allowed the previous 
researchers to better quantify the relationship between the quality assurance practices of 
interest and the dependent variables of interest. For this study, the dummy variables were 
the variables of primary concern. The models incorporated other independent variables in 
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order to better quantify the relationship between the dummy variables and the dependent 
variables of interest. 
The fixed-effects models incorporated two broad categories of related factors: 
audit-specific factors and laboratory characteristics. Audit-specific factors included 
• the length of the audit, 
• the number of auditors on the team, 
• the number of audit observers, 
• time since the previous audit, 
• the type of audit, and 
• the number of audit modules. 
Laboratory characteristics included 
• the type of laboratory and 
• the laboratory’s performance. 
Overview of Methodology 
This dissertation study used secondary data originally collected and compiled by 
the DOE from 398 separate DOECAP audits of 61 different laboratories over a 13-year 
period. These data were downloaded from the ORO’s DOECAP website. Using these 
data, I conducted a series of regression analyses using multiple dependent and 
independent variables.  
The source dataset contained numerical audit results of three types of audit issues: 
(a) Priority 1 findings, (b) Priority 2 findings, and (c) observations. The DOECAP audit 
reports also distinguished between different categories of issues. Thus, it was possible to 
distinguish between technical issues and general management or QA issues. Four 
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variations of a general regression model were developed, and each variation used a 
different dependent variable. These four dependent variables were (a) technical findings, 
(b) technical issues, (c) findings, and (d) issues. I examined four laboratory types: (a) 
chemistry laboratories, (b) radiation laboratories, (c) multipurpose laboratories, and (d) 
nonchemistry, nonradiation laboratories (e.g., industrial hygiene laboratories). I used 
dummy independent variables for the laboratory type and selected the nonchemistry, 
nonradiation laboratory type as the reference type for the regression analyses.  
In addition to the four variations of the general model, I also developed specific 
laboratory-type models. For these models, I omitted the laboratory type dummy variables 
and ran the models on subsets of the data consisting solely of the laboratory types of 
concern. I developed model variations for each of the four dependent variables for 
chemistry laboratories, radiation laboratories, and multipurpose laboratories, for a total of 
12 additional model variations. 
Research Questions 
The study assumed that audit-specific factors outside the control of the contracted 
laboratory affected audit results. In order to use audit results to benchmark contractors 
fairly in performance comparisons, relevant audit-specific factors needed to be identified. 
To achieve the objectives of this study, I sought answers to the following questions: 
1. Is there a statistically significant relationship between the number of issues 
detected during an audit and the audit duration, the audit team size, the audit 
frequency, the audit scope, or the presence of oversight during an audit? 
2. Does the relationship between independent and dependent variables differ 
depending on the type of laboratory? 
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3. Does the relationship between independent and dependent variables differ 
depending on the selected definition of audit issue? 
Limitations 
This study was limited by the quality and quantity of source data, which were 
obtained from the DOECAP website and limited to results from audits conducted 
between January 2000 and August 2012. The study did not examine data from other 
auditing organizations (i.e., nonDOECAP). I considered only the variables identified in 
the audit reports and contained in the source data. Many independent variables may affect 
audit results, but most of these may not be included in the available source data. As such, 
it was anticipated that the models would account for significantly less than 100% of the 
observed variation in the numerical results. 
Some laboratories work to multiple standards, such as ISO 9001, or ISO 14001. 
The study did not examine compliance with most of these standards. The study examined 
only laboratory compliance with the DOE QSAS. 
Delimitations 
The study was delimited in the following ways. First, the decision to study only 
DOECAP audit results limited the ability to generalize the data. As such, quantitative 
results applied only to DOECAP. Qualitatively, the results may apply to a much larger set 
of organizations. However, the ability to generalize the results to other organizations is 
limited to organizations with structure and stability similar to DOECAP’s. Second, the 
study was delimited to data from laboratories that participated in DOECAP from FY 
2000 through FY 2012. Significant changes in DOECAP’s structure or implementation 
after FY 2012 may have affected the applicability of the models. 
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Assumptions 
The study relied on secondary data that I obtained from the DOECAP website. 
Also available on the website were the original audit reports from which the data were 
extracted. During the study, I detected a few minor discrepancies between the extracted 
data and the audit reports. In general, it was not possible to determine if the discrepancies 
were data entry errors or if the data had changed sometime after DOECAP finalized the 
audit reports. For the study, I assumed that the data in the database were accurate. 
DOECAP has revised the QSAS 10 times since it was initially issued. The study 
assumed that changes in QSAS requirements did not influence the systematic bias from 
audit-specific factors. No attempt was made to investigate the statistical relationship 
between specific auditors and the dependent variables of interest; only the relationship 
between the number of auditors and the dependent variables was investigated. For the 
study, I assumed that bias due to the number of auditors could be estimated without 
taking into account the identity of any specific auditor. 
Summary 
 In chapter 1, I introduced the research problem, provided a cursory overview of 
the research methods, and provided background information that helps put the research 
into context. Chapter 1 also included brief discussions and references to work conducted 
previously by other researchers. In chapter 2, I examine the work of these researchers, 
and others, in more detail in order to better demonstrate how the current research fits into 
the larger body of performance assurance research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
To understand the importance of the research, it is helpful to understand the 
following, which comprise the four parts of this chapter: (a) the purpose and history of 
QA programs with an emphasis on QA research related to laboratories and their 
importance for government agencies supporting science and research, (b) the purposes 
and motivations behind comparative performance measurements,  (c) the requirements 
and challenges of comparative performance measurements, and (d) how the proposed 
study fits within current research.. This chapter begins with a brief history of quality 
assurance programs..  
Quality Assurance 
QA lacks a single, universally accepted definition but is generally described as the 
collection of planned or systematic actions necessary to provide adequate confidence that 
a product or service meets its intended purpose or fulfills customer expectations (adapted 
from ASQ, 2010b; DOE, 2005, p. 12; DOE Quality Assurance Requirements, 2001). 
Historical Context of QA 
QA principles have been integral components of science and engineering for 
thousands of years (ASQ, 2010a). However, QA, as a separately recognized discipline, 
has its origins in the post-World War II work of researchers Deming and Juran. Prior to 
Deming, quality research focused on identifying optimum conditions for production. 
Researchers, such as Taylor (1967), studied methods, conditions, and physical 
configurations that would optimize production while minimizing costs. However, these 
quality concepts adopted by early manufacturers were primarily based on deterministic 
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models of production. These models had a fatal flaw:  They did not account for variation 
in the production process. As a result, a typical assembly line may have minimized the 
per item cost of production; however, statistical variation resulted in the introduction of 
product defects. Quality control at these production facilities consisted of identifying 
product defects and either reworking the defective items, disposing of them, or passing 
them on to the customer. As a statistician, Deming showed that when the associated costs 
of defects were factored into the overall costs of production, the results were less than 
optimal. 
Deming’s seminal contributions to quality were his 14 key points of management 
that, in large part, formed the foundation of modern QA programs. Underlying these 14 
principles was the concept that quality should be engineered into products (or services) at 
the outset rather than accommodated later after defects have occurred. Deming showed 
that the costs associated with preventing defects were more than compensated for by 
reducing the costs of re-work, redundant inspections, and customer dissatisfaction 
(Deming, 2000). 
A contemporary of Deming, Juran was likewise influential in establishing QA as 
a separate discipline. Juran established a threefold managerial process known as the Juran 
Trilogy®, which consisted of (a) quality planning, (b) quality control, and (c) quality 
improvement (Juran, 1988, p. 12). The concepts of the Juran Trilogy® were not new, but 
Juran’s structured systematic approach for applying these concepts was, in many ways, 
revolutionary. Juran focused on the human dimension of quality, and because humans are 
complex beings, he reasoned that quality had to be evaluated by means other than simple 
statistics, such as production numbers or profit margins: “ [E]valuation of performance 
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necessarily involves a good deal of sensing and judging by human beings. The goals and 
plans are too broad to permit evaluation solely by the numbers” (1988, p. 263). 
The Japanese auto industry was the first to apply Deming and Juran’s QA 
principles. Although Deming (2000) and Juran’s (1988) work was originally met with a 
considerable degree of skepticism in western nations, the success experienced by the 
Japanese was so significant that manufacturers in the United States and elsewhere around 
the world soon followed suit and implemented their own QA programs with similar 
success. In the decades that followed, governments and industries standardized QA 
principles and methodologies in regulations and consensus standards, such as the 
International Organization for Standardization’s ISO 9001 for Manufacturing, ISO 14001 
for environmental industries, and the American Society of Mechanical Engineers’ ASME 
NQA-1 for nuclear facilities. 
QA in Science and Laboratories 
Although the work of both Deming (2000) and Juran (1988) originated in the 
domain of manufacturing, the quality principles they espoused were management 
philosophies not manufacturing methods. As such, the application of these philosophies 
cut across organizational types and could be readily applied to nonmanufacturing 
disciplines. However, the efficacy of QA programs outside the sphere of manufacturing 
tended to be more difficult to measure in some respects, especially in the area of 
laboratory research. Objectively assessing the relative quality of a tangible product was 
relatively straightforward:  the product could be measured, tested, and compared to 
established standards. In contrast, assessing the adequacy of QA controls in a 
nonproduction laboratory tended to be more difficult because these organizations defined 
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quality in more subjective terms, such as “Are we asking the right scientific questions?” 
“Are we using the most effective methods?” “Are we making enough progress?” Metrics 
for evaluating these types of goals may be difficult to define. Moreover, even if an 
individual organization could successfully develop adequate metrics, the metrics might 
be so organizationally dependent that comparing across organizations would be difficult. 
Relatively recent studies by diverse researchers around the world, such as Du 
(2002), Dizadji and Anklam (2004), Vogt (2001), and Barak, Younes, and Froom (2003), 
have sought to bridge this knowledge gap by specifically looking at QA in scientific 
research laboratories to determine whether QA programs were value-added and cost 
effective. Israeli researchers Barak, Younes, and Froom (2003) investigated commercial 
medical research laboratories that implemented ISO 9001 compliant QA programs. Their 
research sought to measure the quality of the laboratories by using customer complaints 
as a surrogate inverse measure of laboratory quality. The results of their five-year study 
showed that QA programs were only marginally effective at reducing the overall number 
of customer complaints. However, their study also showed that “the proportion of 
justified complaints had decreased by nearly 80% . . . to only 10.9% of the total 
complaints” (p. 282). Barak et al. concluded that the QA program effectively improved 
quality in “that the use of the ISO 9000 along with good laboratory practice resulted in a 
significant decrease in the proportion of justified complaints” (p. 282). 
In a three-year study jointly conducted by the European Commission and 
Belgium’s Institute for Reference Materials and Measurements, researchers Dizadji and 
Anklam (2004) demonstrated that QA controls, if properly implemented, could be cost 
effective. However, their research indicated that the level of success in making QA 
 26 
 
controls cost effective depended somewhat on the strategic approach used by the 
laboratory. Dizadji and Anklam concluded that laboratories should tailor their QA 
approach to fit the predisposition of the target institution. Furthermore, to implement a 
QA program properly, the institution should “identify and classify different groups of 
activities in [the] laboratory into separate business domains” (p. 317). The institution 
should then “assess for each business domain, the approach, the benefits, costs and 
implications of working with a systematic QA and then design a priori appropriate 
working systems tailored to the real needs of each business” (p. 317). 
Although previous research has demonstrated that QA could be cost effective, 
research by the German scientist Vogt (2001) showed the value of implementing QA in 
the laboratory when “perfect production is a prerequisite for services at the highest 
quality level” (p. 398). Pre-Deming quality control measures allowed an institution to 
recognize and correct errors, but this approach may be insufficient for laboratories where 
perfect production is a prerequisite. Vogt’s research showed that a total quality 
management program could increase the technical quality of a laboratory’s products. 
Moreover, Vogt’s research also demonstrated that QA principles added the benefit of 
containing overall costs. Thus, a properly selected and applied QA program could bridge 
the gap between researchers who were primarily concerned with product quality and 
administrators who were primarily concerned with financial aspects. 
Funk, Dammann, and Donnevert (2007) extended QA research to identify 
processes and techniques specific to analytical laboratories. They identified four QA 
components of particular importance to laboratories that must produce “reliable analytical 
results, the accuracy of which is determined, regularly verified, and documented” (p. 4). 
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Those four components were (a) determining quality objectives, (b) establishing quality 
control measures, (c) executing the quality assurance measures, and (d) conducting audits 
and confirmatory testing of results. Funk et al. noted, “Only by tying together all 
analytical activities into a closed system of both internal and external laboratory quality 
assurance can the reliability of analytical results be guaranteed” (p. 7). 
Reminiscent of Juran’s studies, work conducted by Llorens and Ruiz (2005) 
extended the study of laboratory QA to include sociological factors. They investigated 
“how externalizing the process of implementing ISO 9001 influences the dissemination 
of cultural values and practices of quality management in laboratories involved in 
chemical measurement” (p. 304). Laboratories required to comply with QA constraints 
have resisted QA programs in many instances. Llorens and Ruiz wanted to identify the 
factors that contributed to increased compliance with QA controls. In particular, they 
wanted to determine if outsourcing QA functions would have a measurable impact on the 
level of compliance. In order to improve efficiency, some laboratories have moved 
towards external QA controls that allow laboratory personnel to focus on core functions. 
According to Llorens and Ruiz, the economically driven belief is that “organizations can 
manage [their] capacity more efficiently and enhance their flexibility by focusing on their 
core activities and externalizing their noncore activities to an external, contingent 
workforce of independent consultants” (p. 304). However, results obtained by Llorens 
and Ruiz demonstrated that the effectiveness of QA programs increased and the 
associated challenges diminished when the QA program was largely implemented by 
individuals within the laboratory organization. Furthermore, due to emotional and 
sociological factors, “the greater the degree of internalization of the implementation 
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process, the greater the dissemination of [Quality Management] culture among the 
workers” (p. 307). When laboratories implement QA programs that are externally 
developed and administered, the perception of ownership decreases and the internal 
desire to comply diminishes. 
Collectively, the results of these and similar studies worldwide confirm that 
proper implementation of QA in the laboratory research setting can result in levels of 
success comparable to those observed in more traditional settings, such as the automotive 
industry. Although a laboratory’s work products may be very different from the products 
of a manufacturing plant, QA controls positively influence numerous commonalities, 
such as customer satisfaction, costs, and employee attention. 
QA in Government 
Motivated by the success of private sector QA programs, the United States federal 
government soon adopted QA standards and programs for high-risk applications, 
particularly applications directly related to public safety. These included the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission’s Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel 
Reprocessing Plants (2007) and the U.S. Department of Energy’s Quality Assurance 
Requirements (2001) for nuclear safety management. The government’s application of 
QA, however, soon broadened to include high-risk, nonpublic safety applications, such as 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Quality Assurance and Quality Control 
Procedures (2011). 
Although government agencies recognized QA’s potential for ensuring the 
production of high quality products, they also viewed QA as expensive. The time workers 
spend implementing QA programs is a substantial opportunity cost to the government. 
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Moreover, QA programs require managers, engineers, and other QA specialists to 
oversee and assess the programs. These activities and personnel cost money. Thus, the 
federal government initially reserved these ostensibly expensive QA programs for fields 
where quality issues trumped financial considerations (Government Contract Quality 
Assurance, 2010). 
As time progressed, forces combined to place pressure on the government to 
apply QA to lower risk applications. These factors included economic pressures, political 
and societal trends, and institutional momentum. Notwithstanding the considerable costs 
associated with QA programs, businesses found their application to be an effective means 
for achieving business goals, staying on schedule, and reducing overall costs. They found 
that the expense of QA was not just a cost of doing business, but a business investment 
that paid measurable dividends (Deming, 2000). Thus, even though costs were a prime 
factor for limiting early applications of QA, as time progressed, government agencies 
began to perceive QA as a means for controlling costs. In the end, elected officials and 
government administrators, faced with having to do more with less, increasingly adopted 
QA programs for lower risk applications as a means for leveraging limited resources 
(Deming, 2000). 
Measuring Quality 
Given the aim of QA programs to assure the quality of products or services, a 
large body of research has attempted to define ways of measuring quality. Early 
researchers, including Flynn, Schroeder, and Sakakibara (1994), attempted to develop a 
framework for measuring quality management practices within organizations. These early 
researchers often focused on defining dimensions of quality management that statistically 
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correlated with achieving and sustaining high quality output in manufacturing settings. 
Flynn et al. (1994) successfully demonstrated that a scale they developed to measure 
management practices was statistically valid as a surrogate measure of quality 
performance. However, the scale had little practical value for interorganizational 
comparisons because it did not provide an absolute measure of quality compliance; 
rather, it was designed to be an indicator of the effectiveness of QA strategies. Moreover, 
the “instrument [was] designed for use at the plant level allowing measurement of plant 
level initiatives” (p. 361). As a survey of employee perceptions and management 
philosophies, the instrument was not designed for assessing quality initiatives at the 
division or corporate levels, much less at the industry level. Although these types of 
instruments may be used within organizations, they do not lend themselves to 
interorganizational comparison studies. Furthermore, Flynn et al. developed their 
instrument in a manufacturing setting, and some of the parameters used to validate their 
model do not apply to service industries, such as laboratories. 
Florida State University researchers Yang and Hsieh (2007) using data from 
Taipei, Taiwan, attempted to build a theory-driven performance measure specifically for 
government agencies. Their results confirmed their model was well grounded in theory. 
However, the narrow scope of their research prevented extrapolation of their results to 
other government agencies. Moreover, the performance measures developed by Yang and 
Hsieh (2007) were based on data obtained from a survey instrument like the instrument 
developed by Flynn et al. (2007).  Survey instruments do not lend themselves to 
interorganizational comparison studies of the type required to meet the intent of the 
GPRA. Research has shown that survey responses “that are perceived by the respondents 
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as undesirable tend to be underreported” (Groves et al., 2004, p. 52). If a government 
agency desires to use a survey instrument to compare its contractors’ relative compliance 
with QA requirements, there is little that the agency can do to ensure that the contractor 
does not intentionally bias the results. 
Researchers such as Du (2002); Dizadji and Anklam (2004); Vogt (2001); Barak, 
Younes, and Froom (2003); and Funk, Dammann, and Donnevert (2007) attempted to 
measure quality more directly. However, they selected quality measurements that 
demonstrated the effectiveness of QA programs—measures such as efficiency, 
productivity, and customer satisfaction. The results of these studies and the studies 
conducted by Flynn et al. (2007) were not absolute measures. They  could show 
improvement in quality, efficiency, or customer satisfaction, but they did not provide an 
absolute measure that government contracting agencies could use to compare one 
government contractor against another. This type of data, if provided to a decision maker 
operating in Kravchuk and Schack’s cybernetic-decision mode, could mislead and 
misdirect when used for interorganizational benchmarking. 
The body of research has shown that compliance with QA standards is an 
important factor related to efficiency, effectiveness, and product quality. As such, 
government agencies have a stake in measuring a contractor’s degree of compliance with 
QA standards. Yet, measures developed to date have generally provided organizations 
with methods for measuring only their own internal level of quality and changes therein. 
Existing research has not identified adequate methods for outside entities, such as 
government contracting agencies, to quantitatively measure and compare the degree of 
QA compliance of one contracted laboratory against another contracted laboratory. 
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Proficiency Testing 
One widely used QA technique for comparing laboratories is the proficiency test 
(PT). “An interlaboratory [PT] study is a planned series of analyses of a common test 
material performed by a number of laboratories, with the goal of evaluating the relative 
performances of the laboratories, the appropriateness and accuracy of the method used, or 
the composition and identity of the material being tested” (Hibbert, 2007, p. 136). 
In a PT, a sample of known composition is prepared and distributed to participating 
laboratories. The laboratories then perform blind analyses on the sample. If a laboratory’s 
analytical results are within predefined acceptance limits, the laboratory passes the PT. 
Although the PT is effective for determining a laboratory’s ability to perform a 
specific analytical test, it is severely limited as a tool for interlaboratory comparison. 
According to the Royal Society of Chemistry’s Analytical Methods Committee (AMC, 
2005), 
The primary purpose of proficiency testing is to help laboratories detect and cure 
any unacceptably large inaccuracy in their reported results. In other words, it is 
designed as a self-help system to tell the participants whether they need to modify 
their procedures. Proficiency tests are not ideally designed for any other 
purpose.(5) 
Failing a PT sample is an indicator that a particular laboratory procedure may be 
inadequate. However, this may or may not be an indicator of larger QA issues. Moreover, 
passing a PT is only an indicator that a laboratory can get the right number; is not an 
indicator of the laboratory’s ability to achieve any other contract quality requirement. 
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Furthermore, although the composition of a PT sample may be unknown, the fact 
that it is a PT sample is usually known. Because laboratories know the importance of PT 
samples, there is an incentive for laboratories to conduct PT sample analyses with greater 
than normal care. Indeed, Hibbert (2007) contended, “it is inevitable that laboratories 
may take more care with their proficiency testing samples” (p. 148). PT sample results, 
therefore, are not necessarily a measure of how well a laboratory performs on a regular 
basis but a measure of how well a laboratory performs at its best. Thus, proficiency 
testing has limited usefulness for interlaboratory performance comparisons of overall 
laboratory quality compliance. 
QA Audits 
According to the American Society for Quality (ASQ, 2013), an audit is defined 
as follows: 
On-site verification activity, such as inspection or examination, of a process or 
quality system, to ensure compliance to requirements. An audit can apply to an 
entire organization or might be specific to a function, process or production step. 
(p. 1) 
Although each agency conducts audits somewhat differently, a typical audit 
consists of a team of individuals that visits a contractor’s facilities, examines records, 
observes work in progress, and interviews contractor employees and management. 
During the effort, auditors may compare observed work practices against approved 
procedures or accepted industry standards; auditors may look for documentation to 
corroborate compliance with regulatory or contractual requirements; or an auditor may 
examine equipment to ensure it functions as intended. As a rule, if auditors identify a 
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violation of a requirement, they will try to determine if it is an isolated instance before 
documenting the violation in the audit report. However, other than trying to determine if 
the issue is an isolated instance, the auditors will not attempt to determine the extent of 
condition. In other words, the audit write-up will record the number of requirements the 
contractor violated, but not the number of times the contractor violated those 
requirements.  
The federal government conducts audits “to determine and document whether 
items, processes, systems, or services meet specified requirements and perform 
effectively” (DOE, 2011b, §6.c). According to the U. S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA, 2000): 
Effective technical audits and assessments contribute to a reduction in the 
occurrences of questionable data, faulty conclusions, and inappropriate practices. 
Key purposes of technical audits and assessments include the discovery and 
characterization of sources of measurement error, the reduction of deficiencies, 
and the safeguarding of EPA’s decision-making process. Audits and assessments 
help to ensure that approved QA Project Plans are being followed and that the 
resulting data are sufficient and adequate for their intended use. Proper use of 
technical audits and assessments can provide increased confidence that the 
collected environmental data are defensible and properly documented. Audits and 
assessments can uncover deficiencies in physical facilities, equipment, project 
planning, training, operating procedures, technical operations, custody 
procedures, documentation, QA and QC activities, and reporting. (p. 14) 
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Auditors in general, and DOECAP auditors in particular, must be qualified or 
certified before they may conduct audits unsupervised (DOE, 2009). Certification is 
based on a combination of factors including training, experience, and demonstration of 
capability. Many organizations base their certification programs on voluntary standards 
promulgated by organizations such as the American National Standards Institute (ASME, 
1978). 
Auditors generally work to a checklist or a line of inquiry based on legal or 
contractual requirements. When auditors identify apparent deviations from requirements, 
they provide the audited organization an opportunity to clarify or dispute the issue. If the 
deviation from the requirement is verified, the issue is formally documented in the audit 
report. Verified issues are then tracked through closure, and records are generally 
maintained for trending or other purposes. 
Audit Effectiveness 
The literature is replete with research on how to conduct effective audits. 
Willborn (1990) examined the need for audits to adapt to changing operational 
environments in order to be effective. Gardner (1997) examined the importance of 
applying standard principles when conducting audits. Russell (2010) looked at audit 
organization and preparation. Copeland, Espersen, and Grobler (2013) emphasized the 
effect that audit scope can have on results (p. 34). Johnston, Crombie, Davies, Alder, and 
Millard (2000) reviewed findings from 93 studies of individual audit projects to identify 
facilitators and barriers to conducting the audit process. 
The body of literature suggests that the way an audit is conducted profoundly 
impacts the results of the audit. Because of this, emphasis has been placed on consistency 
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of the audit process. Handzo (1990), a professional quality assurance auditor of corporate 
suppliers, stated the following: 
One auditing system should be developed for the entire company, providing a 
uniform measuring/rating criteria for each area of discussion during the audit. 
This ensures that audits are conducted the same way and provides identical 
training for the audit team members. (p. 54) 
Although Dalhousie University researcher Karapetrovic and University of 
Manitoba researcher Willborn (2000), did not dismiss the importance of consistency, they 
did recognize that perfect consistency is not always possible: “Audits are open and 
dynamic systems, meaning that the parameters and constraints under which they operate 
inevitably change…” (p. 683). Moreover, “Audits are adaptive systems, being able to 
accustom themselves to changing operational environments” (p. 683). 
Thus, the body of research has suggested  that audits must change to be effective. 
Moreover, changes in the way audits are conducted impact the results. Traditional 
methods for using audit results for benchmarking implicitly assume that the way an audit 
is conducted does not significantly affect the results and can, therefore, be ignored in 
performance comparison studies. I conducted this study to determine if changes to the 
audit process do significantly affect the results and, therefore, must be explicitly included 
in performance comparison studies. 
Purpose for Measuring and Comparing Performance 
Numerous researchers have identified management uses for performance 
measurements (Ammons, 1995; Kopczynski and Lombardo, 1999; Osborne & Plastrik, 
2000; Wholey & Newcomer, 1997). Noted Harvard University researcher Behn (2003) 
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grouped these various uses into eight major reasons that public managers measure 
performance: 
As part of their overall management strategy, the leaders of public agencies can 
use performance measurement to (1) evaluate; (2) control; (3) budget; (4) 
motivate; (5) promote; (6) celebrate; (7) learn; and (8) improve. (p. 588) 
Each of these reasons can provide some motivation for measuring and assessing an 
analytical laboratory’s level of compliance with QA requirements. However, four of 
these reasons have particular relevance to the current study. 
Program Evaluation 
A principle motivation for measuring performance is simply to evaluate an 
organization’s status towards meeting its goals and how that status changes in time. 
Performance measurement of program outputs and outcomes provides important, 
if not vital, information on current program status and how much progress is 
being made towards important program goals. It provides needed information as 
to whether problems are worsening or improving, even if it cannot tell us why or 
how the problem improvement (or worsening) came about. (NAPA 1994, p. 2) 
Likewise, as stated by Hatry of the Urban Institute: 
. . . performance data do not reveal the extent to which the program caused the 
measured results. . . . Performance measurement is designed primarily to provide 
data on outcomes. . . . But to be most helpful . . . performance measurement 
systems also need to have built into them opportunities to analyze the details of 
program performance and steps to seek explanations for the outcome data such 
systems produce. (2006, p. 5) 
 38 
 
Understanding the story behind the numbers is a key challenge associated with 
using QA audit results for performance measurements. The number and types of detected 
audit issues can be readily tabulated, but the raw numbers do not tell why the audit team 
was able to detect the identified issues. “[T]o evaluate performance, public managers 
need some kind of desired result with which to compare the data, and thus judge 
performance” (Behn, 2003, p. 598). 
Motivation and Control 
Performance measurement is a standard tool used by management for asserting 
control. As stated by Lancaster University Management School’s David Otley, a “major 
function of accounting performance measurement lies in its internal use as a means of 
motivating and controlling the activities of managers so that they concentrate on 
increasing the overall value of the business . . .” (Otley, 2003, p. 12). 
Indeed, the controlling style of management has a long and distinguished history. 
It has cleverly encoded itself into one of the rarely stated but very real purposes 
behind performance measurement. “Management control depends on 
measurement.” (Behn, 2003, p. 589) 
QA compliance measurements may be used for influencing laboratories to change 
for the better. If a contracting organization, like DOE or one of its prime contractors, has 
unbiased QA performance data, those data may provide incentives for a subpar laboratory 
to improve its level of performance. However, if the laboratory has reason to believe its 
relative ranking is based on biased data, the laboratory may have little or no incentive to 
change its level of performance. 
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Budget 
Federal acquisition requirements mandated by Government Services 
Administration require that cost comparisons be included in contract award decisions 
(GSA Contract Pricing, 2005). However, cost comparisons require more than data on the 
cost of the item or service being procured. Purchasing personnel and contract managers 
must also consider the provider’s ability to deliver a product or service that meets all the 
customer’s needs. These customer needs may include a host of other requirements such 
as security requirements, schedule requirements, production requirements, and quality 
compliance standards. 
Contracting organizations’ requests for proposals (RFPs) typically identify 
minimum requirements that all bidders must meet in order to win a contract. 
Additionally, RFPs include weighted factors that permit the awarding agency to rank and 
differentiate eligible bidders. Cost is a required differentiating factor. If two or more 
bidders are equal on all other factors, the low bidder will win the contract. 
DOE’s emphasis on QA compliance suggests that past QA performance is a 
potential factor that DOE could use to rank bidders, but this requires data about each 
bidding organization’s compliance with QA requirements. Results from effectively 
conducted QA audits can provide past compliance data. However, if compliance metrics 
use raw audit results, uncorrected for audit-specific factors, the results may detrimentally 
affect the award process by unjustifiably favoring one contractor over another. 
Requirements for Effective Performance Measurements 
The National Research Council (NRC, 2005) recommends that performance 
measures for implementing the GPRA meet the following ten characteristics: 
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• Measureable, objectively or subjectively; 
• Reliable and consistent; 
• Simple, unambiguous, and understandable; 
• Verifiable; 
• Timely; 
• Minimally affected by external influence; 
• Cost effective; 
• Meaningful to users; 
• Related to mission outcome; and 
• Drive effective decisions and process improvement (p. 10). 
Identifying or developing performance measures that meet these 10 requirements can be 
challenging for an organization. Moreover, although the list is broad, it is not 
comprehensive. The following subsections examine additional performance measure 
requirements and challenges. 
Measurement Framework 
UK researchers  Propper and Wilson (2003) showed the importance of using 
multiple metrics for measuring performance. A single organization may have multiple 
stakeholders, and each stakeholder may have a distinct set of values and priorities. A 
single metric or set of metrics that may be used to measure success towards meeting one 
stakeholder’s desired outcome may not be adequate to measure another stakeholder’s 
desired outcome. Propper and Wilson concluded, 
[A] single [performance measure] is not sufficient. Public sector organisations 
often have multiple stakeholders who have differing, and sometimes conflicting, 
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goals. One [performance measure] cannot adequately address all these actors’ 
objectives. Instead a range of [performance measures] should be employed, both 
in terms of what they measure and also in terms of their form. (p. 19) 
Similarly, researchers Kravchuk and Schack (1996) suggested using a framework 
of performance measures: 
What is needed, then, is a framework for system-wide performance measurement 
that acknowledges the diversity of the system’s goals, while providing 
information on aggregate efficiency and effectiveness. Ideally, this framework 
should measure inputs, processes, outputs, and outcomes as well as client 
satisfaction. Further, the system should serve the purposes of both continual 
performance assessment and long-term evaluation. (p. 354) 
More recently, researchers Nicholson-Crotty, Theobald, and Nicholson-Crotty 
(2006) identified additional dangers associated with using single performance measures. 
They found that managers often have multiple, plausible metrics available to them to 
measure a single concept (p. 101). Unfortunately, these metrics can sometimes provide 
conflicting results. Nicholson-Crotty et al. asserted that “differing measures can provide 
starkly different feedback to managers about their organizations” (p. 110). 
The danger of selecting a single metric for measuring performance increases if the 
metric is used to compare different organizations. One metric may unfairly benefit one 
organization to the detriment of another organization. Selecting a different metric may 
reverse the perceived results, even though there has been no change in the organizations. 
Nicholson-Crotty et al. showed that if measurements and comparisons of organizational 
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performance were to be fair and effective, they “must be sensitive to the real differences 
among multiple measures of performance” (Nicholson-Crotty, et al., 2006, p. 110). 
Quantitative Measurements 
Performance data can come in the form of both qualitative and quantitative data. 
Evaluators may appropriately use both types of data for comparative measurements of 
performance; however, they have tended to prefer quantitative data. “Qualitative 
evidence is, in general, considerably less convincing than quantitative evidence of 
progress” (Hatry, 2006, p. 79). 
Recent research from Heinrich (2012) at the University of Texas at Austin 
demonstrated the importance of using credible quantitative data. In 2002, the George W. 
Bush administration introduced the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) to meet the 
goals of the GPRA more effectively. PART is a management tool that 
looks at all factors that affect and reflect program performance including program 
purpose and design; performance measurement, evaluations, and strategic 
planning; program management; and program results. (OMB, 2013, ¶ 1) 
Heinrich’s research examined data submitted to the Office of Management and Budget in 
support of the PART process. Heinrich hypothesized, and her research confirmed, that 
favorable PART scores were positively correlated with the rigor of the data used for 
evaluating performance. Organizations that provided only qualitative evidence had lower 
PART scores overall (Heinrich, 2012, p. 132). 
In addition to credibility issues, problems arise when using qualitative measures 
in conjunction with other measures. For instance, it is common for the government to 
issue requests for proposals that include provisions for evaluating potential contractors 
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according to both quality of service and cost. However, if one potential contractor is 
judged highest in its quality of service, but charges twice as much as the other contractor, 
how can the government determine if the superior service is worth the additional cost? If 
it were possible to determine that the agency was getting three times the service for only 
twice the cost, perhaps the additional cost may be justified, but that requires 
quantification of the quality of service. If the amount of additional quality cannot be 
quantified, it may not be possible to justify awarding a contract to the more expensive 
contractor, even if they do better work. 
Organizational Fit 
Hatry (2006) contended that all service-providing organizations, “small or large, 
public or private, … should be intensely concerned with the quality, outcomes, and 
efficiency of those services and should measure performance” (p. 7). Nevertheless, 
performance measures need to be developed that are consistent within the organization 
and understood by stakeholders (NRC, 2005, p. 29). “Establishing a performance 
measurement process begins with identification of a program’s . . . mission and its basic 
objectives” (Hatry, 2006, p. 39). 
Larger Political Climate 
Research from Yang and Hsieh (2007) illustrated the importance of selecting 
performance measures that have an appropriate institutional fit within a broader political 
climate. Their research results indicated “that the implementation of performance 
measurement is inseparable from the evolution of politics and democratic governance” 
(p. 872). The successful adoption and implementation of measurement programs is more 
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likely to occur if an organization has the support and participation of external 
stakeholders. 
In order to institutionalize performance measurement and make it work, public 
managers must ensure top management commitment, middle manager support, 
stakeholder involvement, continuous training, and external political support. 
(Yang & Hsieh, 2007, p. 872) 
Existing Data 
For contracting organizations to compare one laboratory against another, they 
must either make the measurements themselves or have the laboratories make the 
measurements and provide the data to the contracting agency. Researchers such as 
Colledge and March (1993), Flynn et al. (1994), and Nevalainen, Berte, Kraft, Leigh, 
Picaso, and Morganza (2000) developed methods or instruments for measuring 
performance. Their methods depended on the assessed organization collecting most, if 
not all, the data. Researchers Galloway and Nadin (2001) investigated interlaboratory 
performance benchmarking and noted that “the more data that were collected [for 
benchmarking] the greater the workload for participating laboratories” (p. 591). 
“Participation does take time and resources” (Yang & Hsieh, 2007, p. 871). 
Moreover, in some cases, the contractor may have never collected the required 
data. Quantitative performance measurements require a sufficiently large dataset to make 
statistically valid inferences. If the contractor never collected the data, they may need 
years to collect a dataset large enough to be assembled. For this reason and others, 
organizations such as the NRC (2004, 2005) have recommended that government 
agencies use existing datasets, where possible, for performance measurements and 
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benchmarking. However, beyond audit results, government contracting organizations 
may have very little QA compliance data available. 
Literature Summary 
For quality metrics to be effective, the current literature on comparative 
performance measurements has suggested that measurements should 
• be system-wide performance measurements (Kravchuk & Schack, 1996), 
• be quantitative to facilitate accurate cross-organizational comparisons (Hatry, 
2006), 
• fit the needs of the organizations’ stakeholders (NRC, 2005), 
• fit within the larger political climate (Yang & Hsieh, 2007), 
• be based on existing datasets so as to reduce data acquisition burdens and 
expedite meaningful analyses (Yang & Hsieh, 2007), and 
• accurately measure performance (Kravchuk & Schack, 1996; Nicholson-
Crotty, et al., 2006; NRC, 2005). 
QA audit results meet many of these criteria. Kravchuk and Schack (1996) stated 
a need for “a framework for system-wide performance measurement that acknowledges 
the diversity of the system’s goals, while providing information on aggregate efficiency 
and effectiveness” (p. 354). QA program requirements, such as those contained within 
the QSAS, are systemwide, total quality management requirements. They encompass a 
broad range of requirements that address efficiency and effectiveness issues, 
administrative and technical issues, legal and contractual issues, internal and external 
issues. 
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QA audit results are also quantitative. Although requirements and audit programs 
differ from agency to agency, the agencies almost universally tabulate audit results 
numerically. Thus, numerical audit results are available for performance comparisons. 
Quantitative performance comparisons are more convincing than qualitative comparison 
(Hatry, 2006, p. 79). 
In general, audit results do not need to be adapted for organizational fit. There are 
many different QA compliance standards. These standards tend to be industry specific. 
The government agency generally selects the compliance standard that is specific for the 
contracted work. For instance, DOE identifies the QSAS, a standard specifically 
developed for analytical laboratories, as the contractually mandated QA standard for 
analytical laboratories. As such, audits, by default, only measure compliance to the 
requirements that fit the audited organization. Thus, the audit results data meet Hatry’s 
requirement for organizational fit. 
QA audits also fit within the larger political climate as required by Yang and 
Hsieh’s (2007) research results. Formal QA programs have increased in popularity over 
the last several years (Sidney, 2003). Even skeptics of quality assurance auditing, such as 
University of Wisconsin researchers Ehrmeyer and Laessig (2007) acknowledge that 
auditing is a recognized component of quality assurance practices and are promoted by 
government agencies and international organizations. In the words of Peter Vermaercke 
of the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre: 
Nowadays, quality assurance (QA) is a common feature in a production or service 
environment such as a routine analytical laboratory…. Any research laboratory 
performing work for external customers or the community at large, must, at some 
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point, guarantee its competence to its clients. This competence can no longer be 
based on the promises of the general management or on a reputation built up over 
the years, but on a well-structured quality system (QS) that preferably has proven 
its competence, e.g. by certification or accreditation. (Vermaercke, 2000, p. 11) 
QA audit results also meet the existing data criterion. Because data generating 
activities take time and resources (Yang and Hsieh, 2007), data for performance 
comparisons either need to be obtained from existing data generating activities (for which 
resources have already been allocated) or from new activities which require new 
resources. Since QA audit programs already exist, the data are available for use without 
requiring significant new resource allocations. This can be critical during times of fiscal 
constraint., 
While QA audit results meet many of the bulleted criteria listed above, they have 
not been shown to meet the last criterion—accurately measure performance. QA audit 
results have not been shown to accurately measure performance because contrary to the 
National Research Council’s recommendations, raw audit results are not “[m]inimally 
affected by external influence” (NRC, 2005, p. 10). Raw audit results are a composite 
measure of both the audited organization’s performance and the auditing organization’s 
performance. 
The current study fills a noticeable gap at the convergence of both QA and 
performance assessment research. Previous QA literature describes methods for assessing 
quality within organizations using QA audits. Performance measurement literature 
describes ways of comparing performance across organizations. This study aimed to 
bridge the gap by determining if contracting agencies, such as the DOE, could use audit 
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results to measure performance with QA requirements accurately and quantitatively 
across organizations by statistically compensating for bias introduced by the audit 
process. If that could be demonstrated, QA audit results could form the basis of an 
effective and efficient system-wide framework for cross-organizational performance 
measurements as called for by Kravchuk and Schack (1996). 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODS 
The purpose of this chapter is to present an overview of the methods used for 
conducting the study. The chapter restates the research questions addressed during the 
study and the procedures that were implemented. 
Research Questions 
To successfully achieve the objectives of the study, answers to the following 
questions were sought: 
1. Is there a statistically significant relationship between the number of issues 
detected during an audit and the audit duration, the audit team size, the audit 
frequency, the audit scope, or the presence of oversight during an audit? 
2. Does the relationship between independent and dependent variables differ 
depending on the type of laboratory? 
3. Does the relationship between independent and dependent variables differ 
depending on the selected definition of audit issue? 
If the research results indicated that there was a significant relationship between the 
audit-specific independent variables and the quantitative audit results, this would suggest 
the need for audit-specific factors to be incorporated into performance comparison 
metrics. If the research results indicated that there was a significant relationship between 
the audit-specific independent variables and the type of laboratory, this would suggest the 
need for contractor type to be incorporated into performance comparison metrics. If the 
research results indicated that the relationship between the independent variables and the 
dependent variables change depending on the choice of dependent variable, this would 
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suggest the need for the contracting agency to consciously determine which quality 
metric should be used for assessing quality performance. Failing to incorporate 
significant variables into performance metrics could result in data being provided to 
decision makers that could mislead or misinform. 
Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis for the study was the quality assurance compliance audit. A 
unit of analysis is the focus or major entity that is analyzed during a study. As stated by 
researcher Babbie (2012), it is the “what or whom being studied” (p. 560). This study 
uses the audit as the unit of analysis because the goal is to investigate how audit results 
vary according to changes in the way audits are conducted. 
Research Variables 
The study examined the relationship between three classes of variables. These 
classes are dependent variables, independent variables, and control variables. Each 
variable class is discussed below. 
Dependent Variables 
As stated by Creswell (2003), “Dependent variables are variables that depend on 
the independent variables; they are the outcomes or results of the influence of the 
independent variables” (p. 94). The study examined four dependent variables: identified 
technical findings, identified technical issues, identified findings, and identified issues. 
The QA community uses a variety of terms to denote audit results. These terms 
include deficiency, nonconformity, nonconformance, noncompliance, finding, 
observation, condition, opportunity for improvement, event, and issue—to name a few. 
Organizations may also assign priority or severity levels to some of these terms. 
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DOECAP audits report results in two broad categories: (a) findings and (b) observations. 
DOECAP defines a finding as 
a factual statement issued from a DOECAP audit to document . . . [a] failure to 
adequately establish or document requirements consistent with applicable 
regulations, industry standards, or contract(s); or a deviation from established 
requirements. (DOE Deficiency, 2009; DOE Findings, 2009) 
There are two severity levels for DOECAP findings: Priority I and Priority II. “A Priority 
I finding constitutes the highest censure the DOECAP can issue against an audited 
facility” (DOE Priority I Findings, 2009). 
A Priority I finding [is] issued for a significant item of concern, or significant 
deficiency regarding key management/programmatic control(s) or practice(s), 
which represents a concern of sufficient magnitude to potentially render the 
audited facility unacceptable to provide services to the DOE, or present 
substantial risk and liability to DOE if not resolved via immediate and expedited 
corrective action(s). (Priority I Findings 2009) 
A Priority II finding is any violation of a requirement that does not meet the threshold of 
a Priority I finding. DOECAP defines an observation as “a deficiency of an isolated 
nature, a deviation from Best Management Practices, or an opportunity for improvement, 
which may warrant attention by the audited facility” (DOE, Observations, 2009). 
DOECAP does not define the term issue. However, the proposed study uses the term 
issue as a generic reference to either a finding or an observation. 
Although DOECAP and the larger QA community define a finding as a violation 
of a requirement, the number of findings identified in an audit report generally does not 
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reflect the number of violations committed by the audited organization. This occurs for 
two reasons. First, findings are tallied by the number of requirements violated, not the 
number of times requirements are violated. For instance, if a laboratory worker violated a 
single requirement 20 times, auditors typically would issue a single finding, not 20 
separate findings. Second, the audit reports reflect the number of violations identified by 
the auditors, not the number of violations that actually occurred. Auditors have a limited 
amount of time and a limited amount of evidence to review. Given these constraints, it is 
generally not possible to identify all violations that may have occurred since the previous 
audit. 
DOECAP organizes its audits in terms of modules that correspond to technical 
disciplines, plus additional modules for general laboratory and information management 
requirements. Each module has a separate audit checklist that lists requirements to be 
verified by the auditors. When an audit team member identifies an issue, they also 
identify and record the associated audit module. As such, in the study I was able to 
distinguish between issues that were technical in nature, and more general, or 
administrative, issues. 
In the study, I examined four dependent variables: (a) Technical Findings, (b) 
Technical Issues, (c) Findings, and (d) Issues. No distinction was made between Priority I 
and Priority II findings. The pilot study conducted in preparation for the proposed study 
showed that Priority I findings were rarely detected during audits and did not 
significantly contribute to the total number of audit findings. Therefore, I grouped both 
severities of findings into a single measure. 
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Figure 1 is a Venn diagram showing the relationship between the various types of 
dependent variables examined in the study. Issue refers to anything in the chart. 
Technical issues are everything in the left set. Findings are those issues in the right set. 
Observations are the compliment of the set of findings. Technical Findings are the 
intersection of the Findings and Technical Issues sets. 
 
 
Figure 1. Venn diagram of issue (dependent variable) types. 
 
Independent Variables 
Creswell (2003) defined independent variables as “variables that (probably) 
cause, influence, or affect outcomes. They are also called treatment, manipulated, 
antecedent, or predictor variables” (p. 94). Quality assurance research literature has 
suggested that how an audit is conducted will affect how many underlying issues are 
detected (Karapetrovic & Willborn, 1999). Three factors in particular affect the results: 
audit depth, audit team expertise, and the number of underlying issues. In this study, I 
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investigated five independent variables for their influence on the number and type of 
detected audit issues. Each of these five variables relates either directly or indirectly to 
one of the three factors above. These five are: 
• Audit duration 
• Audit team size 
• Number of audit modules 
• Time between successive audits 
• Audit oversight 
Audit duration. (Duration) Audit duration directly relates to audit depth. The 
longer the audit, the more time auditors have to examine records, interview personnel, 
read procedures, and observe operations. Each of these provides additional opportunities 
to detect issues. I hypothesized that a positive relationship would exist between the 
duration of an audit and the number of identified audit issues. 
Audit duration was calculated as the number of business days on-site during an 
audit. No attempt was made to estimate the time spent on pre- or post-audit activities. 
Because the source dataset did not record the start time or end time of daily audit 
activities, only whole numbers were used for audit duration. This may have affected the 
statistical significance of some of the audit results. I discuss this in more detail in Chapter 
4. 
Audit team size. (AuditorsPerMod) The size of an audit team directly relates to 
audit depth. If an audit team has more auditors, then more interviews can be conducted, 
more records can be reviewed, more procedures can be read, and more activities can be 
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observed. I hypothesized that a positive relationship would exist between the size of the 
audit team and the number of identified audit issues. 
The audit team size was measured in terms of number of auditors per module. The 
ratio of auditors per module, rather than the number of auditors, was used because the 
number of auditors generally increases as the number of modules increases. This 
increases the potential for collinearity of independent variables. Using the ratio of 
auditors per module corrects for this collinearity. 
Number of audit modules. (NumMods) The number of audit modules directly 
relates to audit depth. Different laboratories have different requirements. Audits only 
assess compliance with applicable requirements. The DOECAP audit process groups 
requirements into lines of inquiry called modules. The more modules included in an 
audit, the more auditors are required to assess. I hypothesized that as the number of 
modules increased so would the number of identified audit issues. 
Although the number of audit questions varies from module to module, no 
attempt was made to examine the relationship between the number of audit questions and 
the number of audit issues. Only the number of modules was used for statistical analyses. 
Time between successive audits. (YearFrac) The elapsed time between 
successive audits indirectly relates to the number of underlying issues. Auditors typically 
concentrate their efforts on reviewing activities that have occurred and records that have 
been generated since the most recently conducted previous audit. As the time between 
successive audits increases, the number of opportunities for violating requirements may 
also increase. I hypothesized that, if there was a statistically significant relationship 
between the audit interval and the number of detected issues, it would to be a positive 
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relationship. However, as a rule, the DOECAP operations team tries to schedule 
successive audits 12 months apart. This meant that there was not much variability in the 
independent variable, so it was not clear if a statistically significant relationship could be 
determined. 
Audit oversight. (Oversight) The presence or absence of managerial oversight 
could indirectly affect audit scope. Auditors may be influenced by sociological factors. 
While most of these factors are not recorded in the available source dataset, one possible 
factor is recorded: many audits have an oversight person observing the audit. These 
oversight individuals may be officials from Washington, high-level DOECAP managers, 
or other stakeholders. The presence of these individuals may influence how diligently an 
auditor works, how lenient an auditor may be when confronted with a borderline 
situation, or how broadly an auditor interprets a requirement. To account for this, audit 
oversight was treated as a dummy variable. One (1) was used to represent audits with one 
or more audit observers and zero (0) was used for audits with no observers. 
This study examined only independent variables directly related to the audit 
process. Numerous independent variables potentially influence the number of identified 
issues. Most of these variables are not directly related to the audit process. Variables such 
as laboratory size, personnel training programs, workload, and corporate oversight may 
cause, mitigate, or prevent issues. However, these variables are related to the laboratory, 
not the audit process. In this study, I sought to determine the bias caused by the audit 
process. As such, I focused on audit-specific attributes. 
No attempt was made to determine the influence of any individual audit team 
members on the number or types of detected audit issues. Research from other nonQA 
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auditing disciplines has shown a relationship between individual auditors and the overall 
effectiveness of audits (Adeyemi, Okpala, & Dabor, 2012). Factors such as an auditor’s 
skill, familiarity with requirements, familiarity with the audited organization, and general 
disposition can influence the number of issues an auditor detects and reports. 
Unfortunately, due to constraints with the source dataset, these factors were not 
investigated as part of the proposed study. However, the DOECAP maintains a relatively 
large cadre of certified auditors. Moreover, DOECAP auditor certification requirements 
are relatively stringent. Therefore, in the study I assumed that the audit team expertise 
was relatively constant across the audits and could be omitted from the analyses without 
significantly affecting the results. 
It was assumed that excluding the influence of individual auditors did not 
seriously affect the validity the results. With such a large pool of auditors (over 50 in any 
given year), there is continual change in the makeup of DOECAP audit teams. Because 
the audit teams are continually changing, the effects of any one auditor should be 
minimal. To test this assumption, I examined the audit history of individual auditors. That 
examination indicated that, on average (both mean and mode), each auditor audits only 
one laboratory once in a ten-year period, and only 5% of auditors audit a single 
laboratory more than three times in a ten-year period. This was an indicator that the 
influence of any single auditor should be negligible. 
Control Variables 
The type of work a laboratory conducts can affect the number of occurrences of 
noncompliances as well as the ease of their detection. A full service laboratory has more 
requirements that are applicable. Each additional requirement represents another 
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opportunity for noncompliance. In order to perform meaningful interlaboratory 
comparisons, I needed to account for laboratory type in the analyses. 
In the study, I identified four laboratory types: chemistry laboratories, radiation 
laboratories, multipurpose laboratories, and nonchemistry, nonradiation laboratories (e.g. 
industrial hygiene laboratories). This grouping corresponds to the modules that DOECAP 
uses for conducting audits and reporting issues. Because a multipurpose laboratory is 
both a chemistry laboratory and a radiation laboratory, only two control variables were 
necessary. The study did not attempt to address why one laboratory type had more or 
fewer detected issues than another. 
Controlling for laboratory type is important for comparison studies. Suppose an 
agency needs to send samples to a laboratory for radionuclide analyses and the agency 
has a choice between a radiation-only laboratory and a full service laboratory. In this 
situation, the agency may not care how well a laboratory performs chemistry analyses, 
but if the laboratory type is not accounted for in the performance comparison, the full 
service laboratory’s irrelevant chemistry performance will contribute to the performance 
score. 
A chief objective for conducting statistical analyses of audit results is to enable 
the government agency to compare its contractors based on their own performance, not 
the performance of the audit team. A fixed-effects model assumes that the performance of 
a contracted laboratory is relatively constant. Given that assumption, each laboratory, 
excluding a reference laboratory, was assigned its own dummy control variable. 
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Hypotheses 
Using the five independent variables described above, five hypotheses were tested 
and, where possible, quantified: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between the number of identified audit issues 
and the duration of an audit. 
H2: There is a positive relationship between the number of identified audit issues 
and the number of auditors on an audit team. 
H3: There is a positive relationship between the number of audit modules and the 
number of detected audit issues. 
H4: There is a positive relationship between the elapsed time between successive 
audits and the number of detected audit issues. 
H5: The number of detected audit issues is affected by the presence of audit 
oversight. 
Research Design 
This study is a nonexperimental correlational design using statistical modeling. 
Statistical modeling of the relationship between the independent variables and the 
dependent variables is appropriate because no fixed, functional relationship exists 
between the two sets of variables. As expressed by Cacuci (2003) of the University of 
South Carolina, 
A statistical model is used when the system’s output cannot be expressed as a 
fixed function of the input variables. Statistical models are particularly useful for 
representing the behavior of a system based on a limited number of measurements 
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and for summarizing and/or analyzing a set of data obtained experimentally or 
numerically. (pp. 40-41) 
A quantitative nonexperimental design is appropriate because the variables of 
interest are not manipulable in ex post facto research (Johnson, 2001). “The purpose of a 
correlational study is to determine relationships between variables or to use these 
relationships to make predictions. . . .” (Gay & Airasian, 2000, p. 321). The research used 
OLS regression analyses to quantify the correlation between the independent variables of 
interest and the dependent variable. 
Bivariate Linear Least Squares Regression 
Before conducting multiple regression analyses, each of the five independent 
variables was examined separately using simple linear least squares regression to 
evaluate their relative impact on the dependent variables. Bivariate linear regression is an 
OLS approach for modeling the relationship between two variables. This approach 
assumes that the relationship between two variables, X and Y can be described by the 
following formula: 
ܻ = ܽܺ + ܾ + ݁. 
In the formula, a and b are constants and e represents the presence of error (Lewis-Beck, 
1980). Using paired sample data, the technique adjusts the constants so that the total sum 
of the squares of the errors is minimized. Of particular interest from these regression tests 
is the sign of the slope coefficient (a) of the regression curve and the degree of statistical 
significance. 
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Collinearity Testing 
Independent variables were tested for multicollinearity before conducting multiple 
regression analyses. OLS assumes that each independent variable is independent of each 
and every other independent variable. However, this often is not the case. If two or more 
variables are collinear, or highly correlated, they may actually be measuring substantially 
the same thing. This tends to inflate standard errors and decrease confidence in slope 
coefficients. 
In the current study, I used two methods for testing collinearity: the Pearson 
correlation matrix and the Lewis-Beck test. The Pearson correlation matrix is a quick 
method that reveals problematic correlations between any two independent variables. The 
result of this test is displayed in Table 1 for all variables excluding the laboratory dummy 
variable. As can be seen in Table 1, the method did not reveal problematic correlations 
between any two independent variables. The variable pair with the highest absolute value 
was the NumMods/isChemLab pair which had a value of 0.627; most other pairs were 
correlated at much lower levels. However, this method has a weakness in that it does not 
indicate if a variable is correlated with a linear combination of other variables. The 
Lewis-Beck test addresses this concern.  
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Table 1 
Pearson Correlation Matrix 
Variable Issues Duration 
Auditors
PerMod 
Num 
Mods 
Year 
Frac 
Over-
sight isRadLab isChemLab
Issues 1.000 0.413 0.153 0.505 0.017 -0.129 0.125 0.212
Duration 1.000 0.172 0.559 0.009 0.005 0.346 0.341
AuditorsPerMod 1.000 -0.132 -0.084 -0.009 0.175 -0.217
NumMods 1.000 -0.071 0.041 0.186 0.627
YearFrac 1.000 -0.013 0.040 -0.034
Oversight 1.000 0.014 0.038
isRadLab 1.000 -0.174
IsChemLab             1.000
 
The Lewis-Beck test is performed by regressing each independent variable against 
the other independent variables to see if any variable is correlated with a linear 
combination of the other variables. Thus, to conduct the test, a separate regression model 
must be performed for each independent and control variable. Table 2 displays the 
results. The coefficient of determination (R2) values for the seven model runs ranged 
from a low of 0.007 for the Oversight variable to a high of 0.568 for the NumMods 
variable. These values were all sufficiently lower than 1, suggesting that collinearity was 
not a problem 
. 
Table 2 
Lewis-Beck Test Results 
Dependent Variable R2 Sig. (p) 
Duration 0.430 0.000 
AuditorPerMod 0.150 0.000 
NumMods 0.568 0.000 
Oversight 0.007 0.897 
YearFrac 0.025 0.206 
IsRadLab 0.262 0.000 
IsChemLab 0.500 0.000 
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Multiple Regression Analyses 
I developed 18 multiple regression models during the study: five variations of a 
general model, four variations of a chemistry laboratory model, four variations of a 
radiation laboratory model, four variations of a multipurpose laboratory model, and one 
control model. The model variations corresponded to the four different dependent 
variables of interest. The general model had one additional variation that used the number 
of observations as the dependent variable. I discuss the reason for this additional model 
variation in Chapter 4. Each model used multiple regression analysis. Multiple regression 
analysis is an extension of bivariate linear regression that incorporates multiple 
independent variables into the equation (Berry & Feldman, 1985; Lewis-Beck, 1980). 
The study examined four dependent variables because contracting agencies have 
different priorities. Contracting agencies conducting basic research may be primarily 
concerned with a laboratory’s compliance with technical requirements. Contrariwise, 
agencies trying to address regulatory issues or facing possible litigation may be 
concerned with more general compliance. Model variations were required to determine 
whether the choice of dependent variable affected performance comparison results and, 
therefore, needed to be accounted for during benchmarking of contractors. 
Analytical Assumptions 
The research design incorporated four assumptions: 
1. The causal relationship is one-way. 
2. There have been no temporal changes in the relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables. 
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3. The performance of the individual laboratories is the primary causal factor 
for the observed audit results. 
One-way causal relationship. The methodology assumed that the listed 
independent variables influence the listed dependent variables, but that the listed 
dependent variables do not significantly influence the listed independent variables. 
No temporal changes. The DOECAP program is dynamic; changes to the 
program are constantly occurring. Requirements are added or changed according to 
programmatic needs. The study made the simplifying assumption that these changes do 
not significantly impact the relationship between the variables of interest. 
Laboratory performance. The underlying assumption of this work is that two 
primary factors contribute to detected audit issues: laboratory performance and audit-
specific factors. If the impact of audit-specific factors can be statistically compensated 
for, then the contracted laboratory’s contribution can be more accurately assessed. There 
are undoubtedly factors external to both the laboratory and the audit process that 
influence the number of detected audit issues. However, the study assumes that a 
laboratory’s ability to manage or cope with these external factors is a component of 
laboratory performance. 
Source Data 
The DOECAP Operations Team maintains an electronic data system (EDS) for 
archiving and making available the results of all audits conducted since FY 2000. 
Information available on the EDS includes the following for each audit: 
• List of audit team members 
• List of audit observers 
 65 
 
• Audit start and end dates 
• Facility names 
• Modules audited 
• Priority I findings listed by module 
• Priority II findings listed by module 
• Observations listed by module 
• Corrective action plans for findings 
Data Confidentiality, Acquisition, and Security 
DOE treats DOECAP audit results as official use only (OUO) information. DOE 
defines OUO information as 
unclassified information that may be exempt from public release under the 
Freedom of information Act (FOIA) and has the potential to damage government, 
commercial, or private interest if disseminated to persons who do not need to 
know the information to perform their jobs or other DOE authorized activities. 
(DOE, 2009, §5.20) 
The current study is a DOE authorized activity. As such, the research had to comply with 
the requirements for using OUO information. 
In order to use the DOECAP audit results, the dataset was culled to remove all 
potentially OUO information. Any information that could potentially identify a 
laboratory was deleted from the source data and was not used for the study. Laboratory 
names were deleted and a numeric designator assigned by the DOECAP Operations 
Team was used for laboratory identification. This numeric designator is available via the 
EDS to government contracting agencies, so the results of the proposed study may be 
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used for meaningful interlaboratory comparisons. Audit dates also were also deleted from 
the source data. Although the study examined temporal components of audits and their 
impacts on audit results, only the elapsed time since the previous audit and the duration 
of audits were necessary for the study; there was no need for the absolute start or end date 
of any audit. 
The protection of potentially OUO information was maintained at all times 
throughout the study. The unscrubbed source data were not made available to any 
individual who had not signed a confidentiality agreement with DOECAP. Once potential 
OUO information was culled from the dataset, two independent, OUO-trained individuals 
reviewed the dataset before it was made public. This ensured that all potentially OUO 
information was removed from the dataset. All analyses were conducted on a 
government-owned, secure system. 
Summary 
The current study used OLS regression models to investigate the impacts that 
audit specific factors can have on audit results. Audit specific factors used as independent 
variables included the duration of audits, the frequency of audits, the number of auditors 
participating on audits, the scope of audits, and the presence or absence of audit 
oversight. The variables were regressed against four different dependent variables of 
possible interest to government organizations.  
The source data for the OLS regression models were obtained from an audit 
program run by the United States DOE. These data were managed in accordance with 
strict protocols for OUO information. The data were analyzed using statistical methods, 
such as the Lewis Beck Test, to assess their suitability for OLS regression models.
 67 
 
CHAPTER 4 
FINDINGS 
In Chapter 1 of this work, I discussed the background, purpose, and significance 
of this study. In Chapter 2, I discussed the context of this study within the larger body of 
quality assurance and government performance research. Chapter 3 addressed the 
methods and design of the research. In this chapter, I restate the research questions and 
present the results of the research. 
Because the study involved multiple types of laboratories, I present the results 
from each type of laboratory in a separate section with subsections devoted to the results 
for each of the four independent variables of interest. I discuss the variations of the 
general model in greatest detail. My discussions of the laboratory-specific models focus 
only on statistically significant variables and major differences between models. 
I calculated the statistical results using IBM SPSS Statistics (SPSS). SPSS is a 
computational software program that is widely used in the social sciences. The software 
is capable of performing simple linear regression, multiple regression, and descriptive 
statistical analyses. I selected and used SPSS to perform the statistical analyses because 
of SPSS’s capabilities and the need for a statistical tool capable of handling multiple 
independent variables. 
Research Questions 
To achieve the objectives of the study, I sought answers to the following 
questions. 
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1. Is there a statistically significant relationship between the number of issues 
detected during an audit and the audit duration, the audit team size, the audit 
frequency, the audit scope, or the presence of oversight during an audit? 
2. Does the relationship between independent and dependent variables differ 
depending on the type of laboratory? 
3. Does the relationship between independent and dependent variables differ 
depending on the selected definition of audit issue? 
 
Methodology Summary 
Using existing data from the DOECAP, I developed 18 fixed-effects, OLS 
regression models for the study. Five models were variations of a general model that 
incorporated dummy variables to account for laboratory type. Each variation of the 
general model investigated the relationship between the independent variables and one of 
five different dependent variables. Twelve models examined the relationship between 
three specific laboratory types and four dependent variables. These 12 models were run 
on subsets of the data; therefore, the models did not require control variables for the 
laboratory type. One additional model was developed that did not account for audit-
specific factors or laboratory type. This model served as a control model. 
General Model 
The general model is a fixed-effects model using a separate dummy variable for 
each laboratory. I selected Laboratory 62 as the reference laboratory for the general 
model and all subsequent models. I assigned all other laboratories a dummy variable 
consisting of the prefix “isLab” followed by the laboratory ID number. For example, the 
dummy variable I assigned to laboratory number 31 was isLab31. I chose laboratory 62 
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as the reference laboratory in part because it was a full-service laboratory and therefore 
would appear in all model runs. Moreover, during the pilot study for this research, 
laboratory 62 appeared to be a high performer. Using laboratory 62 as the reference 
laboratory resulted in model runs wherein the majority of laboratory dummy variables 
had positive slope coefficients. Positive slope coefficients were not necessary for the 
analyses, but they did facilitate rapid visual comparison of the resulting data. 
The general model also incorporated two dummy variables for laboratory type: 
isRadLab and isChemLab. The value of isRadLab equaled “1” for radiation laboratories, 
and “0” for nonradiation laboratories. The value of isChemLab equaled “1” for chemistry 
laboratories, and “0” for nonchemistry laboratories. Laboratories that were neither 
radiation laboratories nor chemistry laboratories served as the reference laboratory type. 
The time between successive audits was denoted by the independent variable 
YearFrac. The value of YearFrac for a given audit is the fractional number of years since 
the previous audit. Since a laboratory’s first audit was not preceded by an earlier audit, 
the YearFrac variable could not be calculated for initial audits. Therefore, the audit 
results for laboratories that had only been audited once fell out of the analyses. This 
reduced the number of laboratories available for comparison down from 61 to 51. 
Dropping initial audits from the analyses also resulted in a reduction of the mean 
number of issues found per audit from 17.86 to 16.28. Descriptive statistics show that, on 
average, audit teams identify 28.0 issues per initial audit—72% more issues on average 
than are identified during subsequent audits. Although the initial audits  represented only 
11% of the total number of audits in the source dataset, their omission from the analysis 
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had a measureable impact due to the relatively high number of issues detected during 
initial audits. 
 The relatively high number of issues found during initial audits suggests that the 
first audit is not representative of the contractor’s true performance. The results from the 
first audit are identified during the learning period of the laboratory, and, thus, are not 
reflective of the long-term performance of laboratories and may appropriately be omitted 
from the statistical analyses. 
I created four variations of the general model—one variation for each of the 
dependent variables of interest. Table 3 displays the coefficient of determination (R2) for 
each of the four variations of the general model. I present the results of each variation of 
the general model in the following subsections. Following these four subsections, I 
include a subsection that compares these results to the raw results. 
 
Table 3 
Coefficients of Determination for the General Models 
Model Run Dependent Variable R2 
General Model Variation 1 Issues 0.554 
General Model Variation 2 Findings 0.451 
General Model Variation 3 Technical Issues 0.499 
General Model Variation 4 Technical Findings 0.388 
 
 
Issues 
The first variation of the general model used the number of detected audit issues 
as the dependent variable. No attempt was made to distinguish between findings and 
observations. Findings and observations were counted equally regardless of severity. 
Model results are presented in Appendix B, Table B1. 
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The model results show a statistically significant correlation between the number 
of issues detected during an audit and the number of audited modules (p < 0.001), the 
number of auditors per module (p < 0.001), the elapsed time since the previous audit (p < 
0.1), and the presence of audit oversight (p < 0.01). The slope coefficient for the number 
of modules per audit was 4.63 issues per module. This suggests that, on average, holding 
all other variables constant, for each additional module included in an audit, you can 
expect auditors to detect 4.63 additional issues. 
The slope coefficient for the number of audit modules per audit was 4.63 detected 
issues per module. This suggests that increasing an audit’s scope by one additional 
module, say from three modules to four, should result in four or five additional detected 
issues if all other variables are unchanged. This implies that performance metrics need to 
account for the scope of the audit. 
The slope coefficient for the number of auditors per modules was 6.877 detected 
issues per auditor per module. This suggests that increasing an audit team size by one 
additional auditor per module should result in the detection of nearly seven additional 
issues. Since the mean number of issues detected per audit is only 16.28, you can expect 
to detect approximately 42% more issues by increasing the number of auditors per 
module by just 1. This increase represents an increase in issue detection, not a decrease in 
contractor performance. 
This coefficient has implications outside the initial scope of this study. It suggests 
that the detection of issues is highly dependent on the size of an audit team. Due to 
budget constraints, the DOECAP operations team has had to reduce the number of 
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auditors on some audits. This coefficient suggests that the reduction in team size allows 
existing issues to go undetected by the audit teams. 
The coefficient for the YearFrac variable was 1.647 issues per year. This suggests 
that for about every 7 months of elapsed time between successive audits, the DOECAP 
audit team will find, on average, 1 additional issue. Like the number of auditors per 
module variable, this variable has particular importance during times of budget 
constraints. Like many agencies, DOECAP attempts to audit its contractors on a yearly 
basis. However, during times of fiscal constraints, the DOECAP may decrease the audit 
frequency. Since the mean number of issues detected per audit is 16.28, 2 successive 
annual audits should detect a total of about 32 or 33 issues at an average laboratory. 
However, this slope coefficient suggests that if the time between successive audits 
increases by 1 year, the total number of issues detected during the 2 year period is only 
expected to be about 18 (0 the first year and 16.28 + 1.647 the second year). Thus, 
although biannual audits may detect more issues per audit, the total number of issues 
detected over time may decrease by as much as 45%. 
Unfortunately, there is no way to determine from the available data if these issues 
undetected by the audit team would get detected and addressed through some other 
means. The laboratory’s internal assessment program may identify and address these 
issues independent of the DOECAP audit program. Nevertheless, the large number of 
detectable issues that may go undetected should be considered before instituting a 
decrease in audit frequency. In addition, although this result is specific to the DOECAP, 
it may very well apply to other agencies. 
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The slope coefficient for the Oversight variable is negative. This suggests that 
each time an audit team includes external oversight, the audit should result in 6.649 fewer 
detected issues on average. There are multiple ways to explain the observed results. First, 
the correlation does not imply causality. Although an overseer could cause a decrease in 
the mean number of detected issues, the causal relationship could actually go the other 
direction. For instance, the dataset does not indicate how audits are selected for oversight. 
It is possible that an overseer is sent to an audit when there is reason to expect that the 
audit team is not adequately prepared. It may be that an overseer is sent when there is 
reason to believe a laboratory has made significant improvement in its level of 
compliance. In either case, it would be Audit that affects the Oversight, not the reverse. 
There are, of course, ways that the presence of oversight could cause a reduction 
in detected issues. It is possible that overseers somehow influence in the audit process. 
Auditors may be more conservative when identifying issues in the presence of oversight, 
or may be distracted by the overseer. The overseer may also affect the performance of the 
laboratory. If the laboratory receives advance warning of oversight, it may better prepare 
for the audit and thus avoid some issues. Unfortunately, the results from this model 
variation alone do not support a definitive conclusion regarding causality. 
The slope of the Duration variable is only 0.168 issues per day and is not 
statistically significant. The source dataset only records the start date and end date of the 
audits; the daily start and end times are not recorded. This meant that only whole 
numbers could be used for the values of the independent variable Duration, whereas the 
true audit duration was an interval value. Moreover, the dataset only recorded the 
duration of the on-site portion of the audits. However, actual audit activities generally 
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start before the audit team arrives on site. As such, the accuracy of the calculation of 
audit Duration was dubious; this made the Duration variable a poor independent variable 
and may have contributed to its statistical insignificance. AppendixTableB1 lists the 
dummy variables for the laboratories in ascending order of the slope coefficients. 
Because laboratory 62 was the reference laboratory, it is not shown, but would have a 
slope coefficient of 0. Because all the other laboratories have positive slope coefficients, 
this implies that laboratory 62 is the highest ranked laboratory using this model variation. 
Of particular interest is the fact that it is only the lowest ranking laboratories that 
have statistically significant slope coefficients. A fixed-effects model assumes that the 
dummy variable represents a stable characteristic. In this case, the dummy variables 
represent the performance of the individual laboratories. The statistical significance of the 
lower ranking laboratories implies that these laboratories are consistently lower 
performers. Whereas the statistical insignificance of the slope coefficients of the higher 
ranking laboratories indicates that they are not consistently the highest ranking. In other 
words, the better laboratories will occasionally have audits with high numbers of detected 
issues, whereas poorer laboratories frequently have audits with higher numbers of 
detected issues. 
The variables isChemLab and isRadLab are control variables that denote whether 
or not a laboratory does chemical analyses or radiation analyses. Both of the variables 
have statistically insignificant slope coefficients. This indicates that the laboratory type 
may be a poor predictor of audit performance. 
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Findings 
The second variation of the general model used the number of detected audit 
findings as the dependent variable. Because findings are actual violations of 
requirements, they are generally considered to be more serious than other detected issues, 
such as observations. Because of this, some agencies may only be concerned about 
findings when conducting performance comparisons. This variation of the general model 
is most appropriate for agencies that only track findings or requirement violations. I 
present the results of this regression model in Appendix Table B2. 
The results from this model variation are comparable to those from the previous 
model variation. The model results show a statistically significant correlation between the 
number of finding detected during an audit and the number of audited modules (p < 
0.001), the number of auditors per module (p < 0.01), and the elapsed time since the 
previous audit (p < 0.01). However, it does not show a statistically significant 
relationship between the number of audit findings and the presence of audit oversight or 
the laboratory type. 
The slope coefficient for the number of modules per audit was 1.728 findings per 
module. This suggests that for each additional module included in an audit you can 
expect auditors to detect 1.728 additional findings on average. This slope coefficient is a 
little less than half the coefficient for the model when issues is the dependent variable. 
Given that findings account for approximately half of all issues, this slope coefficient is 
not unreasonable. 
Likewise, the slope for the number of auditors per module is what might be 
expected given the results of the previous model variation. The slope coefficient for the 
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number of auditors per modules was 3.216 findings per auditor per module—a little less 
than half the slope coefficient for this variable when regressed against issues. This 
suggests that increasing an audit team size by one additional auditor per module, should 
result in the detection of approximately three additional findings. Since the mean number 
of findings detected per audit is only 7.66, you can expect to detect approximately 42% 
more issues by increasing the number of auditors per module by just 1. This increase 
represents an increase in issue detection, not a decrease in contractor performance. 
The slope coefficient for the YearFrac variable was 1.556 findings per year. This 
suggests that for about every 8 months of elapsed time between successive audits, the 
DOECAP audit team will find, on average, 1 additional finding. Since the mean number 
of findings detected per audit is 7.66, 2 successive annual audits should detect a total of 
about 15 findings at an average laboratory. However, this slope coefficient suggests that 
if the time between successive audits increases by 1 year, the total number of findings 
detected during the 2-year period is only expected to be about 9 (0 the first year and 7.66 
+ 1.556 the second year). Thus, although biannual audits may detect more findings per 
audit, the total number of findings detected over time may decrease by as much as 40%. 
The slope coefficient for the independent variable Duration was 0.601 findings 
per day. However, like the results from the previous model variation, this slope 
coefficient was not statistically significant. Imprecision in recording the daily start and 
end times of the audits hindered precise determination of the independent variable. 
Unlike the results from previous model variation, the coefficient for the oversight 
variable was not statistically significant when regressed against findings only. To 
investigate why this variable may be significant for issues in general, and not for 
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findings, I developed a new model variation with the number of observations as the 
dependent variable. Those model results are shown in Table B3. Those results show that 
there is a statistically significant relationship between the number of observations and the 
presence of oversight. 
To understand why oversight might affect the likelihood of identifying an 
observation, but not a finding, it is helpful to recall the differences between the two types 
of audit issues. A finding is either a deviation from a requirement, or a failure to 
document compliance with a requirement (DOE Deficiency, 2009; DOE Findings, 2009). 
Findings are relatively objective. However, an observation is “a deficiency of an isolated 
nature, a deviation from Best Management Practices, or an opportunity for improvement, 
which may warrant attention by the audited facility” (DOE, Observations, 2009). 
Observations are more subjective than findings. Since the model shows a significant 
correlation between oversight and observation, but no significant correlation between 
Oversight and Findings, this may suggest that the presence of oversight may impact 
subjective determinations, but have less impact on more objective results. 
As seen in the results of model variation 1, the slope coefficients for the 
laboratory dummy variables are only significant for the poorer performing laboratories. 
What is noticeably different for the results of this model is the number of laboratories 
with negative coefficients. As with the previous model, laboratory 62 was the reference 
laboratory. Therefore, a slope coefficient less than zero signifies how many fewer 
findings the model predicts a laboratory will have compared to laboratory 62, assuming 
all other variables are equal. The fact that there are six laboratories with coefficients less 
than zero means that laboratory 62 dropped in ranking from first place, to seventh place. 
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Technical Issues 
The variation 3 of the general model used the number of detected technical issues 
as the dependent variable. Total quality management programs incorporate a wide range 
of requirements. Many of these requirements are administrative in nature. Some agencies 
may be less concerned about administrative issues and more concerned about technical 
issues when conducting performance comparisons. This variation of the general model 
tested the fixed-effects model for applicability when only technical issues are of concern. 
I present the results of this regression model in Appendix-TableB4. 
The results from this model variation are comparable to those from the model 
variation 1. The model results show a statistically significant correlation between the 
number of technical issues detected during an audit and the number of audited modules (p 
< 0.001), the number of auditors per module (p < 0.001), and the presence of audit 
oversight (p < 0.05). The slope coefficient for the NumMods variable was 2.027 technical 
issues per module. This suggests that for each additional module included in an audit you 
can expect auditors to detect around two additional technical issues on average. The slope 
coefficient for the number of AuditorsPerMod variable was 4.548 technical issues per 
auditor per module. This suggests that for each additional auditor per module included in 
an audit you can expect auditors to detect four or five additional technical issues. The 
slope coefficient for the Oversight variable was -3.600 technical issues per audit. This 
implies that an audit with external oversight will have three or four fewer issues than a 
similar audit without oversight. However, as with model variation1, variation 3 does not 
show a statistically significant relationship between the dependent variable and the 
elapsed time since the previous audit or the laboratory type. 
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The ranking of individual laboratories using this model differs from both the 
previous two model variations, although it more closely resembles variation 1. In this 
model variation, the reference laboratory, laboratory 62, rose to the third position from 
the top. This may imply that issue category (i.e. finding versus observation) more heavily 
influences overall performance ranking than issue type (i.e. administrative versus 
technical). 
Technical Findings 
Variation 4 of the general model used the number of detected technical findings 
as the dependent variable. This variation of the general model tested the fixed-effects 
model for applicability when only technical finding are of concern. I present the results of 
this regression model in Appendix-Table B5. 
The results from this model variation are comparable to those from the model 
variation 2. The model results show a statistically significant correlation between the 
number of technical findings detected during an audit and the number of audited modules 
(p < 0.05), the number of auditors per module (p≤0.001), and the elapsed time since the 
previous audit (p < 0.05). It does not show a statistically significant relationship between 
the number of technical findings and the duration of the audit or the presence of audit 
oversight. However, unlike model variation 2, model variation 4 show a statistically 
significant relationship between the dependent variable and the laboratory type (p < 0.05 
for isChemLab and p < 0.1 for isRadLab). This is likely due to additional requirements 
that apply to these two types of labs that are above basic requirements. 
The ranking of individual laboratories using this model differs substantially from 
the previous 3 model variations. In this model variation, the reference laboratory, 
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laboratory 62, dropped from first position to 19th position. The selection of dependent 
variable clearly affects the relative ranking of a contractor when benchmarking against 
quality compliance. 
Comparison to Raw Results Model 
In order to determine the impact of conducting contractor performance 
comparisons using the general model, it was necessary to compare performance scores 
using the model against performance scores based on raw audit results. To do this, I 
generated a fixed-effects regression model using laboratory dummy variables as the only 
independent variables and audit issues as the dependent variable. This model produced 
the Raw Slope values displayed in Table B6. This model assumes that all the observed 
variation in the number of detected audit issues is attributable to the audited laboratory. 
Based on the dummy variables’ coefficients, I calculated a raw performance score 
by using the following formula which is a variant of the standard unit normalization 
formula (Etzkorn, 2012): 
ݏܿ݋ݎ݁ = ሼ1 − ሾሺ݉௜ − ݉௠௜௡ሻ ÷ ሺ݉௠௔௫ − ݉௠௜௡ሻሿሽ × 100%, 
where mi is the slope of the dummy variable for the individual laboratory, ݉௠௜௡ is the 
slope of the best performing laboratory, and ݉௠௔௫ is the slope of the worst performing 
laboratory. The resulting values are displayed in the Raw Score column of TableB6 in 
Appendix B. Similarly, I calculated the performance comparison scores for model 
variation 1 using the same formula and the laboratory dummy variables for mi. Those 
results are displayed in the Model Score column of Table B6. The final column displays 
the simple difference between the two scores. 
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The results in Table B6 indicate the importance of accounting for audit-specific 
factors in performance comparison metrics. Table B6 displays as much as a 61% 
difference between the raw benchmarking score and the score adjusted based on audit-
specific factors. This difference can be substantial when it comes time for contract 
renewals. In highly competitive situations, only a few percentage points may separate 
award recipients from nonrecipients. 
Even when regression analyses do account for audit-specific factors, performance 
scores can be substantially impacted by the selection of dependent variable. Table B7 
displays the results of the laboratory performance scores based on the four variations of 
the general model. As can be seen in the table, the choice of dependent variable can have 
a major impact on the performance score. After correcting for audit-specific factors, 
laboratory 30 was the best performing laboratory in terms of technical findings and 
findings. However, it was the 2nd worst performing laboratory when judged on technical 
issues. 
Laboratory Type 1: Chemistry Laboratories 
I developed four model variations for chemistry laboratories—one model 
variation for each dependent variable of interest. These models differ from the general 
model in two respects. First, they do not include control variables for laboratory type. 
Second, they used a subset of the source data: only audits from laboratories that do 
chemical analyses were included in the statistical analyses. The subset of the data 
included 250 audits of 40 laboratories. As with the general model, laboratory 62 was 
selected as the reference laboratory. Model results corresponding to each of the four 
dependent variables are presented in the following subsections. 
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Issues 
The first variation of the chemistry laboratory model used the number of detected 
audit issues as the dependent variable. No attempt was made to distinguish between 
findings and observations. Findings and observations were counted equally regardless of 
severity. The mean number of issues detected per audit was 19.65. Model results are 
presented in Table C1. 
The results from this model variation show a statistically significant correlation 
between the number of issues detected during an audit of a chemistry laboratory and the 
number of audited modules (p < 0.001), the number of auditors per module (p < 0.001), 
and the presence of audit oversight (p < 0.05). The slope coefficient for the number of 
modules per audit was 4.345 issues per module. This suggests that, on average, holding 
all other variables constant, for each additional module included in an audit, you can 
expect auditors to detect 4.345 additional issues. 
The slope coefficient for the number of AuditorsPerMod variable was 10.278 
detected issues per auditor per module. This suggests that increasing an audit team size 
by one additional auditor per module, should result in the detection of approximately 10 
additional issues. The value of this coefficient is noticeably higher than its counterpart in 
variation 1 of the general model. This may suggest that, for some reason, the 
effectiveness of chemistry laboratory audits is more sensitive to the number of auditors. 
The slope coefficient for the NumMods variable was 4.345 detected issues per 
module per audit. This suggests that increasing an audit team size by one additional 
auditor per module, should result in the detection of about four additional issues on 
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average. The value of this coefficient is noticeably higher than its counterpart in variation 
1 of the general model. 
The coefficient for the YearFrac variable was 1.653 issues per year. This suggests 
that for about every 7 months of elapsed time between successive audits, the DOECAP 
audit team will find, on average, 1 additional issue. However, the slope does not appear 
to be statistically significant. Nevertheless, the value does imply that agency 
administrators should carefully consider the possible consequences of reducing audit 
frequencies in response to fiscal constraints. 
The slope coefficient for the Oversight variable is -6.434. This coefficient is 
significant at the p < 0.05 level. This suggests that each time an audit team includes 
external oversight, the audit should result in 6.434 fewer detected issues on average. 
The slope of the Duration variable is only 0.223 issues per day and is not 
statistically significant. 
Table C1 lists the dummy variables for the laboratories in ascending order of the 
slope coefficients. Because laboratory 62 was the reference laboratory, it is not shown, 
but would have a slope coefficient of 0. The difference between the highest and lowest 
value for laboratory dummy coefficients is nearly identical to that of variation 1 of the 
general model. As seen previously in the results from all the other model runs, only the 
lower ranking laboratories have statistically significant slope coefficients 
Findings 
The second variation of the chemistry laboratory model used the number of 
detected audit findings as the dependent variable. This variation of the model is most 
appropriate for agencies that want to compare chemistry laboratories and only is 
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concerned about issues that are actual violations of requirements. The mean number of 
findings per audit was 9.61. I present the results of this regression model in Table C2. 
The results from this model variation only show a statistically significant 
`correlation between the number of findings detected during an audit of a chemistry 
laboratory and two independent variables (not including the laboratory dummy 
variables). The coefficient for the NumMods variable was significant at the p < 0.01 
level. The coefficient for the AuditorsPerMod variable was significant at the p≤0.001 
level. 
The slope coefficient for the AuditorsPerMod variable was 5.792 detected 
findings per auditor per module. This suggests that increasing an audit team size by one 
additional auditor per module, should result in the detection of approximately 5 or 6 
additional findings on average. The value of this coefficient is noticeably higher than its 
counterpart in variation 2 of the general model. Again, this may suggest that, for some 
reason, the effectiveness of chemistry laboratory audits is more sensitive to the number of 
auditors. 
The slope coefficient for the NumMods variable was 1.484 detected findings per 
module per audit. This suggests that increasing an audit team size by one additional 
auditor per module, should result in the detection of 1 or 2 additional issues on average. 
The value of this coefficient is only slightly lower than its counterpart in variation 2 of 
the general model. 
The values of the coefficients for the YearFrac, Oversight, and Duration variables 
were similar to the values from Variation 2 of the general model. YearFrac’s value was 
1.136 findings per year. Oversight’s value was -1.078 findings per audit. Duration’s value 
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was 0.808 findings per day. However, none of these independent variables were 
statistically significant. 
Table C2 lists the dummy variables for the laboratories in ascending order of the 
slope coefficients. Because laboratory 62 was the reference laboratory, it is not shown, 
but would have a slope coefficient of 0. The difference between the highest and lowest 
value for laboratory dummy coefficients is comparable to that of variation 2 of the 
general model. As seen previously in the results from all the other model runs, only the 
lowest ranking laboratories have statistically significant slope coefficients. 
Technical Issues 
In variation 3 of the chemistry laboratory model, I used the number of detected 
technical issues as the dependent variable. This variation of the model is most appropriate 
for agencies that want to compare chemistry laboratories and  are only concerned about 
technical issues, as opposed to administrative issues. The mean number of technical 
issues per audit was 9.55. I present the results of this regression model in Table C3. 
The results from this model variation are comparable to those from the 
ChemistryLlaboratorieM modVl variation 1. The model results show a statistically 
significant correlation between the number of technical issues detected during an audit 
and the NumMods variable (p < 0.001) and the AuditorsPerMod variable (p < 0.001). 
However, the statistical significance of the Oversight variable was weak, at best (p < 0.1). 
As with model variation1, it does not show a statistically significant relationship between 
the dependent variable and the YearFrac or the Duration variables. 
The ranking of individual laboratories using this model differs from both the 
previous two model variations, although it more closely resembles variation 1. In model 
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variation 1, the reference laboratory, laboratory 62, was in the third position from the top. 
In model variation 2, laboratory 62 dropped to 15th position. In this model variation, 
laboratory 62 rose to 9th position. 
Technical Findings 
In Variation 4 of the chemistry laboratory model, I used the number of detected 
technical finding as the dependent variable. This variation of the model is most 
appropriate for agencies that want to compare chemistry laboratories and is only 
concerned about violations of technical requirements. The mean number of Technical 
Findings was 4.47. I present the results of this regression model in Appendix and 
TableC4. 
The results from this model variation only show a statistically significant 
correlation between the number of technical findings detected during an audit of a 
chemistry laboratory and one independent variable. The coefficient for the 
AuditorsPerMod variable was significant at the p < 0.001 level. All other variables were 
statistically insignificant. 
The ranking of individual laboratories using this model differs substantially from 
the previous 3 model variations. In this model variation, the reference laboratory, 
laboratory 62, dropped to the 31st position. The selection of dependent variable clearly 
impacts the relative ranking of a contractor when benchmarking against quality 
compliance. 
Laboratory Type 2: Radiation Laboratories 
I developed four model variations for radiation laboratories—one model variation 
for each dependent variable of interest. Like the chemistry laboratory models, these 
 87 
 
models differ from the general model in two respects. First, they do not include control 
variables for laboratory type. Second, they used a subset of the source data: only audits 
from laboratories that do radioisotope analyses were included in the statistical analyses. 
The subset of the data included 179 audits of 27 laboratories. As with the general model, 
laboratory 62 was selected as the reference laboratory. Model results corresponding to 
each of the four dependent variables are presented in the following subsections. 
Issues 
The first variation of the radiation laboratory model used the number of detected 
audit issues as the dependent variable. No attempt was made to distinguish between 
findings and observations. Findings and observations were counted equally regardless of 
severity. The mean number of issues per audit was 19.27. Model results are presented in 
Table D1. 
The results from this model variation show a statistically significant correlation 
between the number of issues detected during an audit of a radiation laboratory and the 
number of audited modules (p < 0.001), and the number of auditors per module (p < 
0.01). The slope coefficient for the NumMods variable was 5.555 issues per module. This 
suggests that, on average, holding all other variables constant, for each additional module 
included in an audit, you can expect auditors to detect 5.555 additional issues. This 
coefficient does not differ greatly from the coefficient from the general model. 
The slope coefficient for the AuditorsPerMod variable was 8.041 detected issues 
per auditor per module. This suggests that increasing an audit team size by one additional 
auditor per module, should result in the detection of approximately eight additional 
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issues. The value of this coefficient is noticeably higher than its counterpart in variation 1 
of the general model, but lower than in variation 1 of the chemistry laboratory model. 
The value of the coefficients for the YearFrac, Oversight, and Duration variables 
were similar to the values from variation 1 of the general model. YearFrac’s value was 
1.854 findings per year. Oversight’s value was -6.292 findings per audit. Duration’s value 
was 1.763 findings per day. However, the significance of Oversight’s slope coefficient 
was only borderline at p=0.054 while YearFrac’s and Duration’s coefficients were not 
statistically significant. 
Table D1 lists the dummy variables for the laboratories in ascending order of the 
slope coefficients. Because laboratory 62 was the reference laboratory, it is not shown, 
but would have a slope coefficient of 0. As was the case for variation 1 of the general 
model, positive slope coefficients for all the laboratory dummy variables indicate that 
laboratory 62 is the highest ranked laboratory. Although the number of radiation 
laboratories is much lower than the total number of laboratories, the relative ranking of 
the radiation laboratories is substantially the same as in variation 1 of the general model. 
Also, as seen all previously models and variations, only the lower ranking laboratories 
have statistically significant slope coefficients. 
Findings 
The second variation of the radiation laboratory model used the number of 
detected audit findings as the dependent variable. This variation of the model is most 
appropriate for agencies that want to compare radiation laboratories and is only 
concerned about issues that are actual violations of requirements. The mean number of 
findings per audit was 9.19. I present the results of this regression model in Table D2. 
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The results from this model variation only show a statistically significant 
correlation between the number of findings detected during an audit of a radiation 
laboratory and three independent variables (not including the laboratory dummy 
variables). The coefficient for the NumMods variable was significant at the p < 0.01 
level. The coefficient for the YearFrac variable was significant at the p < 0.01 level. The 
coefficient for the AuditorsPerMod variable was significant at the p≤0.05 level. 
The slope coefficient for the YearFrac variable was 2.015 findings per year. This 
suggests that for about every 6 months of elapsed time between successive audits, the 
DOECAP audit team should find one additional finding, on average. 
The slope coefficient for the number of modules per audit was 2.062 detected 
findings per module per audit. This suggests that increasing an audit team size by one 
additional auditor per module, should result in the detection of approximately two 
additional issues on average. The value of this coefficient is slightly lower than its 
counterpart in variation 2 of the general model. This may suggest that, as was the case for 
chemistry laboratories, the effectiveness of radiation laboratory audits is more sensitive to 
the number of auditors. 
The slope coefficient for the number of auditors per modules was 3.256 findings 
per auditor per module—a little less than half the slope coefficient for this variable when 
regressed against issues. This suggests that increasing an audit team size by one 
additional auditor per module, should result in the detection of approximately three 
additional findings. 
The value of the coefficients for the Oversight, and Duration variables were 
noticeably different from the values from variation 2 of the general model and variation 1 
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of the radiation laboratories model. Oversight’s value was -0.659 findings per audit. 
Duration’s value was 2.223 findings per day. However, neither of these independent 
variables were statistically significant. 
Table D2 lists the dummy variables for the laboratories in ascending order of the 
slope coefficients. Because laboratory 62 was the reference laboratory, it is not shown, 
but would have a slope coefficient of 0. As seen previously in the results from all the 
other model runs, only the lowest ranking laboratories have statistically significant slope 
coefficients. 
Technical Issues 
In variation 3 of the radiation laboratory model I used the number of detected 
technical issues as the dependent variable. This variation of the model is most appropriate 
for agencies that want to compare radiation laboratories and is only concerned about 
technical issues, as opposed to administrative issues. The mean number of technical 
issues per audit was 9.93. I present the results of this regression model in Table D3. 
The results from this model variation show a statistically significant correlation 
between the number of technical issues detected during an audit and the NumMods 
variable (p < 0.001) and the AuditorsPerMod variable (p≤0.001). The model does not 
show a statistically significant relationship between the dependent variable and the 
YearFrac, Duration, or Oversight variables. 
The slope coefficient for the NumMods variable was 3.027 detected findings per 
module per audit. This suggests that increasing an audit team size by one additional 
auditor per module, should result in the detection of around additional technical issues on 
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average. The value of this coefficient is only somewhat higher than its counterpart in 
variation 3 of either the general model or the chemistry laboratory model. 
The slope coefficient for the AuditorsPerMod variable was 5.958 detected 
technical issues per auditor per module. This suggests that increasing an audit team size 
by one additional auditor per module, should result in the detection of approximately six 
additional technical issues. The value of this coefficient is slightly smaller than its 
counterpart in variation 3 of the chemistry laboratories model, but somewhat higher than 
in variation 3 of the general model. 
Technical Findings 
In Variation 4 of the radiation laboratory model, I used the number of detected 
technical finding as the dependent variable. This variation of the model is most 
appropriate for agencies that want to compare radiation laboratories and is only 
concerned about violations of technical requirements. The mean number of technical 
findings per audit was 4.67. I present the results of this regression model in Table D4. 
The results from this model variation show a statistically significant correlation 
between the number of technical findings detected during an audit and the NumMods 
variable (p < 0.05) and the AuditorsPerMod variable (p≤0.05). The YearFrac variable 
was only borderline significant with p = 0.076. The model does not show a statistically 
significant relationship between the dependent variable and the Duration, or Oversight 
variables. 
The slope coefficient for the NumMods variable was 1.128 detected technical 
findings per module per audit. This suggests that increasing an audit team size by one 
additional auditor per module, should result in the detection of around one additional 
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technical finding on average. The value of this coefficient is only noticeably higher than 
its counterpart in variation 4 of either the general model or the chemistry laboratory 
model. 
The slope coefficient for the AuditorsPerMod variable was 2.549 detected 
technical findings per auditor per module. This suggests that increasing an audit team size 
by one additional auditor per module, should result in the detection of around 2 or 3 
additional technical issues. The value of this coefficient is similar to its counterpart in 
variation 4 of the general model. 
Laboratory Type 3: Full-Service Laboratories 
I developed four model variations for full-service laboratories—one model 
variation for each dependent variable of interest. Like the chemistry and radiation 
laboratory models, these models do not include control variables for laboratory type and 
only use a subset of the source data. Only results from audits of laboratories that do both 
chemical and radioisotope analyses were included in the statistical analyses. The subset 
of the data included 120 audits of 19 laboratories. As with the general model, laboratory 
62 was selected as the reference laboratory. Model results corresponding to each of the 
four dependent variables are presented in the following subsections. 
Issues 
The first variation of the full-service laboratory model used the number of 
detected audit issues as the dependent variable. No attempt was made to distinguish 
between findings and observations. Findings and observations were counted equally 
regardless of severity. The mean number of issues per audit was 20.53. Model results are 
presented in Table E1. 
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The results from this model variation show a statistically significant correlation 
between the number of issues detected during an audit of a radiation laboratory and the 
number of audited modules (p < 0.001), and the number of auditors per module (p < 
0.01). The slope coefficient for the NumMods variable was 5.558 issues per module. This 
suggests that, on average, holding all other variables constant, for each additional module 
included in an audit, you can expect auditors to detect 5 or 6 additional issues. This 
coefficient is nearly identical in value to the coefficient from variation 1 of the radiation 
laboratories model (5.555). 
The slope coefficient for the AuditorsPerMod variable was 11.585 detected issues 
per auditor per module. This suggests that increasing an audit team size by one additional 
auditor per module, should result in the detection of around 11 or 12 additional issues. 
The value of the coefficient for this model variation is the highest of all the model runs.. 
The value of the coefficients for the YearFrac, Oversight, and Duration variables 
were similar to the values from variation 1 of the general model. YearFrac’s value was 
1.184 issues per year. Oversight’s value was -6.090 issues per audit. Duration’s value 
was 2.277 issues per day. However, slope coefficients for these variables were not 
statistically significant. 
Findings 
The second variation of the radiation laboratory model used the number of 
detected audit findings as the dependent variable. This variation of the model is most 
appropriate for agencies that want to compare radiation laboratories and is only 
concerned about issues that are actual violations of requirements. The mean number of 
findings per audit was 9.67. I present the results of this regression model in Table E2. 
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The results from this model variation only show a statistically significant 
correlation between the number of findings detected during an audit of a full-service 
laboratory and one independent variable. The coefficient for the AuditorsPerMod 
variable was significant at the p < 0.001 level. All other variables were statistically 
insignificant. 
The slope coefficient for the AuditorsPerMod variable was 6.596 detected 
findings per auditor per module. This suggests that increasing an audit team size by one 
additional auditor per module, should result in the detection of around 11 or 12 additional 
findings. The value of the coefficient for this model variation is only slightly higher than 
slope coefficient for the AuditorsPerMod variable of the Chemistry Laboratories Model 
Variation 2. 
Technical Issues 
In variation 3 of the full-service laboratory model I used the number of detected 
technical issues as the dependent variable. This variation of the model is most appropriate 
for agencies that want to compare full-service laboratories and is only concerned about 
technical issues. The mean number of technical issues per audit was 11.65. I present the 
results of this regression model in Table E3. 
The results from this model variation show a statistically significant correlation 
between the number of technical issues detected during an audit of a full-service 
laboratory and the number of audited modules (p < 0.01), and the number of auditors per 
module (p < 0.05). The value of the coefficients for the YearFrac, Oversight, and 
Duration variables were not statistically significant. 
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The slope coefficient for the NumMods variable was 3.776 technical issues per 
module. This suggests that, on average, holding all other variables constant, for each 
additional module included in an audit, you can expect auditors to detect about four 
additional technical issues. The value of the coefficient for this model variation is the 
highest of all the model runs for technical issues. 
The slope coefficient for the AuditorsPerMod variable was 7.561 detected 
technical issues per auditor per module. This suggests that increasing an audit team size 
by one additional auditor per module, should result in the detection of around 7 or 8 
additional issues. The value of the coefficient for this model variation is the highest of all 
the model runs. 
Technical Findings 
In variation 4 of the full-service laboratory model, I used the number of detected 
technical finding as the dependent variable. This variation of the model is most 
appropriate for agencies that want to compare laboratories that have both analytical 
chemistry and radioisotope capabilities and is only concerned about violations of 
technical requirements. The mean number of technical findings per audit was 5.30. I 
present the results of this regression model in Table E4. 
The results from this model variation only show a statistically significant 
correlation between the number of findings detected during an audit of a full-service 
laboratory and one independent variable. The coefficient for the AuditorsPerMod 
variable was significant at the p < 0.01 level. All other variables were statistically 
insignificant. The slope coefficient for the AuditorsPerMod variable was 4.775 detected 
technical findings per auditor per module. This suggests that increasing an audit team size 
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by one additional auditor per module, should result in the detection of around five 
additional technical findings. The value of the coefficient for this model variation is only 
slightly higher than slope coefficient for the AuditorsPerMod variable of the Chemistry 
Laboratories Model Variation 2. The value of the coefficient for this model variation is 
the highest of all the model runs. 
Summary 
The results presented in this chapter show that the number of issues detected 
during contractor audits is significantly influence by the way auditing agency conducts 
the audits. As such, contractor rankings based on raw audit results may not accurately 
reflect a contractor’s true performance. Variables such as the frequency of audits, the 
number of auditors conducting the audit, and audit scope may need to be accounted for 
statistically in order to accurately measure a contractor’s true relative performance. 
Likewise, the data indicate that the choice of dependent variables also impacts the 
relative ranking of a contractor. Thus, the government agency conducting the comparison 
must carefully determine which issue types have the greatest importance to the agency. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
In this final chapter, I restate the research problem, review the research questions, 
summarize the results, and discuss the implications of the results. As stated in Chapter 1, 
traditional rational-choice theory assumes decision makers use their cognitive abilities to 
evaluate information to make optimal decisions. However, the GPRA forces government 
decision makers to rely heavily on metrics when making decisions. The complexities of 
government agencies and the legislative mandate to rely on metrics practically ensure that 
decision makers will not work in ideal rational-choice mode. Rather, decision makers 
operate in cybernetic-decision mode—decision makers do what the data tell them to do 
(Kravchuk & Schack, 1996). 
Under these circumstances, it is imperative that the data provided  and used by 
decision makers to evaluate contractors actually address the issues of concern to the 
agency. Moreover, the data need to accurately reflect the relative performance of the 
contractors who were being evaluated. Failing to use metrics that actually measure 
characteristics of importance could result in the agency not receiving the services it 
needs. Failing to fairly assess a contractor’s performance could result in less-than-optimal 
contractors winning contract awards. 
One characteristic that is increasingly becoming important to government 
agencies is quality. However, contractor data on quality has been difficult to quantify for 
inclusion in performance metrics. The results of quality assurance audits hold promise as 
a quantitative measure of quality; however, factors external to the contractors’ 
performance may contribute to the quantitative results. Failing to account for these 
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external factors results in contractors being assessed, in part, on the performance of the 
government agency. 
I conducted this study to determine if it were possible to account for some of the 
agency’s contribution to quality assurance audit results. Accounting for the agency’s 
contribution allows for more accurate estimates of the contractors’ contributions. Having 
these corrected numbers allows government agencies to more accurately incorporate 
quality into overall contractor performance assessments. 
Summary of Results 
To achieve the objectives of the study, answers to the following questions were 
sought. 
1. Is there a statistically significant relationship between the number of issues 
detected during an audit and the audit duration, the audit team size, the audit 
frequency, the audit scope, or the presence of oversight during an audit? 
2. Does the relationship between independent and dependent variables differ 
depending on the type of laboratory? 
3. Does the relationship between independent and dependent variables differ 
depending on the selected definition of audit issue? 
To answer Question1, I tested the five hypotheses from Chapter 3: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between the number of identified audit issues 
and the duration of an audit. 
H2: There is a positive relationship between the number of identified audit issues 
and the number of auditors on an audit team. 
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H3: There is a positive relationship between the number of audit modules and the 
number of detected audit issues. 
H4: There is a positive relationship between the elapsed time between successive 
audits and the number of detected audit issues. 
H5: The number of detected audit issues is affected by the presence of audit 
oversight. 
Audit Duration 
H1: There is a positive relationship between the number of identified audit issues 
and the duration of an audit. 
The results of the regression models did not support this hypothesis. Although the 
slope coefficients were positive for all model runs, none of the 17 model variations 
showed a statistically significant relationship between the Duration independent variable 
and the dependent variable of interest. Audit Duration directly relates to audit depth. The 
longer the audit, the more time auditors have to examine records, interview personnel, 
read procedures, and observe operations. However, the Duration variable in the source 
dataset only represents a portion of the time spent on the audit; only the number of days 
on site is recorded in the dataset. Neither the number of hours per day on site nor the time 
spent conducting off-site audit activities, are recorded in the dataset. Variations in the 
unaccounted for components of the audit duration may have contributed to the statistical 
insignificance of this variable. 
Audit Team Size 
H2: There is a positive relationship between the number of identified audit issues  
and the number of auditors on an audit team. 
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The results of the regression models support this hypothesis. The size of the audit 
team, in terms of number of auditors per audited module, was significant for all 17 model 
variations. Moreover, the coefficients were positive for all model variations. The size of 
an audit team directly relates to audit depth. If an audit team has more auditors, more 
interviews can be conducted, more records can be reviewed, more procedures can be 
read, and more activities can be observed. 
Audit Scope 
H3: There is a positive relationship between the number of audit modules and the 
number of detected audit issues. 
The results of the regression models support this hypothesis. Audit scope refers to 
the number of requirements against which an organization is assessed. The slope 
coefficients were positive for all model runs. Moreover, 13 of the 16 model variations 
showed a statistically significant (p < 0.05) relationship between the NumMods 
independent variable and the dependent variables of interest. 
Audit Frequency 
H4: There is a positive relationship between the elapsed time between successive 
audits and the number of detected audit issues. 
The results of the regression models did not support this hypothesis. Although the 
slope coefficient for the YearFrac variable was positive for all 17 model variations, 
coefficient was statistically significant (p < 0.05) for only three variations. In the general 
model, there was a statistically significant relationship (p < 0.01) between YearFrac and 
the number of findings, but no statistically significant relationship between YearFrac and 
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the number of observations. This led to a borderline significance (p=0.075) between 
YearFrac and issues in general. 
There are multiple reasons why the frequency of audits may be more likely to 
impact the detection of findings than the detection of observations. A finding is either a 
deviation from a requirement, or a failure to document compliance with a requirement 
(DOE Deficiency, 2009; DOE Findings, 2009). However, an observation is “a deficiency 
of an isolated nature, a deviation from Best Management Practices, or an opportunity for 
improvement, which may warrant attention by the audited facility” (DOE, Observations, 
2009). Because observations are either one-off events or minor in nature, they may be 
more difficult to detect than findings as time elapses. On the other hand, more serious 
infringements or failure to document compliance may have more permanency. Thus, an 
auditor may be able to detect a finding much longer after it occurs than an observation. 
This makes findings less sensitive to audit frequency. 
Audit Oversight 
H5: The number of detected audit issues is affected by the presence of audit 
oversight. 
Overall, the results of the regression models were inconclusive for this 
hypothesis. For all but 1 of the 17 model variations, the slope coefficient for the 
Oversight variable was negative. Additionally, the significance of the slope coefficients 
for findings was consistently lower than for issues in general. This was particularly 
noticeable in the general model where the relationship between Oversight and findings 
was statistically insignificant (p = 0.320), while the relationship between Oversight and 
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Observations was p < 0.001. This would seem to indicate that the presence of Oversight 
tends to reduce the number of observations identified by auditors. 
Observations are more subjective than findings. Although the general model 
shows a significant correlation between oversight and observation, but no significant 
correlation between oversight and Findings, this may suggest that the presence of 
oversight may impact subjective determinations, but have less impact on more objective 
results. 
Laboratory Type 
Does the relationship between independent and dependent variables differ 
depending on the type of laboratory? 
The results of the 12 laboratory specific regression models indicate that the 
relationships between the independent variables and dependent variables do differ 
depending on the type of laboratory. Although the general behavior of the models is 
consistent for all model variations, the minor differences have noticeable impact on the 
ranking of laboratories. This is particularly noticeable when the dependent variable is 
TechnicalFindings. This is not surprising given that different types of laboratories have 
different technical requirements. It may be that some technical requirements are 
inherently more difficult to comply with, or may be more difficult to understand. In either 
case, those types of laboratories that have to comply with these technical requirements 
will have more issues than those laboratories that have a different set of technical 
requirements. 
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Issue Type 
Does the relationship between independent and dependent variables differ 
depending on the selected definition of audit issue? 
The results of the regression models indicate that the choice of dependent variable 
has a significant impact on performance comparison results. In this study, I primarily 
investigated four dependent variables: (a) technical findings, (b) technical issues, (c) 
findings, and (d) issues. However, the selection of these four dependent variables was 
somewhat arbitrary. I could have selected Priority I findings or Priority II findings. I 
could have selected administrative issues or observations related to organic chemistry. 
The study results show that this choice of dependent variables impacts the relative 
ranking of contractors. 
The purpose of contractor performance comparisons, or benchmarking, is to rank, 
measure, or compare outcomes or traits between contractors (Hatry, 2006). However, in 
order for the performance comparisons to be most meaningful to the assessing agency, 
the agency must determine what outcomes or traits are most desirable or worth 
comparing. While quality as a general concept is important, when it comes to achieving 
agency objectives, agency decision makers need to decide what dependent variable needs 
to be the basis of the quality measurement. 
Discussion of Results 
Quality assurance audit results hold promise as a potential metric for performance 
comparisons. The data are quantitative, tend to fit the organization being assessed, and fit 
within the larger political climate. Moreover, audit data are obtained from existing 
programs, which eliminates or reduces the need for new data gathering efforts. 
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However, audit results are affected by external influence. The results of this study 
indicated that audit results were significantly affected by external factors related to the 
way the auditing agency performed the audit. These external factors included the scope of 
the audit, the number of auditors, the audit frequency, and the degree of audit oversight. 
As such, audit results were a composite measure of both the audited organization’s 
performance and the auditing agency’s performance. 
If quality assurance audit results are to be used for contractor performance 
comparisons, proper metrics must be developed. These metrics must account for the 
auditing agency’s contribution to the results. The metrics must also measure the most 
appropriate dependent variable. The results of the current study indicate that failure to 
account for audit-specific variables and the improper selection of dependent variable can 
dramatically affect contractor performance scores. 
Implications of the Study 
The requirements of the GPRA and the growing prominence of quality assurance 
contract requirements puts pressure on government agencies to conduct quality assurance 
performance comparisons of government contractors. Quality assurance is a key 
component of many government contracts. Contractor performance comparisons that 
address some contract requirements, while ignoring quality, do not address all the salient 
needs of the agency. Failing to incorporate quality in performance metrics undermines 
the purpose of performance comparisons. 
However, the metrics used for quality performance comparisons must be carefully 
crafted or risk being counterproductive. The complexity of government agencies and the 
realities of bounded rationality theory suggest that agency decision makers will 
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increasingly “rely upon formal measurement devices and systems,” rather than the 
traditional rational-actor decision-making process (Kravchuk & Schack, 1996, p. 349). 
As such, the measurement devices upon which these decision makers rely must 
accurately reflect the most important aspects of the contract. A decision-making system 
that provides inaccurate data does little good and can even “do great harm if it 
misrepresents, misleads, or introduces perverse behavioral incentives” (Kravchuk & 
Schack, 1996, p. 349). If quality assurance audit results are to be used for performance 
comparison efforts, the metrics based on these results must accurately represent the 
characteristic being measured. 
In this research, I identified variables that have a statistically significant 
relationship to audit results. These variables and their associated regression slope 
coefficients are particular to the DOECAP. Their values and statistical significances 
cannot be extrapolated to other organizations. Nevertheless, the fact that there are audit-
specific variables that have statistical significance has broader implications. 
The research results imply that audit-specific factors affect audit results. Raw 
audit results are not an accurate interorganizational measure of a contractor’s quality 
performance. Audit factors outside the control of the contractor, such as the size of the 
audit team, the number of audit questions, and the frequency of the audit, can affect the 
quantitative results of the audit. This implies that if an agency desires to use audit results 
for performance comparison studies, the agency must account for audit-specific factors. 
In this research, I demonstrated a method that can be used to account for audit-specific 
factors by identifying relevant audit-specific independent variables and incorporating 
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them into fixed-effects regression models that use dummy variables for each of the 
contractors of interest. 
Relationship to Prior Research 
Previous research indicates that government agencies need to include accurate 
quality metrics in feedback loops to decision makers. Research from Kravchuk and 
Schack (1996) suggested that the requirements of the GPRA and the complexities of 
modern organizations bind the rationality of decision makers to such an extent that 
decisions tend to be based primarily on numbers. If the numbers do not incorporate all 
relevant information, the decision makers are likely to make sub-optimal decisions. Since 
QA requirements are an increasingly important component of government contracts, 
performance to the requirements is a key component of overall contractor performance. 
Therefore, metrics for quality should be included in the feedback loops. 
Propper and Wilson (2003) and Nicholson-Crotty, et al. (2006) showed the 
importance of using metrics that measure a range of stakeholder goals and objectives. 
Moreover, they concluded that “accuracy of the information is essential” (Propper & 
Wilson, 2003, p. 19). The current study showed that QA audit results, which measure 
compliance with a wide range of technical, administrative, and regulatory requirements, 
may be used for performance comparisons. However, the accuracy of QA audit results 
for measuring performance is dependent on correcting the data for audit-specific factors. 
Previous research, such as that conducted by Nevalainen, et al. (2000),  
Flynn et al. (1994), and Colledge and March (1993), developed methods and instruments 
for measuring performance. However, research from Yang and Hsieh (2007) and the 
NRC have indicated the impracticality of these methods due to the resource burdens they 
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place on the assessed contractors. This study provides a means for measuring contractor 
performance that is based on existing programs and, therefore, does not further burden 
contractors with any new resource demands. 
Hatry (2006) and Yang and Hsieh (2007) investigated the importance of 
performance metrics that fit the values of the organization being assessed as well as the 
values of other stakeholders. Since QA audit results generally measure compliance with 
requirements that are defined by the contractor’s industry, compliance with these 
requirements is generally valued by the assessed contractors. The current study shows 
how performance metrics can be developed that are based on these contractor-accepted 
values. 
Propper and Wilson (2003), Hatry (2006), Heinrich (2012), and the NRC stressed 
the importance of using quantitative metrics that accurately measure the actual 
performance of the contractor. Metrics that are significantly affected by external 
influences are poor tools for benchmarking. The current study showed that QA audit 
results are significantly affected by external influences. Therefore, raw audit results are 
not suitable for interorganizational performance comparisons. Nevertheless, the study 
demonstrated how agencies could use statistical techniques to account for many of the 
externalities that would otherwise make QA audit results unsuitable for performance 
comparison measurements. 
Unanticipated Findings 
Finding a statistically significant relationship between Oversight and Issues, but 
not between Oversight and Finding was unanticipated. Findings are subsets of Issues. 
Consequently, if the presence of Oversight were to influence an auditor to upgrade an 
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observation to a finding, or downgrade a finding to an observation, it would affect the 
total number of findings, but it would not affect the overall number of issues. Therefore, 
it would not be surprising to observe a statistically significant relationship between 
Oversight and Findings, but not Oversight and Issues. Nevertheless, the results showed 
the opposite. In context of the current study, this unanticipated result (a) further supports 
the need to control for audit-specific factors when ranking contractors by using audit 
results and (b) illustrates the importance of properly selecting the most appropriate 
dependent variable. If Findings is the dependent variable of choice, including Oversight 
in the statistical analysis may not be important. However, if the agency is concerned with 
the total number of audit issues, Oversight may need to be included in performance score 
calculations. 
This unanticipated result may actually be a very positive result for the DOECAP 
in particular. The result suggests that an auditor’s determination of what is and what is 
not a finding is relatively insensitive to the presence of Oversight. Since DOECAP 
findings are supposed to be objective (DOE Deficiency, 2009; DOE Findings, 2009), it 
would be disconcerting to see a significant relationship between Oversight and the 
number of findings. However, a statistically significant relationship between Oversight 
and the number of relatively subjective Observations is not troubling. 
It was not anticipated that the slope coefficients for the YearFrac variable would 
be so small compared to the mean number of issues detected per audit. DOECAP auditors 
identify about 16 issues per audit, on average. The average DOECAP-contracted 
laboratory is audited once a year. The low values of the slope coefficients suggest that if 
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the audit frequency is reduced to once every two years, a significant percentage of 
detectable issues, as much as 45%, may not be detected by DOECAP. 
The results of this study do not prove that these issues will never be identified or 
resolved. It is possible that the laboratories could identify and resolve these issues 
themselves, independent of the DOECAP auditors. Nevertheless, this is something 
worthy of additional consideration when determining audit frequency. 
Recommendations 
Government agencies should incorporate quality performance metrics in 
evaluations of contractor performance. In order for contractor performance comparisons 
to be most meaningful, performance measurements should include metrics that address 
all performance elements of importance. The increasing prominence of total quality 
management requirements in government contracts suggests that quality is an element of 
importance, and it should be measured and included in contractor benchmarking. 
QA audit results uniquely meet many of the requirements for performance 
measurements and should be used to measure historic quality performance. The data are 
quantitative, tend to fit the organization being assessed, and fit within the larger political 
climate. Moreover, these data are obtained from existing programs, which eliminates or 
reduces the need for new data gathering activities. 
However, agencies that elect to use QA audit results for performance comparisons 
need to corrected the data for audit-specific factors. Raw audit results are significantly 
impacted by audit-specific factors. These factors do not reflect the performance of the 
audited contractor. Failing to adjust for these audit-specific factors impacts performance 
scores and jeopardizes accurate ranking of contractors. 
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In order to be most accurate, audit programs should record audit data that 
potentially biases raw audit results so that the raw results can be corrected. This study 
showed that there is a statistical relationship between DOECAP audit results and both the 
number of auditors and the number of audit modules in a DOECAP audit. Recording this 
information allows the raw audit results to be corrected for these variables. Different 
audit programs may have different independent variables that significantly affect audit 
results. Failing to maintain information on these variables makes them unavailable for 
inclusion in statistical analyses. If agencies wish to maximize the accuracy of their 
performance comparisons, they must collect and maintain the source data needed for the 
analyses. 
The results suggest that agencies may be wise to use multiple dependent variables 
when conducting quality performance comparisons. In some instances, the total number 
of issues may be the best measure for an agency. In other cases, perhaps due to specific 
program project requirements, the agency may only be concerned with technical findings. 
Given that contractor performance scores depend on the selection of dependent variables, 
a contractor may score high with one dependent variable and low with another. Using 
multiple dependent variables can help identify contractors that are consistently high 
ranking. 
Implications 
Current contractor performance comparison studies that do not include quality 
metrics may be misleading. Although cost, schedule, production, and other common 
measures of contractor performance are undoubtedly important, the quality of contracted 
products and services is also important. The research of Kravchuk and Schack (1996) 
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suggested that failing to include important information in the feedback mechanism results 
in decisions based on incomplete information. In other words, the decision is still likely 
to be made even if the information is incomplete or inadequate. 
Agencies may use audit results for performance comparisons; however, current 
quality performance metrics that use raw audit results may be misleading. The results of 
this study show a marked difference between performance scores based on raw audit 
results and performance scores adjusted for audit-specific factors. Although the analytical 
results of this study are specific to DOECAP audits and cannot be extrapolated to other 
programs, they do demonstrate differences can occur if audit-specific factors are not 
accounted for. Failing to account for audit-specific factors can result in a high performing 
contractor appearing to be a poor performing contractor and can make a poor performing 
contractor appear to be a much better performing contractor, which undermines the 
purpose of performance comparisons.  
Inaccurate ranking of contractors not only has implications for the government 
agency, but also for the contracted entities. Contractors should be concerned about how 
past performance is being scored. Auditing a contractor frequently, or with larger than 
average audit teams, or to a larger number of requirements as compared to its 
competitors, may unfairly disadvantage the contractor. Depending on how quality is 
scored against other requirements, such as cost and schedule, even minor decreases in a 
quality score can cause a contractor to lose a bid. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
The current study investigated the impact of laboratory type on the number of 
audit issues, but it did not investigate other contract specific variables that may impact 
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the results. These variables may include contract size, contractor size, time in business, or 
time in the audit program. These factors may have unanticipated impacts that should be 
accounted for in the performance comparison process. Further research investigating 
these contract specific variables appear s warranted. 
Additional research also seems needed to determine why oversight reduces the 
number of detected observations. This result may be isolated to DOECAP, or it may be a 
more fundamental effect of audit oversight. Similar analyses of data from other audit 
programs may shed light on the observed behavior. A better understanding of this 
behavior could be used to improve the audit process. 
A study investigating contractor learnability may be worthwhile. The research 
showed that initial DOECAP audits result in 72% more issues, on average, than 
subsequent audits. This indicates that contractors are learning organizations. During times 
of change, it may be advantageous to contract with highly adaptable, quick-learning 
organizations. Identifying and including contractor learnability or adaptability in 
performance metrics may be advantageous. 
Future research needs to investigate means for weighting issues. This study did 
not weigh dependent variables according to severity; Priority I and Priority II findings 
were treated equally. When Findings and Observations were combined into a single 
dependent variable, Issues, they were equally weighted. In reality, the severity is not 
constant over issue type. For performance scores based on audit results to be most 
meaningful, issues should be weighted by severity. Research investigating the impacts of 
weighting on performance scores would be enlightening. 
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Limitations 
Slope coefficients and significance values in this study are DOECAP specific and 
cannot be extrapolated to other organizations. There is no reason to believe that the 
insignificance of the Duration variable in this study means that audit duration is always 
insignificant. Idiosyncrasies in the way DOECAP records audit duration may have 
contributed to its statistical insignificance. The slope value for YearFrac was small 
compared to the average number of issues detected per audit; this relationship might not 
hold true for other auditing organizations. 
Some slope coefficients may be trivial, even if they are statistically significant. 
For instance, the small value for the YearFrac coefficient (1.556 findings per year) for the 
general model of this study is non-trivial if it is being used to determine how frequently 
to schedule audits. However, it may be quite trivial for performance comparison purposes 
if the elapsed time between successive audits is nearly the same for all contractors. Since 
the values of the coefficients are program dependent, the values should be evaluated for 
meaningfulness whenever the model is applied. 
This study indicates that an agency can use this process for interorganizational 
comparisons of contractors only if one or more of the available dependent variables is 
important to the government agency. However, this may not always be the case. For 
some agencies, the number of violations of requirements may be more important than the 
number of requirements violated. For other agencies, the rate of violations per unit of 
work may be important. To use this method, an agency must carefully consider the 
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appropriateness of the dependent variable selected and may need to adjust that variable 
for factors such as contractor size or volume of work.  
The process needs to be modified to include contractors that have been audited 
only once. The YearFrac variable, which was used to determine the time between 
successive audits, requires a previous audit; initial audits are not preceded by earlier 
audits, so the value for YearFrac is null for initial audits and the audit records are 
excluded from the statistical analyses. If the YearFrac variable is omitted, initial audits 
can be incorporated into the analyses. However, if the contracted organizations, like 
DOECAP laboratories, display the same disparity between the number of issues detected 
in initial audits and the number detected in subsequent audits, the analyses would need to 
include a dummy variable for initial audit to adequately account for the steep learning 
curve. 
Although the research indicates that it is possible to reduce the influence of 
external factors on the results of quality performance measurements, it does not indicate 
that the influence of external factors can be eliminated. The coefficient of determination 
for the general model’s four variations was only about 0.5. This means there is a 
substantial amount of variation that is not attributable to any of the identified independent 
variables. 
There are two types of variables that can affect the audit results. One type affects 
the number of issues that occur; the other type affects the fraction of issues that are 
detected. Unidentified variables that affect the number of issues that occur are not 
troublesome to performance comparisons. Although external issues such as illnesses, 
economic downturns, or power outages may affect a contractor’s level of quality 
 115 
 
compliance, they are not supposed to; the contractor is supposed to comply with 
requirements at all times, regardless of external factors. If some variable impacts a 
contractor’s level of compliance, that is a measure of the contractor’s performance. 
However, unknown variables that affect the fraction of detected issues are worrisome. If 
the auditing agency does something different in one audit that allows the audit team to 
find a higher percentage of existing issues, the process unfairly impacts one contractor 
over another. For instance, if the contracting agency consistently sends it most thorough 
auditors to one contractor, and its least thorough auditors to another contractor, and does 
not account for this variation in the performance comparison analyses, the performance 
comparisons may be meaningless or misleading. 
Summary and Conclusion 
The NPM movement of the 1990s and beyond resulted in numerous government 
reforms that were designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public 
agencies. These reforms put “emphasis on strategic planning; on performance 
measurement, especially the measurement of program outcomes; on customer satisfaction 
as one of the desired outcomes; [and] on results-oriented objectives” (Swiss, 2005, p. 
592). An underlying assumption of these reform measures was that an agency could not 
claim success, without objective evidence that desired outcomes were being achieved. 
The NPM movement is no longer popular. In fact, some researchers have gone so 
far as to declare NPM “dead” (Dunleavy, et al., 2006). The popularity of NPM reforms 
has waned, in some cases, because the reforms had “little impact on altering the overall 
effectiveness of government” (Dunleavy, et al., 2006, p. 468). Even worse, in other cases, 
NPM reforms led to “policy disasters” (Dunleavy, et al., 2006, p. 468). 
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However, the ineffectiveness of NPM reforms was not entirely unanticipated. 
Early NPM researchers such as Kravchuk and Schack (1996) recognized that some NPM 
reforms, like the performance comparison requirements of the GPRA, might be 
counterproductive because they move agency decision makers away from the traditional 
rational-actor role wherein decision makers use their cognitive abilities to evaluate 
information to make optimal decisions. NPM reforms that stress measurement pressure 
agency decision makers to do what the numbers tell them to do—with minimal rational 
skepticism. 
Nevertheless, even some of the strongest critics of NPM recognize that the 
reforms have been widely entrenched and, consequently, will be around for a long time. 
“NPM practices are extensively institutionalized and will continue” (Dunleavy, et al., 
2006, p. 468). The performance requirements of the GPRA are public law and are not 
likely to be repealed any time soon. 
The permanency of these institutionalized reforms makes it imperative that 
methods be developed to make the reforms workable. The research of Kravchuk and 
Schack suggests that in order to make contractor performance comparison efforts 
effective, the metrics used must accurately reflect the true performance of the contractor. 
If accurate, representative metrics can be developed, the metrics can be used in a 
decision-making process that produces meaningful results—even if the agency decision 
maker is not operating in rational-actor mode. 
The growing prominence of QA requirements for government programs illustrates 
the importance of these programs for government contracts. Given this importance, QA 
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needs to be incorporated into the performance comparison process. However, this 
requires metrics to be identified for measuring QA compliance. 
QA audit results are readily available metrics for QA compliance. Many 
government agencies already conduct QA audits of contractors. These audits are used to 
assess contractors’ compliance with QA requirements. The results from these audits 
could be used for interorganizational comparisons of government contractors provided 
the data are accurate measures of the contractors’ performance. 
This study shows that uncorrected, raw audit results are not appropriate for 
interorganizational comparisons. Raw audit results are a composite measure of how many 
issues a contractor has as well as how effectively the audit team finds those issues. Using 
the uncorrected metric in interorganizational performance comparisons is inappropriate 
because a suitable metric should be relatively insensitive to factors external to the 
contractor’s performance. If left uncorrected, audit results are unsatisfactory for 
interorganizational performance comparisons 
However, the research shows that a significant portion of the auditing agency’s 
contribution to the raw results can be compensated for statistically. Using OLS regression 
techniques, agencies can identify and compensate for audit-specific factors that would 
otherwise bias comparison results. The method does not entirely eliminate external 
factors, but it does diminish them. 
QA is an important element of modern government contracts. The degree of 
compliance with QA is highly variable across contractors. Contractors that comply well 
with QA requirements should be recognized for their high degree of compliance. 
Contractors that comply poorly with QA requirements should not be unduly rewarded. 
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This research identifies a methodology that government agencies can use to compare 
contractors’ compliance with QA requirements. 
  
 119 
 
APPENDIX A 
ABBREVIATIONS 
DOE  U.S. Department of Energy 
DOECAP U.S. Department of Energy Consolidated Audit Program 
GPRA  Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 
NPM  New Public Management 
NRC  National Research Council 
OLS  Ordinary Least Squares 
OUO  Official Use Only 
QA  Quality Assurance 
TAT  Turnaround Time 
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APPENDIX B 
GENERAL MODEL RESULTS 
Table B1 
General Model Variation 1: Association between Independent Variables and the Number 
of Issues Identified During an Audit 
Variable B Std. Error Beta t Sig. (p) 
(Constant) -24.936 6.62   -3.767 0.000
Duration 0.168 1.514 0.010 0.111 0.912
AuditorsPerMod 6.877 1.820 0.209 3.778 0.000
NumMods 4.630 0.765 0.495 6.049 0.000
Oversight -6.949 2.278 -0.132 -3.051 0.003
YearFrac 1.647 0.921 0.084 1.788 0.075
isChemLab 1.714 2.871 0.067 0.597 0.551
isRadLab 1.226 2.628 0.055 0.467 0.641
isLab39 1.817 5.129 0.029 0.354 0.723
isLab35 1.825 4.445 0.029 0.411 0.682
isLab2 2.498 5.193 0.027 0.481 0.631
isLab33 4.390 5.961 0.043 0.736 0.462
isLab26 5.328 6.334 0.058 0.841 0.401
isLab23 5.511 4.517 0.084 1.220 0.223
isLab44 5.740 9.453 0.028 0.607 0.544
isLab19 6.188 4.725 0.107 1.310 0.191
isLab25 6.211 9.726 0.030 0.639 0.524
isLab48 6.516 9.690 0.032 0.672 0.502
isLab69 6.582 7.254 0.055 0.907 0.365
isLab7 6.824 5.145 0.113 1.326 0.186
isLab32 6.926 6.278 0.094 1.103 0.271
isLab43 7.458 4.724 0.108 1.579 0.115
isLab37 7.540 6.364 0.073 1.185 0.237
isLab4 8.105 4.667 0.135 1.736 0.084
isLab30 8.106 9.027 0.040 0.898 0.370
isLab46 8.250 5.253 0.125 1.570 0.117
isLab21 8.332 4.585 0.138 1.817 0.070
isLab59 8.349 5.796 0.090 1.441 0.151
isLab42 9.147 4.424 0.152 2.068 0.040
isLab11 9.149 4.438 0.146 2.062 0.040
isLab61 9.316 5.393 0.119 1.727 0.085
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Variable B Std. Error Beta t Sig. (p) 
isLab18 9.708 4.482 0.161 2.166 0.031
isLab70 9.711 9.883 0.047 0.983 0.327
isLab41 9.776 5.254 0.141 1.861 0.064
isLab5 10.601 4.468 0.176 2.373 0.018
isLab20 10.826 9.052 0.053 1.196 0.233
isLab24 10.850 5.771 0.173 1.880 0.061
isLab14 11.502 5.014 0.191 2.294 0.023
isLab65 12.350 7.323 0.085 1.686 0.093
isLab28 12.802 5.387 0.175 2.376 0.018
isLab60 12.868 9.337 0.063 1.378 0.169
isLab53 12.984 7.271 0.089 1.786 0.075
isLab9 13.155 4.492 0.218 2.929 0.004
isLab57 14.073 6.536 0.118 2.153 0.032
isLab13 15.013 5.152 0.249 2.914 0.004
isLab16 15.662 5.125 0.260 3.056 0.002
isLab49 16.031 5.606 0.190 2.860 0.005
isLab10 16.580 5.751 0.180 2.883 0.004
isLab66 16.873 7.836 0.116 2.153 0.032
isLab12 17.113 5.586 0.219 3.063 0.002
isLab40 17.202 5.084 0.274 3.383 0.001
isLab47 18.285 6.455 0.154 2.833 0.005
isLab54 18.755 5.862 0.203 3.199 0.002
isLab38 20.587 6.861 0.142 3.001 0.003
isLab17 21.721 6.562 0.183 3.310 0.001
isLab8 26.981 5.429 0.345 4.970 0.000
isLab36 27.510 7.334 0.189 3.751 0.000
isLab27 27.746 9.337 0.135 2.972 0.003
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Table B2 
General Model Variation 2: Association between Independent Variables and the Number 
of Findings Identified During an Audit 
Variable B Std. Error Beta t Sig. (p) 
(Constant) -12.012 4.046   -2.969 0.003
Duration 0.601 0.926 0.064 0.649 0.517
AuditorsPerMod 3.216 1.113 0.177 2.890 0.004
NumMods 1.728 0.468 0.335 3.693 0.000
Oversight -1.386 1.392 -0.048 -0.996 0.320
YearFrac 1.556 0.563 0.145 2.763 0.006
isChemLab 1.885 1.755 0.134 1.074 0.284
isRadLab 1.390 1.607 0.113 0.865 0.388
isLab30 -6.282 5.518 -0.055 -1.138 0.256
isLab44 -2.146 5.778 -0.019 -0.371 0.711
isLab35 -1.756 2.717 -0.051 -0.646 0.519
isLab23 -1.329 2.761 -0.037 -0.481 0.631
isLab39 -0.898 3.135 -0.026 -0.286 0.775
isLab2 -0.190 3.174 -0.004 -0.060 0.952
isLab19 0.369 2.888 0.012 0.128 0.898
isLab42 0.384 2.704 0.012 0.142 0.887
isLab4 0.531 2.853 0.016 0.186 0.853
isLab48 0.621 5.923 0.005 0.105 0.917
isLab11 0.730 2.713 0.021 0.269 0.788
isLab26 1.047 3.872 0.021 0.270 0.787
isLab43 1.196 2.887 0.031 0.414 0.679
isLab37 1.913 3.890 0.034 0.492 0.623
isLab25 2.243 5.945 0.020 0.377 0.706
isLab28 2.485 3.293 0.061 0.755 0.451
isLab7 2.516 3.145 0.076 0.800 0.424
isLab14 2.564 3.065 0.077 0.837 0.404
isLab60 2.825 5.708 0.025 0.495 0.621
isLab61 3.045 3.297 0.071 0.924 0.356
isLab20 3.056 5.533 0.027 0.552 0.581
isLab59 3.250 3.543 0.064 0.917 0.360
isLab33 3.365 3.644 0.059 0.923 0.357
isLab32 3.624 3.837 0.090 0.944 0.346
isLab57 3.711 3.996 0.057 0.929 0.354
isLab9 3.724 2.746 0.112 1.356 0.176
isLab18 3.936 2.740 0.118 1.436 0.152
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Variable B Std. Error Beta t Sig. (p) 
isLab46 3.982 3.211 0.110 1.240 0.216
isLab5 4.038 2.731 0.121 1.479 0.140
isLab69 4.052 4.434 0.062 0.914 0.362
isLab41 4.059 3.212 0.106 1.264 0.207
isLab24 4.109 3.528 0.119 1.165 0.245
isLab21 4.344 2.803 0.131 1.550 0.122
isLab27 4.710 5.708 0.042 0.825 0.410
isLab53 4.956 4.444 0.062 1.115 0.266
isLab70 5.926 6.041 0.052 0.981 0.328
isLab16 6.090 3.133 0.183 1.944 0.053
isLab66 6.272 4.790 0.078 1.309 0.191
isLab13 7.145 3.149 0.215 2.269 0.024
isLab65 7.448 4.476 0.093 1.664 0.097
isLab47 7.533 3.946 0.115 1.909 0.057
isLab40 7.829 3.108 0.226 2.519 0.012
isLab12 8.683 3.415 0.201 2.543 0.012
isLab38 8.806 4.194 0.110 2.100 0.037
isLab54 9.065 3.583 0.178 2.530 0.012
isLab49 9.640 3.427 0.207 2.813 0.005
isLab8 9.801 3.318 0.227 2.953 0.003
isLab10 10.423 3.516 0.205 2.965 0.003
isLab17 10.499 4.011 0.160 2.618 0.009
isLab36 13.402 4.483 0.167 2.994 0.003
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Table B3 
Association between Independent Variables and the Number of Observations Identified 
During an Audit 
Variable B Std. Error Beta t Sig. (p) 
(Constant) -12.924 4.194   -3.081 0.002
Duration -0.433 0.959 -0.042 -0.451 0.652
AuditorsPerMod 3.661 1.153 0.185 3.174 0.002
NumMods 2.902 0.485 0.515 5.984 0.000
Oversight -5.563 1.443 -0.176 -3.855 0.000
YearFrac 0.091 0.584 0.008 0.156 0.876
isChemLab -0.171 1.819 -0.011 -0.094 0.925
isRadLab -0.164 1.665 -0.012 -0.098 0.922
isLab33 1.025 3.777 0.017 0.271 0.786
isLab69 2.530 4.596 0.035 0.551 0.582
isLab2 2.687 3.290 0.048 0.817 0.415
isLab39 2.715 3.250 0.072 0.835 0.404
isLab32 3.302 3.977 0.075 0.830 0.407
isLab35 3.582 2.817 0.095 1.272 0.205
isLab70 3.785 6.262 0.031 0.604 0.546
isLab25 3.968 6.162 0.032 0.644 0.520
isLab21 3.988 2.905 0.110 1.373 0.171
isLab46 4.268 3.328 0.108 1.282 0.201
isLab26 4.282 4.013 0.077 1.067 0.287
isLab7 4.308 3.260 0.119 1.322 0.187
isLab65 4.902 4.640 0.056 1.057 0.292
isLab59 5.099 3.672 0.092 1.389 0.166
isLab37 5.627 4.032 0.091 1.396 0.164
isLab41 5.717 3.329 0.137 1.717 0.087
isLab18 5.773 2.840 0.159 2.033 0.043
isLab19 5.819 2.994 0.167 1.944 0.053
isLab48 5.895 6.140 0.048 0.960 0.338
isLab10 6.158 3.644 0.111 1.690 0.092
isLab43 6.262 2.993 0.150 2.092 0.037
isLab61 6.270 3.417 0.133 1.835 0.068
isLab49 6.392 3.552 0.126 1.800 0.073
isLab5 6.563 2.831 0.181 2.319 0.021
isLab24 6.741 3.657 0.178 1.844 0.066
isLab23 6.840 2.862 0.173 2.390 0.018
isLab4 7.574 2.957 0.209 2.561 0.011
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Variable B Std. Error Beta t Sig. (p) 
isLab20 7.770 5.735 0.063 1.355 0.177
isLab13 7.868 3.264 0.217 2.411 0.017
isLab44 7.886 5.989 0.064 1.317 0.189
isLab53 8.028 4.607 0.092 1.743 0.082
isLab11 8.419 2.812 0.223 2.994 0.003
isLab12 8.430 3.540 0.179 2.382 0.018
isLab42 8.762 2.803 0.242 3.126 0.002
isLab14 8.937 3.177 0.246 2.813 0.005
isLab40 9.373 3.221 0.248 2.910 0.004
isLab9 9.431 2.846 0.260 3.314 0.001
isLab16 9.572 3.247 0.264 2.948 0.003
isLab54 9.690 3.714 0.174 2.609 0.010
isLab60 10.043 5.916 0.081 1.698 0.091
isLab28 10.317 3.413 0.234 3.023 0.003
isLab57 10.362 4.141 0.145 2.502 0.013
isLab66 10.601 4.965 0.121 2.135 0.034
isLab47 10.753 4.090 0.150 2.629 0.009
isLab17 11.222 4.157 0.157 2.699 0.007
isLab38 11.781 4.347 0.135 2.710 0.007
isLab36 14.090 4.647 0.161 3.032 0.003
isLab30 14.387 5.719 0.116 2.515 0.012
isLab8 17.180 3.440 0.365 4.995 0.000
isLab27 23.036 5.916 0.186 3.894 0.000
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Table B4 
General Model Variation 3: Association between Independent Variables and the Number 
of Technical Issues Identified During an Audit 
Variable B Std. Error Beta t Sig. (p) 
(Constant) -12.497 4.170   -2.997 0.003
Duration -0.605 0.954 -0.060 -0.635 0.526
AuditorsPerMod 4.548 1.147 0.231 3.966 0.000
NumMods 2.027 0.482 0.363 4.203 0.000
Oversight -3.600 1.435 -0.115 -2.509 0.013
YearFrac 0.635 0.580 0.055 1.094 0.275
isChemLab 2.901 1.809 0.190 1.604 0.110
isRadLab 1.763 1.656 0.132 1.065 0.288
isLab39 -0.904 3.231 -0.024 -0.280 0.780
isLab33 -0.518 3.755 -0.008 -0.138 0.890
isLab35 0.079 2.801 0.002 0.028 0.978
isLab60 0.196 5.883 0.002 0.033 0.973
isLab25 0.942 6.127 0.008 0.154 0.878
isLab2 1.085 3.272 0.020 0.332 0.740
isLab20 1.463 5.703 0.012 0.256 0.798
isLab26 1.480 3.990 0.027 0.371 0.711
isLab48 1.623 6.105 0.013 0.266 0.791
isLab19 1.648 2.977 0.048 0.554 0.580
isLab44 2.406 5.955 0.020 0.404 0.686
isLab53 2.539 4.580 0.029 0.554 0.580
isLab46 2.637 3.310 0.067 0.797 0.426
isLab7 2.689 3.241 0.075 0.830 0.407
isLab32 2.711 3.955 0.062 0.686 0.494
isLab69 2.777 4.57 0.039 0.608 0.544
isLab65 3.109 4.613 0.036 0.674 0.501
isLab41 3.122 3.310 0.075 0.943 0.346
isLab14 3.194 3.159 0.089 1.011 0.313
isLab61 3.250 3.398 0.069 0.957 0.340
isLab24 3.627 3.636 0.097 0.998 0.319
isLab70 3.760 6.226 0.031 0.604 0.546
isLab5 4.038 2.815 0.112 1.435 0.153
isLab37 4.040 4.009 0.066 1.008 0.314
isLab23 4.056 2.846 0.103 1.425 0.155
isLab28 4.445 3.394 0.101 1.310 0.191
isLab21 4.941 2.889 0.137 1.711 0.088
 127 
 
Variable B Std. Error Beta t Sig. (p) 
isLab43 4.982 2.976 0.120 1.674 0.095
isLab59 5.102 3.651 0.092 1.397 0.163
isLab42 5.249 2.787 0.146 1.883 0.061
isLab4 5.324 2.940 0.148 1.810 0.071
isLab11 5.371 2.796 0.143 1.921 0.056
isLab16 5.539 3.229 0.154 1.716 0.087
isLab18 5.574 2.824 0.155 1.974 0.049
isLab47 5.702 4.067 0.080 1.402 0.162
isLab49 5.728 3.532 0.114 1.622 0.106
isLab40 6.200 3.203 0.165 1.936 0.054
isLab12 6.221 3.519 0.133 1.768 0.078
isLab66 6.630 4.937 0.076 1.343 0.180
isLab57 6.665 4.118 0.094 1.618 0.107
isLab36 6.666 4.620 0.077 1.443 0.150
isLab54 7.242 3.693 0.131 1.961 0.051
isLab17 7.793 4.134 0.110 1.885 0.060
isLab13 7.948 3.246 0.221 2.449 0.015
isLab10 8.127 3.623 0.147 2.243 0.026
isLab9 8.875 2.830 0.247 3.136 0.002
isLab27 13.149 5.882 0.107 2.235 0.026
isLab38 13.242 4.322 0.153 3.064 0.002
isLab30 13.272 5.687 0.108 2.334 0.020
isLab8 13.407 3.420 0.287 3.920 0.000
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Table B5 
General Model Variation 4: Association between Independent Variables and the Number 
of Technical Findings Identified During an Audit 
Variable B Std. Error Beta t Sig. (p) 
(Constant) -5.881 2.501   -2.352 0.019
Duration 0.009 0.572 0.002 0.015 0.988
AuditorsPerMod 2.356 0.688 0.219 3.426 0.001
NumMods 0.597 0.289 0.196 2.066 0.040
Oversight -0.895 0.860 -0.052 -1.04 0.299
YearFrac 0.732 0.348 0.115 2.103 0.036
isChemLab 2.406 1.085 0.289 2.218 0.027
isRadLab 1.712 0.993 0.235 1.725 0.086
isLab30 -2.971 3.410 -0.044 -0.871 0.384
isLab20 -2.423 3.419 -0.036 -0.709 0.479
isLab39 -2.065 1.938 -0.101 -1.066 0.288
isLab60 -1.942 3.527 -0.029 -0.551 0.582
isLab44 -1.937 3.571 -0.029 -0.542 0.588
isLab23 -1.506 1.706 -0.070 -0.883 0.378
isLab35 -1.440 1.679 -0.070 -0.857 0.392
isLab19 -1.093 1.785 -0.058 -0.612 0.541
isLab53 -0.953 2.747 -0.020 -0.347 0.729
isLab25 -0.842 3.674 -0.013 -0.229 0.819
isLab2 -0.791 1.962 -0.026 -0.403 0.687
isLab42 -0.745 1.671 -0.038 -0.446 0.656
isLab26 -0.726 2.393 -0.024 -0.303 0.762
isLab48 -0.674 3.661 -0.010 -0.184 0.854
isLab28 -0.605 2.035 -0.025 -0.297 0.767
isLab33 -0.364 2.252 -0.011 -0.162 0.872
isLab5 -0.176 1.688 -0.009 -0.104 0.917
isLab61 -0.031 2.037 -0.001 -0.015 0.988
isLab37 0.005 2.404 0.000 0.002 0.998
isLab7 0.129 1.943 0.007 0.067 0.947
isLab65 0.178 2.766 0.004 0.064 0.949
isLab11 0.217 1.676 0.011 0.129 0.897
isLab41 0.386 1.985 0.017 0.195 0.846
isLab43 0.508 1.784 0.022 0.285 0.776
isLab46 0.581 1.984 0.027 0.293 0.770
isLab4 0.628 1.763 0.032 0.356 0.722
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Variable B Std. Error Beta t Sig. (p) 
isLab24 0.837 2.180 0.041 0.384 0.701
isLab14 0.863 1.894 0.044 0.455 0.649
isLab59 0.949 2.189 0.032 0.434 0.665
isLab27 1.004 3.527 0.015 0.285 0.776
isLab57 1.070 2.469 0.028 0.433 0.665
isLab32 1.323 2.371 0.055 0.558 0.577
isLab9 1.451 1.697 0.074 0.855 0.393
isLab70 1.469 3.733 0.022 0.393 0.694
isLab47 1.486 2.439 0.038 0.610 0.543
isLab69 1.537 2.740 0.040 0.561 0.575
isLab18 1.543 1.693 0.079 0.912 0.363
isLab16 1.798 1.936 0.091 0.929 0.354
isLab21 2.061 1.732 0.105 1.190 0.235
isLab40 2.078 1.921 0.101 1.082 0.280
isLab66 2.479 2.960 0.052 0.837 0.403
isLab12 2.512 2.110 0.098 1.190 0.235
isLab54 3.024 2.214 0.100 1.366 0.173
isLab36 3.240 2.770 0.068 1.170 0.243
isLab49 3.403 2.118 0.124 1.607 0.109
isLab10 4.015 2.173 0.133 1.848 0.066
isLab38 4.560 2.592 0.096 1.759 0.080
isLab13 4.566 1.946 0.232 2.346 0.020
isLab8 4.590 2.051 0.180 2.238 0.026
isLab17 4.643 2.479 0.120 1.873 0.062
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Table B6 
Comparison of Raw Performance Scores to Model-Adjusted Performance Scores Based 
on Audit Issues 
Lab Slope Raw Score Model Slope Model Score  Diff 
isLab48 -8.667 100.00% 6.516 76.52% 23.48% 
isLab25 -7.167 96.39% 6.211 77.61% 18.77% 
isLab70 -6.167 93.98% 9.711 65.00% 28.98% 
isLab24 -5.667 92.77% 10.850 60.90% 31.88% 
isLab32 -5.444 92.23% 6.926 75.04% 17.20% 
isLab26 -4.167 89.16% 5.328 80.80% 8.36% 
isLab66 -4.000 88.75% 16.873 39.19% 49.57% 
isLab69 -3.167 86.75% 6.582 76.28% 10.47% 
isLab37 -2.067 84.10% 7.540 72.82% 11.27% 
isLab39 -1.750 83.33% 1.817 93.45% -10.12% 
isLab19 -0.524 80.38% 6.188 77.70% 2.68% 
Lab 62 0.000 79.12% 0.000 100.00% -20.88% 
isLab43 0.933 76.87% 7.458 73.12% 3.75% 
isLab33 1.533 75.42% 4.390 84.18% -8.76% 
isLab35 1.833 74.70% 1.825 93.42% -18.72% 
isLab46 2.152 73.93% 8.250 70.27% 3.66% 
isLab23 3.970 69.55% 5.511 80.14% -10.59% 
isLab2 4.000 69.48% 2.498 91.00% -21.52% 
isLab59 4.667 67.87% 8.349 69.91% -2.04% 
isLab14 5.795 65.15% 11.502 58.55% 6.61% 
isLab7 6.256 64.04% 6.824 75.41% -11.36% 
isLab61 6.583 63.25% 9.316 66.42% -3.17% 
isLab42 6.949 62.37% 9.147 67.03% -4.66% 
isLab41 7.433 61.20% 9.776 64.77% -3.56% 
isLab21 7.949 59.96% 8.332 69.97% -10.01% 
isLab40 9.917 55.22% 17.202 38.00% 17.22% 
isLab10 10.167 54.62% 16.58 40.24% 14.37% 
isLab18 10.564 53.66% 9.708 65.01% -11.35% 
isLab11 10.667 53.41% 9.149 67.03% -13.61% 
isLab28 11.222 52.07% 12.802 53.86% -1.79% 
isLab44 11.833 50.60% 5.740 79.31% -28.71% 
isLab57 14.583 43.98% 14.073 49.28% -5.30% 
isLab53 15.000 42.97% 12.984 53.20% -10.23% 
isLab47 15.083 42.77% 18.285 34.10% 8.67% 
isLab4 15.103 42.72% 8.105 70.79% -28.07% 
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Lab Slope Raw Score Model Slope Model Score  Diff 
isLab54 15.500 41.77% 18.755 32.40% 9.36% 
isLab16 15.641 41.43% 15.662 43.55% -2.13% 
isLab65 15.667 41.36% 12.350 55.49% -14.13% 
isLab13 15.949 40.68% 15.013 45.89% -5.21% 
isLab5 16.103 40.31% 10.601 61.79% -21.48% 
isLab49 16.476 39.41% 16.031 42.22% -2.81% 
isLab9 16.718 38.83% 13.155 52.59% -13.76% 
isLab30 17.833 36.14% 8.106 70.78% -34.64% 
isLab27 18.333 34.94% 27.746 0.00% 34.94% 
isLab60 18.333 34.94% 12.868 53.62% -18.68% 
isLab8 19.958 31.02% 26.981 2.76% 28.27% 
isLab12 21.958 26.20% 17.113 38.32% -12.12% 
isLab17 22.833 24.10% 21.721 21.71% 2.38% 
isLab36 26.000 16.47% 27.510 0.85% 15.61% 
isLab38 32.333 1.20% 20.587 25.80% -24.60% 
isLab20 32.833 0.00% 10.826 60.98% -60.98% 
 
  
 132 
 
Table B7 
Comparison of Laboratory Performance Scores forFour Variations of the General Model 
(G1-G4) 
Lab G1 G2 G3 G4 Min Max Diff 
isLab10 40.2% 15.2% 36.9% 8.2% 8.2% 54.6% 46.4%
isLab11 67.0% 64.4% 56.2% 58.1% 53.4% 67.0% 13.6%
isLab12 38.3% 24.0% 50.2% 28.0% 24.0% 50.2% 26.2%
isLab13 45.9% 31.8% 38.1% 1.0% 1.0% 45.9% 44.9%
isLab14 58.5% 55.1% 71.4% 49.6% 49.6% 71.4% 21.7%
isLab16 43.6% 37.2% 55.0% 37.4% 37.2% 55.0% 17.8%
isLab17 21.7% 14.8% 39.2% 0.0% 0.0% 39.2% 39.2%
isLab18 65.0% 48.1% 54.7% 40.7% 40.7% 65.0% 24.3%
isLab19 77.7% 66.2% 82.2% 75.3% 66.2% 82.2% 15.9%
isLab2 91.0% 69.1% 86.1% 71.4% 69.1% 91.0% 21.9%
isLab20 61.0% 52.6% 83.5% 92.8% 0.0% 92.8% 92.8%
isLab21 70.0% 46.1% 59.2% 33.9% 33.9% 70.0% 36.1%
isLab23 80.1% 74.9% 65.3% 80.8% 65.3% 80.8% 15.4%
isLab24 60.9% 47.3% 68.3% 50.0% 47.3% 92.8% 45.5%
isLab25 77.6% 56.7% 87.1% 72.0% 56.7% 96.4% 39.7%
isLab26 80.8% 62.8% 83.3% 70.5% 62.8% 89.2% 26.4%
isLab27 0.0% 44.2% 1.8% 47.8% 0.0% 47.8% 47.8%
isLab28 53.9% 55.5% 62.6% 68.9% 52.1% 68.9% 16.9%
isLab30 70.8% 100.0% 0.9% 100.0% 0.9% 100.0% 99.1%
isLab32 75.0% 49.7% 74.7% 43.6% 43.6% 92.2% 48.6%
isLab33 84.2% 51.0% 97.3% 65.8% 51.0% 97.3% 46.3%
isLab35 93.4% 77.0% 93.1% 79.9% 74.7% 93.4% 18.7%
isLab36 0.9% 0.0% 47.1% 18.4% 0.0% 47.1% 47.1%
isLab37 72.8% 58.4% 65.5% 60.9% 58.4% 84.1% 25.7%
isLab38 25.8% 23.4% 1.2% 1.1% 1.1% 25.8% 24.7%
isLab39 93.5% 72.7% 100.0% 88.1% 72.7% 100.0% 27.3%
isLab4 70.8% 65.4% 56.5% 52.7% 42.7% 70.8% 28.1%
isLab40 38.0% 28.4% 50.4% 33.7% 28.4% 55.2% 26.8%
isLab41 64.8% 47.5% 71.9% 55.9% 47.5% 71.9% 24.4%
isLab42 67.0% 66.2% 57.0% 70.8% 57.0% 70.8% 13.8%
isLab43 73.1% 62.0% 58.9% 54.3% 54.3% 76.9% 22.6%
isLab44 79.3% 79.0% 76.9% 86.4% 50.6% 86.4% 35.8%
isLab46 70.3% 47.9% 75.3% 53.3% 47.9% 75.3% 27.4%
isLab47 34.1% 29.9% 53.8% 41.5% 29.9% 53.8% 24.0%
isLab48 76.5% 65.0% 82.3% 69.8% 65.0% 100.0% 35.0%
isLab49 42.2% 19.2% 53.7% 16.3% 16.3% 53.7% 37.4%
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Lab G1 G2 G3 G4 Min Max Diff 
isLab5 61.8% 47.6% 65.5% 63.3% 40.3% 65.5% 25.2%
isLab53 53.2% 43.0% 75.9% 73.5% 43.0% 75.9% 33.0%
isLab54 32.4% 22.1% 43.1% 21.3% 21.3% 43.1% 21.8%
isLab57 49.3% 49.3% 47.1% 46.9% 44.0% 49.3% 5.3%
isLab59 69.9% 51.6% 58.0% 48.5% 48.5% 69.9% 21.4%
isLab60 53.6% 53.8% 92.3% 86.5% 34.9% 92.3% 57.4%
isLab61 66.4% 52.7% 71.0% 61.4% 52.7% 71.0% 18.3%
isLab65 55.5% 30.3% 72.0% 58.6% 30.3% 72.0% 41.6%
isLab66 39.2% 36.3% 47.4% 28.4% 28.4% 88.8% 60.3%
isLab69 76.3% 47.5% 74.3% 40.8% 40.8% 86.7% 46.0%
isLab7 75.4% 55.3% 74.9% 59.3% 55.3% 75.4% 20.1%
isLab70 65.0% 38.0% 67.4% 41.7% 38.0% 94.0% 55.9%
isLab8 2.8% 18.4% 0.0% 0.7% 0.0% 31.0% 31.0%
isLab9 52.6% 49.2% 31.7% 41.9% 31.7% 52.6% 20.9%
Lab62 100.0% 68.1% 93.7% 61.0% 61.0% 100.0% 39.0%
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APPENDIX C 
CHEMISTRY LABORATORIES MODEL RESULTS 
Table C1 
Chemistry Laboratories Model Variation 1: Association between Independent Variables 
and the Number of Issues Identified During an Audit 
Variable B Std. Error Beta t Sig. (p) 
(Constant) -23.519 7.577   -3.104 0.002
Duration 0.223 1.812 0.011 0.123 0.902
AuditorsPerMod 10.278 2.823 0.245 3.641 0.000
NumMods 4.345 0.905 0.362 4.803 0.000
Oversight -6.434 2.657 -0.133 -2.421 0.016
YearFrac 1.653 1.698 0.065 0.974 0.331
isLab26 -1.825 9.191 -0.015 -0.199 0.843
isLab39 -0.462 4.659 -0.009 -0.099 0.921
isLab37 1.119 10.035 0.006 0.112 0.911
isLab35 1.290 4.619 0.024 0.279 0.780
isLab2 1.875 5.393 0.024 0.348 0.729
isLab33 2.167 6.440 0.021 0.337 0.737
isLab25 3.616 10.120 0.021 0.357 0.721
isLab7 3.754 4.740 0.072 0.792 0.429
isLab23 4.489 4.716 0.079 0.952 0.342
isLab46 4.735 5.043 0.079 0.939 0.349
isLab19 5.517 6.056 0.062 0.911 0.363
isLab4 5.612 5.139 0.108 1.092 0.276
isLab43 5.665 5.016 0.095 1.130 0.260
isLab44 5.686 9.955 0.032 0.571 0.568
isLab21 6.339 4.670 0.117 1.357 0.176
isLab59 6.485 5.423 0.082 1.196 0.233
isLab30 7.768 9.368 0.044 0.829 0.408
isLab41 8.019 4.759 0.134 1.685 0.093
isLab11 8.232 4.632 0.152 1.777 0.077
isLab18 8.285 4.597 0.159 1.802 0.073
isLab42 8.370 4.634 0.155 1.806 0.072
isLab24 8.636 6.495 0.119 1.330 0.185
isLab5 9.568 4.699 0.184 2.036 0.043
isLab20 9.921 9.414 0.056 1.054 0.293
isLab28 10.215 4.952 0.162 2.063 0.040
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Variable B Std. Error Beta t Sig. (p) 
isLab60 10.734 9.331 0.061 1.150 0.251
isLab65 11.123 7.096 0.089 1.568 0.119
isLab57 11.845 6.332 0.116 1.871 0.063
isLab9 12.014 4.742 0.231 2.534 0.012
isLab13 12.677 4.634 0.244 2.736 0.007
isLab16 13.552 4.586 0.261 2.955 0.003
isLab49 13.802 5.202 0.190 2.653 0.009
isLab12 14.211 5.210 0.211 2.728 0.007
isLab17 18.888 6.328 0.185 2.985 0.003
isLab38 19.963 7.116 0.160 2.805 0.006
isLab53 22.040 9.329 0.125 2.362 0.019
isLab54 23.221 6.198 0.228 3.746 0.000
isLab36 25.519 7.122 0.205 3.583 0.000
isLab27 25.612 9.327 0.146 2.746 0.007
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Table C2 
Chemistry Laboratories Model Variation 2: Association between Independent Variables 
and the Number of Findings Identified During an Audit 
Variable B Std. Error Beta t Sig. (p) 
(Constant) -9.800 4.668   -2.100 0.037
Duration 0.808 1.116 0.068 0.724 0.470
AuditorsPerMod 5.792 1.739 0.247 3.331 0.001
NumMods 1.484 0.557 0.221 2.663 0.008
Oversight -1.078 1.637 -0.040 -0.658 0.511
YearFrac 1.136 1.046 0.080 1.087 0.279
isLab30 -6.513 5.771 -0.066 -1.129 0.260
isLab37 -4.047 6.181 -0.041 -0.655 0.513
isLab26 -3.606 5.662 -0.052 -0.637 0.525
isLab39 -3.114 2.870 -0.103 -1.085 0.279
isLab44 -2.513 6.132 -0.026 -0.410 0.682
isLab35 -2.151 2.845 -0.071 -0.756 0.451
isLab23 -2.097 2.905 -0.066 -0.722 0.471
isLab4 -1.399 3.165 -0.048 -0.442 0.659
isLab2 -0.656 3.322 -0.015 -0.197 0.844
isLab7 -0.318 2.920 -0.011 -0.109 0.913
isLab19 -0.177 3.730 -0.004 -0.047 0.962
isLab43 -0.134 3.090 -0.004 -0.043 0.965
isLab42 -0.097 2.854 -0.003 -0.034 0.973
isLab11 -0.008 2.853 0.000 -0.003 0.998
isLab28 0.020 3.050 0.001 0.006 0.995
isLab25 0.055 6.234 0.001 0.009 0.993
isLab60 0.644 5.748 0.007 0.112 0.911
isLab46 0.961 3.106 0.029 0.309 0.757
isLab57 1.365 3.900 0.024 0.350 0.727
isLab59 1.446 3.341 0.033 0.433 0.665
isLab33 1.638 3.967 0.029 0.413 0.680
isLab41 2.337 2.931 0.070 0.797 0.426
isLab24 2.358 4.001 0.058 0.589 0.556
isLab20 2.429 5.799 0.025 0.419 0.676
isLab27 2.560 5.745 0.026 0.446 0.656
isLab18 2.655 2.832 0.091 0.938 0.350
isLab21 2.768 2.877 0.091 0.962 0.337
isLab9 2.847 2.921 0.098 0.975 0.331
isLab5 3.251 2.895 0.112 1.123 0.263
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Variable B Std. Error Beta t Sig. (p) 
isLab16 4.007 2.825 0.138 1.418 0.158
isLab13 4.916 2.855 0.169 1.722 0.087
isLab65 6.033 4.371 0.086 1.380 0.169
isLab12 6.036 3.209 0.160 1.881 0.061
isLab49 7.464 3.204 0.184 2.329 0.021
isLab17 7.799 3.898 0.137 2.001 0.047
isLab38 8.368 4.383 0.120 1.909 0.058
isLab53 9.167 5.747 0.093 1.595 0.112
isLab54 11.229 3.818 0.197 2.941 0.004
isLab36 11.373 4.387 0.163 2.592 0.010
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Table C3 
Chemistry Laboratories Model Variation 3: Association between Independent Variables 
and the Number of Technical Issues Identified During an Audit 
Variable B Std. Error Beta t Sig. (p) 
(Constant) -9.999 4.973   -2.010 0.046
Duration -0.631 1.189 -0.049 -0.531 0.596
AuditorsPerMod 6.642 1.853 0.262 3.585 0.000
NumMods 2.142 0.594 0.295 3.607 0.000
Oversight -3.243 1.744 -0.111 -1.859 0.064
YearFrac 0.651 1.114 0.042 0.584 0.560
isLab39 -3.144 3.058 -0.096 -1.028 0.305
isLab33 -2.428 4.227 -0.039 -0.574 0.566
isLab60 -1.892 6.124 -0.018 -0.309 0.758
isLab37 -1.427 6.586 -0.013 -0.217 0.829
isLab25 -0.970 6.642 -0.009 -0.146 0.884
isLab26 -0.658 6.033 -0.009 -0.109 0.913
isLab35 -0.323 3.032 -0.010 -0.106 0.915
isLab7 -0.049 3.111 -0.002 -0.016 0.988
isLab46 0.012 3.310 0.000 0.004 0.997
isLab20 0.556 6.179 0.005 0.090 0.928
isLab2 0.643 3.540 0.013 0.182 0.856
isLab41 1.127 3.123 0.031 0.361 0.719
isLab19 1.373 3.975 0.026 0.345 0.730
isLab65 1.433 4.657 0.019 0.308 0.759
isLab28 1.932 3.250 0.051 0.594 0.553
isLab24 1.983 4.263 0.045 0.465 0.642
isLab44 2.434 6.534 0.023 0.373 0.710
isLab5 3.175 3.084 0.101 1.030 0.304
isLab59 3.175 3.560 0.066 0.892 0.373
isLab16 3.217 3.010 0.102 1.069 0.286
isLab21 3.328 3.065 0.102 1.086 0.279
isLab12 3.352 3.419 0.082 0.980 0.328
isLab49 3.531 3.414 0.080 1.034 0.302
isLab23 3.544 3.095 0.103 1.145 0.254
isLab4 3.551 3.373 0.113 1.053 0.294
isLab43 4.290 3.292 0.119 1.303 0.194
isLab18 4.353 3.017 0.139 1.443 0.151
isLab42 4.377 3.042 0.134 1.439 0.152
isLab36 4.521 4.675 0.060 0.967 0.335
isLab57 4.619 4.156 0.075 1.111 0.268
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Variable B Std. Error Beta t Sig. (p) 
isLab11 4.855 3.040 0.148 1.597 0.112
isLab17 5.178 4.153 0.084 1.247 0.214
isLab13 5.431 3.042 0.173 1.786 0.076
isLab53 6.835 6.123 0.064 1.116 0.266
isLab54 6.974 4.068 0.113 1.714 0.088
isLab9 7.922 3.112 0.252 2.545 0.012
isLab27 11.060 6.122 0.104 1.807 0.072
isLab30 12.716 6.149 0.120 2.068 0.040
isLab38 12.799 4.670 0.170 2.740 0.007
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Table C4 
Chemistry Laboratories Model Variation 4: Association between Independent Variables 
and the Number of Technical Findings Identified During an Audit 
Variable B Std. Error Beta t Sig. (p) 
(Constant) -3.326 2.966   -1.121 0.263
Duration 0.206 0.709 0.029 0.290 0.772
AuditorsPerMod 4.043 1.105 0.288 3.659 0.000
NumMods 0.573 0.354 0.143 1.617 0.107
Oversight -0.532 1.040 -0.033 -0.511 0.610
YearFrac 0.490 0.664 0.057 0.738 0.461
isLab39 -4.241 1.824 -0.234 -2.326 0.021
isLab37 -4.152 3.928 -0.071 -1.057 0.292
isLab60 -4.057 3.652 -0.069 -1.111 0.268
isLab30 -3.285 3.667 -0.056 -0.896 0.371
isLab20 -2.998 3.685 -0.051 -0.814 0.417
isLab28 -2.978 1.938 -0.141 -1.536 0.126
isLab25 -2.576 3.961 -0.044 -0.650 0.516
isLab7 -2.452 1.855 -0.141 -1.322 0.188
isLab26 -2.431 3.598 -0.058 -0.676 0.500
isLab44 -2.325 3.896 -0.039 -0.597 0.551
isLab23 -1.979 1.846 -0.104 -1.072 0.285
isLab19 -1.814 2.370 -0.061 -0.765 0.445
isLab33 -1.765 2.521 -0.052 -0.700 0.485
isLab35 -1.726 1.808 -0.095 -0.955 0.341
isLab46 -1.722 1.974 -0.086 -0.872 0.384
isLab65 -1.509 2.777 -0.036 -0.543 0.588
isLab41 -1.494 1.863 -0.075 -0.802 0.423
isLab2 -1.123 2.111 -0.042 -0.532 0.595
isLab42 -1.106 1.814 -0.061 -0.610 0.543
isLab57 -1.102 2.478 -0.032 -0.445 0.657
isLab27 -1.094 3.651 -0.019 -0.300 0.765
isLab59 -0.933 2.123 -0.035 -0.440 0.661
isLab24 -0.806 2.542 -0.033 -0.317 0.751
isLab4 -0.798 2.011 -0.046 -0.397 0.692
isLab5 -0.795 1.839 -0.046 -0.432 0.666
isLab16 -0.397 1.795 -0.023 -0.221 0.825
isLab53 -0.263 3.651 -0.004 -0.072 0.943
isLab11 -0.242 1.813 -0.013 -0.133 0.894
isLab43 -0.154 1.963 -0.008 -0.079 0.937
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Variable B Std. Error Beta t Sig. (p) 
isLab12 -0.031 2.039 -0.001 -0.015 0.988
isLab18 0.436 1.799 0.025 0.243 0.809
isLab21 0.667 1.828 0.037 0.365 0.716
isLab9 0.762 1.856 0.044 0.411 0.682
isLab36 1.143 2.788 0.027 0.410 0.682
isLab49 1.262 2.036 0.052 0.620 0.536
isLab54 2.082 2.426 0.061 0.858 0.392
isLab17 2.142 2.477 0.063 0.865 0.388
isLab13 2.277 1.814 0.131 1.255 0.211
isLab38 4.244 2.785 0.102 1.524 0.129
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APPENDIX D 
RADIATION LABORATORIES MODEL RESULTS 
Table D1 
Radiation Laboratories Model Variation 1: Association between Independent Variables 
and the Number of Issues Identified During an Audit 
Variable B Std. Error Beta t Sig. (p) 
(Constant) -32.374 9.825   -3.295 0.001
Duration 1.763 2.444 0.065 0.722 0.472
AuditorsPerMod 8.041 2.632 0.246 3.055 0.003
NumMods 5.555 1.122 0.580 4.952 0.000
Oversight -6.292 3.236 -0.124 -1.944 0.054
YearFrac 1.854 1.268 0.101 1.463 0.146
isLab35 1.696 4.862 0.037 0.349 0.728
isLab2 2.080 5.656 0.031 0.368 0.714
isLab44 2.364 10.876 0.016 0.217 0.828
isLab19 4.525 5.339 0.098 0.848 0.398
isLab23 5.352 4.927 0.111 1.086 0.279
isLab4 5.772 5.409 0.130 1.067 0.288
isLab18 6.650 5.180 0.124 1.284 0.201
isLab30 6.768 9.867 0.045 0.686 0.494
isLab33 6.933 10.187 0.046 0.681 0.497
isLab61 8.425 5.406 0.147 1.558 0.121
isLab42 8.431 4.953 0.174 1.702 0.091
isLab43 8.679 5.214 0.171 1.665 0.098
isLab11 9.021 4.833 0.195 1.866 0.064
isLab20 9.277 9.924 0.062 0.935 0.351
isLab37 9.336 7.359 0.124 1.269 0.207
isLab5 9.460 4.976 0.213 1.901 0.059
isLab48 10.209 11.145 0.068 0.916 0.361
isLab14 10.470 5.001 0.235 2.093 0.038
isLab9 11.897 5.030 0.268 2.365 0.019
isLab21 12.381 5.490 0.200 2.255 0.026
isLab10 15.618 5.761 0.231 2.711 0.008
isLab40 16.189 5.033 0.350 3.217 0.002
isLab47 18.695 6.932 0.216 2.697 0.008
isLab38 20.155 7.462 0.190 2.701 0.008
isLab53 23.409 9.773 0.157 2.395 0.018
isLab8 25.946 5.383 0.452 4.820 0.000
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Table D2 
Radiation Laboratories Model Variation 2: Association between Independent Variables 
and the Number of Findings Identified During an Audit 
Variable B Std. Error Beta t Sig. (p) 
(Constant) -15.731 5.652   -2.783 0.006
Duration 2.223 1.406 0.153 1.581 0.116
AuditorsPerMod 3.256 1.514 0.184 2.151 0.033
NumMods 2.062 0.645 0.398 3.195 0.002
Oversight -0.659 1.861 -0.024 -0.354 0.724
YearFrac 2.015 0.729 0.203 2.764 0.006
islab30 -6.680 5.676 -0.083 -1.177 0.241
islab44 -5.456 6.256 -0.068 -0.872 0.385
islab35 -1.566 2.797 -0.063 -0.560 0.576
islab23 -1.468 2.834 -0.056 -0.518 0.605
islab19 -0.937 3.071 -0.037 -0.305 0.761
islab4 -0.425 3.111 -0.018 -0.137 0.891
islab2 -0.265 3.253 -0.007 -0.081 0.935
islab42 -0.006 2.849 0.000 -0.002 0.998
islab11 0.817 2.780 0.033 0.294 0.769
islab14 1.216 2.877 0.051 0.423 0.673
islab61 1.625 3.110 0.052 0.523 0.602
islab37 1.941 4.233 0.048 0.459 0.647
islab43 1.995 2.999 0.072 0.665 0.507
islab48 2.594 6.411 0.032 0.405 0.686
islab20 2.614 5.709 0.032 0.458 0.648
islab18 3.050 2.980 0.105 1.024 0.308
islab9 3.458 2.893 0.144 1.195 0.234
islab5 3.790 2.862 0.158 1.324 0.188
islab33 4.096 5.860 0.051 0.699 0.486
islab40 6.341 2.895 0.253 2.190 0.030
islab21 6.533 3.158 0.195 2.069 0.040
islab47 7.344 3.987 0.157 1.842 0.068
islab8 8.153 3.097 0.263 2.633 0.009
islab38 8.700 4.292 0.152 2.027 0.044
islab10 8.950 3.314 0.245 2.701 0.008
islab53 9.934 5.622 0.123 1.767 0.079
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Table D3 
Radiation Laboratories Model Variation 3: Association between Independent Variables 
and the Number of Technical Issues Identified During an Audit 
Variable B Std. Error Beta t Sig. (p) 
(Constant) -18.126 6.560   -2.763 0.006
Duration 0.876 1.632 0.050 0.537 0.592
AuditorsPerMod 5.958 1.757 0.282 3.391 0.001
NumMods 3.027 0.749 0.489 4.041 0.000
Oversight -2.609 2.160 -0.079 -1.208 0.229
YearFrac 0.562 0.846 0.047 0.664 0.507
isLab33 -1.114 6.801 -0.012 -0.164 0.870
isLab44 -0.756 7.261 -0.008 -0.104 0.917
isLab19 -0.706 3.565 -0.024 -0.198 0.843
isLab20 -0.250 6.626 -0.003 -0.038 0.970
isLab35 -0.178 3.246 -0.006 -0.055 0.956
isLab2 0.603 3.776 0.014 0.160 0.873
isLab14 0.875 3.339 0.030 0.262 0.794
isLab61 1.167 3.610 0.031 0.323 0.747
isLab4 2.702 3.611 0.094 0.748 0.456
isLab5 2.729 3.322 0.095 0.821 0.413
isLab23 3.861 3.289 0.123 1.174 0.242
isLab18 3.897 3.458 0.112 1.127 0.262
isLab40 3.948 3.360 0.132 1.175 0.242
isLab48 4.253 7.441 0.044 0.572 0.568
isLab42 4.531 3.307 0.145 1.370 0.173
isLab47 4.832 4.628 0.086 1.044 0.298
isLab11 5.167 3.227 0.173 1.601 0.111
isLab37 5.382 4.913 0.111 1.095 0.275
isLab10 5.976 3.846 0.137 1.554 0.122
isLab43 6.209 3.481 0.189 1.784 0.077
isLab21 7.011 3.666 0.175 1.913 0.058
isLab9 7.426 3.358 0.258 2.211 0.029
isLab53 7.701 6.525 0.080 1.180 0.240
isLab8 11.294 3.594 0.304 3.142 0.002
isLab30 11.789 6.588 0.122 1.790 0.076
isLab38 12.765 4.982 0.187 2.562 0.011
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Table D4 
Radiation Laboratories Model Variation 4: Association between Independent Variables 
and the Number of Technical Findings Identified During an Audit 
Variable B Std. Error Beta t Sig. (p) 
(Constant) -9.105 3.839   -2.372 0.019
Duration 1.501 0.955 0.163 1.572 0.118
AuditorsPerMod 2.549 1.028 0.228 2.479 0.014
NumMods 1.128 0.438 0.345 2.572 0.011
Oversight -0.087 1.264 -0.005 -0.069 0.945
YearFrac 0.886 0.495 0.141 1.788 0.076
isLab44 -5.027 4.250 -0.099 -1.183 0.239
isLab30 -3.643 3.856 -0.071 -0.945 0.346
isLab20 -3.140 3.878 -0.062 -0.810 0.419
isLab19 -2.583 2.086 -0.163 -1.238 0.218
isLab61 -1.778 2.113 -0.091 -0.841 0.401
isLab23 -1.582 1.925 -0.096 -0.822 0.413
isLab33 -1.410 3.981 -0.028 -0.354 0.724
isLab35 -1.368 1.900 -0.086 -0.720 0.473
isLab42 -1.011 1.936 -0.061 -0.523 0.602
isLab2 -0.936 2.210 -0.041 -0.423 0.673
isLab14 -0.883 1.954 -0.058 -0.452 0.652
isLab5 -0.654 1.944 -0.043 -0.336 0.737
isLab4 -0.604 2.113 -0.040 -0.286 0.775
isLab40 0.241 1.967 0.015 0.122 0.903
isLab11 0.268 1.889 0.017 0.142 0.887
isLab53 0.388 3.819 0.008 0.102 0.919
isLab37 0.508 2.876 0.020 0.177 0.860
isLab9 0.925 1.966 0.061 0.471 0.639
isLab47 0.939 2.709 0.032 0.347 0.729
isLab48 1.246 4.355 0.024 0.286 0.775
isLab43 1.527 2.037 0.088 0.749 0.455
isLab18 1.636 2.024 0.089 0.808 0.420
isLab10 2.193 2.251 0.095 0.974 0.332
isLab8 2.719 2.103 0.139 1.292 0.198
isLab21 3.068 2.145 0.145 1.430 0.155
isLab38 4.405 2.916 0.122 1.511 0.133
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APPENDIX E 
FULL-SERVICE LABORATORIES MODEL RESULTS 
Table E1 
Full-Service Laboratories Model Variation 1: Association between Independent 
Variables and the Number of Issues Identified During an Audit 
Variable B Std. Error Beta t Sig. (p) 
(Constant) -36.047 14.775   -2.440 0.017
Duration 2.277 3.281 0.073 0.694 0.489
AuditorsPerMod 11.585 4.371 0.278 2.651 0.009
NumMods 5.558 1.751 0.423 3.173 0.002
Oversight -6.090 4.491 -0.125 -1.356 0.178
YearFrac 1.184 4.675 0.021 0.253 0.801
isLab35 1.140 5.250 0.029 0.217 0.829
isLab44 1.335 12.318 0.011 0.108 0.914
isLab2 1.371 6.074 0.024 0.226 0.822
isLab4 2.779 6.512 0.073 0.427 0.670
isLab37 4.282 12.585 0.034 0.340 0.734
isLab23 4.436 5.359 0.108 0.828 0.410
isLab18 5.544 5.663 0.121 0.979 0.330
isLab19 5.982 7.236 0.094 0.827 0.410
isLab30 6.040 10.653 0.048 0.567 0.572
isLab43 7.404 6.206 0.171 1.193 0.236
isLab42 7.873 5.371 0.182 1.466 0.146
isLab20 8.013 10.735 0.064 0.747 0.457
isLab11 8.052 5.260 0.204 1.531 0.129
isLab5 8.106 5.541 0.213 1.463 0.147
isLab9 10.389 5.658 0.273 1.836 0.069
isLab21 10.589 6.297 0.186 1.682 0.096
isLab38 19.491 7.990 0.219 2.439 0.017
isLab53 22.857 10.573 0.182 2.162 0.033
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Table E2 
Full-Service Laboratories Model Variation 2: Association between Independent 
Variables and the Number of Findings Identified During an Audit 
Variable B Std. Error Beta t Sig. (p) 
(Constant) -15.146 8.355   -1.813 0.073
Duration 2.233 1.855 0.134 1.203 0.232
AuditorsPerMod 6.596 2.471 0.296 2.669 0.009
NumMods 1.595 0.990 0.227 1.611 0.111
Oversight -0.776 2.540 -0.030 -0.305 0.761
YearFrac 1.040 2.644 0.035 0.393 0.695
isLab30 -6.810 6.024 -0.102 -1.131 0.261
isLab44 -5.383 6.966 -0.080 -0.773 0.442
isLab37 -3.161 7.116 -0.047 -0.444 0.658
isLab4 -2.649 3.682 -0.131 -0.719 0.474
isLab23 -2.420 3.030 -0.110 -0.799 0.426
isLab35 -2.080 2.969 -0.099 -0.701 0.485
isLab2 -0.839 3.434 -0.028 -0.244 0.808
isLab19 -0.594 4.092 -0.018 -0.145 0.885
isLab42 -0.301 3.037 -0.013 -0.099 0.921
isLab11 -0.205 2.975 -0.010 -0.069 0.945
isLab43 0.026 3.509 0.001 0.007 0.994
isLab20 2.007 6.070 0.030 0.331 0.742
isLab18 2.192 3.202 0.090 0.685 0.495
isLab9 2.415 3.199 0.119 0.755 0.452
isLab5 2.861 3.133 0.141 0.913 0.363
isLab21 5.540 3.561 0.182 1.556 0.123
isLab38 8.191 4.518 0.172 1.813 0.073
isLab53 9.117 5.979 0.136 1.525 0.131
 
  
 148 
 
Table E3  
Full-Service Laboratories Model Variation 3: Association between Independent 
Variables and the Number of Technical Issues Identified During an Audit 
Variable B Std. Error Beta t Sig. (p) 
(Constant) -24.653 10.257   -2.403 0.018
Duration 1.527 2.278 0.074 0.670 0.504
AuditorsPerMod 7.561 3.034 0.276 2.492 0.014
NumMods 3.776 1.216 0.438 3.106 0.002
Oversight -2.225 3.118 -0.070 -0.713 0.477
YearFrac 0.279 3.246 0.008 0.086 0.932
isLab44 -2.208 8.552 -0.027 -0.258 0.797
isLab20 -1.720 7.452 -0.021 -0.231 0.818
isLab35 -0.528 3.644 -0.020 -0.145 0.885
isLab2 0.133 4.216 0.004 0.031 0.975
isLab4 0.513 4.521 0.021 0.113 0.910
isLab5 1.533 3.847 0.061 0.398 0.691
isLab19 2.131 5.023 0.051 0.424 0.672
isLab37 2.137 8.737 0.026 0.245 0.807
isLab18 3.062 3.931 0.102 0.779 0.438
isLab23 3.673 3.720 0.136 0.987 0.326
isLab42 4.165 3.728 0.147 1.117 0.267
isLab11 4.853 3.652 0.187 1.329 0.187
isLab21 6.033 4.371 0.161 1.380 0.171
isLab9 6.098 3.928 0.244 1.552 0.124
isLab43 6.821 4.308 0.240 1.583 0.117
isLab53 8.045 7.340 0.098 1.096 0.276
isLab30 10.563 7.395 0.128 1.428 0.156
isLab38 12.314 5.547 0.211 2.220 0.029
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Table E4 
Full-Service Laboratories Model Variation 4: Association between Independent 
Variables and the Number of Technical Findings Identified During an Audit 
Variable B Std. Error Beta t Sig. (p) 
(Constant) -9.797 5.835   -1.679 0.096
Duration 1.506 1.296 0.139 1.162 0.248
AuditorsPerMod 4.775 1.726 0.330 2.766 0.007
NumMods 0.982 0.692 0.215 1.419 0.159
Oversight 0.227 1.774 0.013 0.128 0.898
YearFrac 0.512 1.846 0.026 0.277 0.782
isLab44 -5.007 4.865 -0.115 -1.029 0.306
isLab30 -3.921 4.207 -0.090 -0.932 0.354
isLab20 -3.759 4.239 -0.086 -0.887 0.378
isLab37 -3.263 4.970 -0.075 -0.656 0.513
isLab4 -2.278 2.572 -0.173 -0.886 0.378
isLab23 -2.205 2.116 -0.154 -1.042 0.300
isLab19 -2.107 2.858 -0.096 -0.737 0.463
isLab35 -1.759 2.073 -0.128 -0.848 0.398
isLab5 -1.385 2.188 -0.105 -0.633 0.528
isLab2 -1.352 2.399 -0.068 -0.563 0.574
isLab42 -1.103 2.121 -0.074 -0.520 0.604
isLab11 -0.360 2.078 -0.026 -0.173 0.863
isLab53 -0.087 4.176 -0.002 -0.021 0.983
isLab9 0.111 2.235 0.008 0.050 0.961
isLab43 0.435 2.451 0.029 0.178 0.859
isLab18 1.013 2.236 0.064 0.453 0.652
isLab21 2.381 2.487 0.120 0.957 0.341
isLab38 4.014 3.156 0.130 1.272 0.206
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APPENDIX F 
SOURCE DATA 
Table F1 
Source Data:  DOECAP Audit Results FY2000 – FY2012. 
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1 2 4 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 2 4 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 5 1 0 0 0 0
3 2 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 3 2 0 1 0 0
4 2 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 2 3 0 1 4 0
5 2 7 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 2 3 0
6 2 7 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 4 0 0 2 0 0
7 3 8 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 5 2 4 0 0 0
8 4 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 1 0 0 6 6 0
9 4 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 1 3 0 4 3 0
10 4 9 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 1 3 0 0 1 0
11 4 9 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 3 5 0 0 1 0
12 4 7 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 0 3 0 1 1 0
13 4 10 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 2 1 0 3 2 0
14 4 9 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 2 0 0 2 3 0
15 4 8 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 2 0 1 4 0
16 4 7 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 4 1 0 2 2 0
17 4 6 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 3 3 0 2 3 0
18 4 7 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 2 2 0 3 3 0
19 4 15 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 4 0 0 9 0 0
20 4 9 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 5 2 0 1 5 0
21 5 7 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
22 5 7 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 7 1 0 0 1 0
23 5 7 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 4 0 0 1 4 0
24 5 7 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 1 2 0 1 2 0
25 5 6 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 4 3 0 0 0 0
26 5 8 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 3 1 0 2 0 0
27 5 7 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 5 5 0 3 2 0
28 5 6 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 3 2 0 0 0 0
29 5 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 5 4 0 4 3 0
30 5 4 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 2 3 0 1 0 0
31 5 6 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 3 0 1 2 0
32 5 8 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 4 3 0 5 10 0
33 5 8 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 5 1 0 0 10 0
34 6 6 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 1 5 1 0 3 1 1
35 7 6 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 4 3 0 2 0 0
36 7 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 2 0 0 1 1 0
37 7 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 0 3 0 0
38 7 4 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 3 1 0 2 4 0
39 7 3 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 2 1 0 0 2 0
40 7 6 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 2 2 0 1 0 0
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1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 1 1 0 5 5 0 0 2 0 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 1 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 2 2 0 7 0 0 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 1 0 1 0 4 0 0 0 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 1 0 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 3 2 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 3 4 0 4 6 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 1 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 2 2 0 1 3 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
17 3 2 0 2 0 0 0 6 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 1 3 0 2 9 0 0 5 0 4 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
19 7 7 0 4 7 0 0 4 0 5 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 3 3 0 3 0 0 3 0 0 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
21 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
22 3 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
23 0 1 0 1 3 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
24 0 1 0 1 3 0 0 1 0 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
25 0 2 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
26 1 7 0 2 2 0 4 1 0 4 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
27 1 2 0 4 4 0 0 0 0 6 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
28 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
29 1 4 0 4 1 0 0 1 0 8 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
30 2 3 0 2 4 0 2 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
31 0 1 0 2 5 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
32 1 3 0 10 6 0 1 4 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
33 0 3 0 5 1 0 1 0 0 11 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
34 3 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
35 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
36 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
37 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 7 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
38 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
39 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
40 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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R
ec
or
d 
# 
O
vs
O
 
Is
su
es
 
Te
ch
ni
ca
lIs
su
es
 
Fi
nd
in
gs
 
Te
ch
ni
ca
lF
in
di
ng
s 
PI
 
PI
I 
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 
D
ur
at
io
n 
A
ud
ito
rs
Pe
rM
o d
 
Y
ea
rF
ra
c 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0.80 1.127
2 0 10 3 8 2 0 8 2 3 0.80 1.034
3 0 26 13 11 7 0 11 15 3 1.00 1.055
4 0 17 9 6 3 0 6 11 3 1.00 1.033
5 0 11 9 7 6 0 7 4 3 1.40 1.114
6 0 18 6 18 6 0 18 0 3 1.17  
7 0 33 15 27 13 4 23 6 2 1.60  
8 0 24 18 11 8 1 10 13 3 1.67 1.034
9 0 20 13 12 9 1 11 8 3 1.67 0.940
10 0 8 1 1 0 0 1 7 3 1.50 1.016
11 0 20 11 8 5 0 8 12 3 1.80 0.959
12 0 17 6 4 3 0 4 13 3 1.17 1.034
13 0 27 22 13 10 0 13 14 3 1.67 0.959
14 0 17 11 7 4 0 7 10 4 1.80 1.151
15 0 13 9 2 2 0 2 11 3 1.60 0.904
16 0 19 12 10 5 0 10 9 4 1.17 0.880
17 0 27 12 11 7 0 11 16 4 1.20 0.934
18 0 41 21 12 6 0 12 29 3 1.17 1.003
19 0 58 34 29 20 0 29 29 4 2.50 1.357
20 0 31 15 20 7 0 20 11 3 1.50  
21 0 10 4 6 3 1 5 4 3 1.40 0.880
22 0 15 5 12 3 0 12 3 3 1.17 1.266
23 0 16 10 7 2 0 7 9 3 1.17 0.997
24 0 19 8 7 2 0 7 12 3 1.17 1.015
25 0 17 5 9 1 0 9 8 3 1.20 0.995
26 0 36 14 16 5 0 16 20 3 1.33 1.016
27 0 39 16 19 8 0 19 20 3 1.40 1.281
28 0 12 3 8 2 0 8 4 3 1.00 0.691
29 0 38 17 22 9 0 22 16 3 1.00 0.956
30 0 23 12 11 5 0 11 12 3 0.67 0.940
31 0 18 11 4 3 0 4 14 3 1.20 1.036
32 0 53 35 24 16 0 24 29 3 1.33 1.048
33 0 39 19 22 5 0 22 17 2 1.60  
34 0 27 8 25 7 4 21 2 3 1.20  
35 0 12 4 8 3 0 8 4 3 1.50 0.975
36 0 14 8 8 5 0 8 6 3 1.25 1.189
37 0 16 3 11 3 0 11 5 3 1.00 0.978
38 0 15 9 7 3 0 7 8 3 0.80 0.748
39 0 7 4 3 1 0 3 4 3 1.00 0.861
40 0 10 3 5 2 0 5 5 3 1.50 1.170
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Table F1 continued. 
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41 7 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 2 0 0 1 0 0
42 7 6 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 2 1 0 0 2 0
43 7 6 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 2 1 0 1 4 0
44 7 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 1 2 0 0 4 0
45 7 8 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 2 1 0 0 2 0
46 7 7 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 6 0 0 4 4 0
47 7 5 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 4 0 6 1 0 2 6 0
48 8 4 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 0 3 1 0 0 0 0
49 8 4 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 0 6 3 0 0 0 0
50 8 4 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 3 3 0 0 0 0
51 8 4 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 1 4 0 0 0 0
52 8 3 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 2 4 0 0 0 0
53 8 5 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 0 4 5 0 0 0 0
54 8 4 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 0 2 4 0 0 0 0
55 8 6 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 0 2 3 0 0 1 0
56 9 7 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 2 0 0 3 1 0
57 9 7 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 0 5 5 0
58 9 6 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 0 2 0 1 4 0
59 9 7 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 8 1 0 0 5 0
60 9 7 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
61 9 9 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 3 1 0 0 0 0
62 9 9 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 3 2 0 3 8 0
63 9 8 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 5 6 0 1 1 0
64 9 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 2 2 0 0 4 0
65 9 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 2 1 0 3 1 0
66 9 6 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 1 3 0 3 1 0
67 9 6 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 3 3 0 3 15 0
68 9 4 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
69 10 3 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
70 10 4 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
71 10 4 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 0 3 1 0 0 0 0
72 10 5 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 0 7 2 0 0 0 0
73 10 4 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 2 2 0 0 0 0
74 10 6 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 4 2 1 1 0 0 0 0
75 11 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 5 0 1 0 0 0 2 0
76 11 6 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 5 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
77 11 5 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
78 11 3 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
79 11 3 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
80 11 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 2 2 0 0 1 0
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Table F1 continued. 
R
ec
or
d 
# 
@
3I
N
II
 
@
3I
N
O
 
@
4R
A
D
I 
@
4R
A
D
II
 
@
4R
A
D
O
 
@
5L
IM
SI
 
@
5L
IM
SI
I 
@
5L
IM
SO
 
@
6H
R
I 
@
6H
R
II
 
@
6H
R
O
 
@
7G
EI
 
@
7G
EI
I 
@
7G
EO
 
@
8A
Q
TI
 
@
8A
Q
TI
I 
@
8A
Q
TO
 
@
9N
D
A
I 
@
9N
D
A
II
 
@
9N
D
A
O
 
O
vs
I 
O
vs
II
 
41 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
42 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
43 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
44 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
45 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
46 5 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
47 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 7 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
48 0 0 1 6 1 0 4 1 0 2 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
49 0 0 0 9 1 0 3 2 0 3 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
50 0 0 0 9 13 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
51 0 0 0 4 6 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
52 0 0 0 5 11 0 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
53 0 0 0 5 17 0 0 5 0 3 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
54 0 0 0 5 6 0 3 1 0 2 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
55 0 0 0 4 1 0 3 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
56 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
57 1 4 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
58 1 1 0 0 3 0 0 2 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
59 1 3 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
60 1 5 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
61 3 4 1 11 5 0 1 4 1 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
62 1 3 0 5 4 0 1 3 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
63 0 3 0 2 5 0 0 0 0 7 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
64 4 8 0 5 1 0 1 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
65 1 4 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
66 1 7 0 4 1 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
67 3 6 0 4 3 0 1 4 0 5 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
68 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
69 0 0 0 3 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
70 0 0 0 4 2 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
71 0 0 0 8 2 0 1 5 0 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
72 0 0 0 8 6 0 4 2 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
73 0 0 2 2 0 1 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
74 0 0 3 2 3 0 9 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
75 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 1 0 0
76 1 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 0 0
77 0 0 0 6 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0
78 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0
79 1 1 0 5 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
80 0 0 0 6 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table F1 continued. 
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41 0 10 2 5 2 0 5 5 3 1.25 1.016
42 0 14 6 5 1 0 5 9 3 1.50 1.034
43 0 16 9 9 4 0 9 7 3 1.50 0.861
44 0 14 9 3 1 0 3 11 3 1.25 0.825
45 0 15 5 5 2 0 5 10 3 1.60 0.997
46 0 29 15 18 9 0 18 11 3 1.40 1.283
47 0 35 9 17 3 0 17 18 3 1.25  
48 0 25 8 16 7 1 15 9 3 1.00 1.074
49 0 35 10 21 9 0 21 14 3 1.00 3.853
50 0 31 22 12 9 0 12 19 3 1.33 1.015
51 0 23 10 9 4 0 9 14 3 1.33 0.915
52 0 26 16 9 5 0 9 17 3 1.00 1.019
53 0 43 22 12 5 0 12 31 3 1.25 1.074
54 0 30 11 12 5 0 12 18 3 1.00 0.995
55 0 24 6 19 4 0 19 5 3 1.50  
56 0 14 7 12 6 1 11 2 3 1.17 0.995
57 0 21 17 9 8 0 9 12 3 1.17 0.863
58 0 18 10 3 2 0 3 15 3 1.00 1.151
59 0 24 11 14 2 0 14 10 3 1.17 0.901
60 0 17 13 3 2 1 2 14 3 1.40 1.034
61 0 39 24 21 15 2 19 18 3 1.50 1.014
62 0 36 24 14 9 0 14 22 3 1.50 0.942
63 0 36 12 15 3 0 15 21 3 1.60 1.073
64 0 32 22 13 9 0 13 19 3 1.00 0.861
65 0 18 11 10 6 0 10 8 3 1.00 0.975
66 0 25 17 11 8 0 11 14 3 1.00 1.038
67 0 54 34 19 10 0 19 35 3 1.00 0.975
68 0 9 3 5 3 0 5 4 3 0.80  
69 0 9 9 3 3 0 3 6 3 1.00 0.838
70 0 12 6 8 4 0 8 4 3 1.00 0.943
71 0 25 10 15 8 0 15 10 3 1.00 1.016
72 0 34 14 24 8 0 24 10 3 1.25 1.282
73 0 17 4 15 4 3 12 2 3 1.33 1.015
74 0 22 8 17 5 5 12 5 3 1.50  
75 0 19 5 15 2 0 15 4 3 1.00 0.959
76 0 16 7 5 3 0 5 11 3 1.20 1.036
77 0 20 12 8 7 1 7 12 3 1.25 0.921
78 0 11 2 2 1 0 2 9 3 0.75 0.956
79 0 10 9 6 6 0 6 4 3 1.00 0.959
80 0 13 9 8 6 0 8 5 3 1.25 1.151
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81 11 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 4 0 0 2 0
82 11 4 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 2 1 0 0 0 0
83 11 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 4 0 2 1 0
84 11 6 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 0 7 0 2 3 0
85 11 7 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 1 3 0 1 5 0
86 11 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 2 2 0 4 9 0
87 12 7 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 1 4 5 1 3 1 0
88 12 7 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 6 4 0 1 1 0
89 12 7 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 6 4 0 1 0 0
90 12 7 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 2 0 2 1 0
91 12 7 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 2 0 0 2 1 0
92 12 6 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 6 5 0 2 9 0
93 12 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 3 0 0 2 5 0
94 12 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 0 10 3 0 9 14 0
95 13 5 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 3 2 0 6 0 0
96 13 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 2 1 0 4 1 3
97 13 6 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
98 13 6 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 1 1 0 6 1 0
99 13 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 5 0 1 3 1 0
100 13 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 3 0 2 2 0
101 13 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 1 4 0 1 1 0
102 13 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 1 4 0 2 3 0
103 13 6 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 3 0 1 1 0
104 13 7 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 1 3 0 2 4 0
105 13 7 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 3 4 0 3 5 0
106 13 6 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 6 3 0 9 5 0
107 13 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 5 0 12 3 0 6 8 0
108 14 6 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
109 14 4 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
110 14 4 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 4 4 0 0 0 0
111 14 5 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 0 1 2 0 0 0 0
112 14 4 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 5 0 0 0 0
113 14 5 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
114 14 6 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 0 0 3 0 0 0 0
115 14 4 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
116 14 3 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 1 3 0 0 0 0
117 14 5 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 0
118 14 5 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
119 14 5 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 0 0 11 0 0 0 0
120 14 4 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 0 1 7 0 0 1 0
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81 0 1 0 5 3 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
82 0 1 0 4 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
83 0 8 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
84 0 6 0 3 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
85 2 2 0 5 11 0 0 2 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
86 3 4 0 6 7 0 1 0 0 6 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
87 7 1 0 0 0 0 6 2 0 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
88 2 6 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
89 9 3 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
90 1 4 0 0 0 0 2 3 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
91 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
92 3 1 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 1 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
93 4 8 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
94 9 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
95 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
96 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
97 5 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
98 5 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
99 4 3 0 0 0 0 1 4 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
100 4 2 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
101 5 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
102 5 5 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
103 2 3 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 3 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
104 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
105 7 8 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
106 6 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
107 5 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
108 0 0 0 4 1 0 0 4 0 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
109 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
110 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
111 0 0 0 6 1 0 7 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
112 0 0 0 10 1 0 0 0 0 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
113 0 0 0 5 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
114 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 3 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
115 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
116 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
117 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
118 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
119 0 0 0 0 4 0 1 7 0 3 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
120 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 2 0 3 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 158 
 
Table F1 continued. 
R
ec
or
d 
# 
O
vs
O
 
Is
su
es
 
Te
ch
ni
ca
lIs
su
es
 
Fi
nd
in
gs
 
Te
ch
ni
ca
lF
in
di
ng
s 
PI
 
PI
I 
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 
D
ur
at
io
n 
A
ud
ito
rs
Pe
rM
o d
 
Y
ea
rF
ra
c 
81 0 19 11 7 5 0 7 12 3 1.00 0.844
82 0 12 7 6 4 0 6 6 3 1.00 1.015
83 0 18 12 2 2 0 2 16 3 1.00 0.940
84 0 24 16 5 5 0 5 19 3 1.00 1.016
85 0 36 26 10 8 0 10 26 3 1.17 0.981
86 0 46 33 22 13 0 22 24 3 0.83  
87 0 38 13 28 11 2 26 10 3 1.40 1.214
88 0 30 10 11 3 0 11 19 3 1.40 0.767
89 0 33 13 22 10 0 22 11 3 1.40 0.825
90 0 17 8 5 3 0 5 12 3 1.40 1.015
91 0 11 4 8 3 0 8 3 2 1.40 0.841
92 0 38 15 15 5 0 15 23 3 1.20 1.132
93 0 30 19 13 6 0 13 17 2 1.00 1.037
94 0 56 34 37 19 2 35 19 3 1.25  
95 0 15 6 12 6 0 12 3 3 1.00 0.995
96 0 19 10 9 7 3 6 10 3 1.00 1.016
97 0 16 7 9 6 0 9 7 3 1.20 0.959
98 0 21 14 15 11 0 15 6 3 1.20 0.997
99 0 26 12 15 8 1 14 11 3 1.00 1.034
100 0 21 10 10 6 0 10 11 3 1.00 0.940
101 0 22 9 8 6 0 8 14 3 1.00 1.052
102 0 31 15 14 7 0 14 17 3 1.00 0.764
103 0 23 7 8 3 0 8 15 2 1.20 1.018
104 0 18 9 9 4 0 9 9 3 1.40 0.997
105 0 39 23 16 10 0 16 23 3 1.40 0.975
106 0 40 25 24 15 0 24 16 2 1.20 1.034
107 0 42 20 29 11 0 29 13 2 1.00  
108 0 15 5 8 4 0 8 7 3 1.50 1.015
109 0 7 2 4 2 0 4 3 3 1.33 1.074
110 0 12 0 7 0 0 7 5 3 1.33 0.940
111 0 19 7 15 6 0 15 4 3 1.25 0.959
112 0 22 11 11 10 0 11 11 3 1.33 1.034
113 0 10 7 5 5 0 5 5 3 1.67 1.036
114 0 13 3 2 1 0 2 11 3 1.50 0.844
115 0 10 3 4 1 0 4 6 3 1.33 0.901
116 0 12 4 4 2 0 4 8 3 1.00 0.956
117 0 9 2 0 0 0 0 9 3 1.25 0.904
118 0 7 2 1 0 0 1 6 2 1.25 0.995
119 0 40 4 4 0 0 4 36 3 1.25 0.923
120 0 25 4 7 2 0 7 18 2 1.00  
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121 16 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 1 1 0 2 0 0
122 16 7 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 0 0 2 0
123 16 4 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 3 4 0 2 0 0
124 16 4 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 2 3 0 1 1 0
125 16 6 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 2 1 0 3 3 0
126 16 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
127 16 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 2 6 0 1 0 0
128 16 4 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 4 0 3 3 0 1 1 0
129 16 4 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 2 4 0 0 1 0
130 16 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 1 3 0 0 4 0
131 16 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 1 10 5 0 2 4 0
132 16 6 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 5 3 0 1 3 0
133 16 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 9 8 0 10 9 0
134 17 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 5 3 0 0 5 0
135 17 6 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 6 4 0 5 1 0
136 17 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 1 4 0 1 1 0
137 17 7 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 2 2 0 2 3 0
138 18 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 7 3 0 1 0 0
139 18 7 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 3 2 0 1 1 0
140 18 7 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 3 2 0 0 0 0
141 18 6 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
142 18 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 1 1 0 2 1 0
143 18 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 1 0 0 1 3 0
144 18 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 2 1 0 5 4 0
145 18 6 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 0 2 0 1 1 0
146 18 4 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 4 0 2 3 0 2 3 0
147 18 3 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 2 2 0 3 3 0
148 18 6 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 1 0 0 0 3 0
149 18 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 3 1 0 0 4 0
150 18 7 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 4 3 0 0 4 0
151 19 5 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
152 19 4 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 3 0 0 0 0
153 19 5 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 6 2 0 0 0 0
154 19 5 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 3 1 0 0 0 0
155 19 3 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
156 19 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
157 19 6 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 5 3 0 0 0 0
158 19 6 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 8 0 0 0 0
159 19 5 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
160 19 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
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121 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
122 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 3 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
123 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
124 3 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
125 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 3 0 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
126 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 5 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
127 4 8 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 3 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
128 3 5 0 0 0 0 2 5 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
129 3 2 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
130 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
131 5 5 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
132 7 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
133 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
134 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
135 3 2 1 10 3 0 1 3 0 2 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
136 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
137 6 0 0 6 6 0 4 5 0 5 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
138 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
139 1 1 0 6 0 0 0 2 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
140 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
141 0 1 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
142 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
143 1 2 0 5 1 0 0 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
144 3 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
145 5 6 0 12 10 0 1 0 0 5 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
146 2 5 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
147 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
148 2 6 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 6 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
149 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
150 8 0 1 0 1 0 3 0 0 3 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
151 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
152 3 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
153 0 5 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
154 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
155 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
156 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
157 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
158 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
159 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
160 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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121 0 12 7 9 5 0 9 3 3 1.00 1.015
122 0 14 3 3 0 0 3 11 3 1.40 0.805
123 0 17 6 12 6 0 12 5 3 0.80 1.112
124 0 17 6 10 4 0 10 7 3 0.80 0.981
125 0 24 10 13 5 0 13 11 3 1.20 1.051
126 0 19 6 9 3 0 9 10 3 1.00 0.997
127 0 31 13 11 5 0 11 20 3 1.00 0.997
128 0 29 10 12 4 0 12 17 3 1.00 0.805
129 0 24 6 8 3 0 8 16 3 0.80 1.034
130 0 17 7 4 1 0 4 13 3 1.25 1.014
131 0 38 16 24 7 1 23 14 3 1.00 0.926
132 0 33 14 14 8 0 14 19 3 1.20 1.045
133 0 54 23 26 12 0 26 28 2 1.00  
134 0 20 6 9 1 0 9 11 3 1.25 0.652
135 0 50 25 28 19 1 27 22 3 1.20 0.844
136 0 17 3 8 2 0 8 9 3 1.25 1.149
137 0 43 23 25 14 0 25 18 2 1.17  
138 0 15 3 10 3 0 10 5 3 1.00 1.015
139 0 20 10 13 8 0 13 7 3 1.17 1.016
140 0 14 4 6 2 1 5 8 3 1.40 0.904
141 0 8 3 1 0 0 1 7 3 1.20 1.031
142 0 9 7 6 5 0 6 3 3 1.00 1.111
143 0 20 13 10 7 0 10 10 3 1.00 1.055
144 0 22 16 13 10 0 13 9 3 1.00 0.825
145 0 47 35 24 18 0 24 23 3 1.00 0.959
146 0 21 12 9 4 0 9 12 3 1.00 0.915
147 0 16 9 7 4 0 7 9 3 1.00 0.978
148 0 21 11 9 2 0 9 12 3 1.20 0.518
149 0 19 6 11 2 0 11 8 3 1.25 1.130
150 0 31 14 19 9 1 18 12 3 1.17  
151 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1.25 1.127
152 0 12 6 7 5 0 7 5 3 1.33 0.981
153 0 20 9 10 3 0 10 10 3 1.25 1.033
154 0 10 5 7 4 0 7 3 3 1.25 0.959
155 0 3 1 1 0 0 1 2 3 1.00 1.015
156 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 3 3.00 1.074
157 0 13 2 8 2 0 8 5 3 2.00 0.866
158 0 18 2 4 0 0 4 14 3 2.00 0.937
159 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 7 3 1.67 0.975
160 0 11 4 3 1 0 3 8 3 1.33 0.901
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161 19 8 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
162 19 6 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 0 3 2 0 0 0 0
163 19 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 1 3 0 0 0 0
164 19 4 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
165 20 7 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 1 4 4 0 2 5 0
166 20 7 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 6 4 0 8 11 0
167 21 6 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
168 21 6 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 2 1 0 3 0 0
169 21 6 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 2 0 3 0 0
170 21 4 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
171 21 4 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 1 1 0 1 4 0
172 21 6 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 4 0 0 5 2 0
173 21 6 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 1 1 0 2 2 0
174 21 6 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 1 2 0 1 1 0
175 21 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
176 21 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 6 1 0 2 1 0
177 21 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
178 21 6 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
179 21 6 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 6 0 0 3 6 0
180 22 3 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 3 3 0 0 0 0
181 23 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
182 23 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 2 1 0 0 2 0
183 23 4 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 3 1 0 2 0 0
184 23 4 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 2 2 0 0 0 0
185 23 4 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
186 23 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 1 5 0 0 0 0
187 23 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 4 3 0 0 5 0
188 23 4 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 2 2 0 1 2 0
189 23 5 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 0 2 0 2 4 0
190 23 6 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 2 0 0 0 4 0
191 23 6 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 3 3 0 1 4 0
192 24 2 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
193 24 2 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
194 24 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
195 24 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 0
196 24 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 4 0 0 0 0
197 24 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
198 24 2 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
199 24 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
200 24 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
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161 0 0 0 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
162 0 0 0 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
163 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
164 0 0 0 3 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
165 0 2 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
166 5 0 0 8 2 0 1 0 0 9 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
167 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
168 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
169 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
170 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
171 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
172 6 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
173 3 0 0 6 4 0 0 0 0 3 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
174 1 3 0 11 2 0 0 0 0 6 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
175 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
176 1 0 0 9 6 0 1 0 0 8 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
177 0 3 0 2 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
178 0 3 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
179 5 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 11 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
180 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
181 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
182 1 5 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
183 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
184 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
185 3 1 0 5 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
186 0 0 0 5 5 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
187 0 1 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
188 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
189 0 6 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
190 0 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
191 0 3 0 1 4 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
192 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
193 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
194 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
195 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
196 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
197 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
198 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
199 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
200 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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161 0 8 6 1 1 0 1 7 3 2.00 0.901
162 0 12 7 5 2 0 5 7 3 1.50 0.386
163 0 4 0 1 0 0 1 3 2 1.00 0.690
164 0 8 4 7 3 0 7 1 3 2.00  
165 0 27 10 12 3 1 11 15 3 1.17 1.130
166 0 58 34 37 21 0 37 21 3 1.17  
167 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1.20 1.111
168 0 14 5 11 4 0 11 3 3 1.20 0.940
169 0 11 5 7 5 0 7 4 3 1.20 0.978
170 0 10 4 4 2 0 4 6 3 1.00 1.053
171 0 14 8 5 2 0 5 9 3 0.80 0.896
172 0 23 15 18 11 0 18 5 3 1.50 1.633
173 0 26 17 15 11 0 15 11 3 1.20 0.633
174 0 30 19 20 13 0 20 10 3 1.20 0.512
175 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1.00 0.735
176 0 39 19 27 12 0 27 12 3 1.00 0.956
177 0 10 7 3 2 0 3 7 4 1.00 1.049
178 0 14 8 2 1 0 2 12 2 1.00 1.130
179 0 38 14 28 8 0 28 10 2 1.20  
180 0 10 0 3 0 0 3 7 3 1.00  
181 0 4 3 3 2 0 3 1 4 1.00 1.204
182 0 13 10 4 2 0 4 9 3 1.25 1.016
183 0 8 4 5 2 0 5 3 3 1.00 2.108
184 0 7 3 3 1 0 3 4 3 1.00 1.038
185 0 13 13 8 8 0 8 5 3 1.00 1.036
186 0 17 10 7 5 0 7 10 3 1.00 0.921
187 0 19 12 7 3 0 7 12 3 1.00 1.086
188 0 15 7 3 1 0 3 12 3 1.00 0.984
189 0 19 13 2 2 0 2 17 3 1.25 0.959
190 0 13 9 2 0 0 2 11 3 1.00 0.978
191 0 22 13 6 2 0 6 16 2 1.00  
192 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.67 1.111
193 0 3 0 3 0 0 3 0 1 0.67 0.997
194 0 4 1 3 0 0 3 1 1 0.33 1.016
195 0 3 0 2 0 0 2 1 1 1.00 0.959
196 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 0.50 1.015
197 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.50 1.074
198 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0.67 0.866
199 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1.00 0.937
200 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1.00 0.975
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201 24 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 0
202 24 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 3 0 0 0 0
203 24 2 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 16 0 0 0 0
204 25 2 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
205 25 3 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 3 0 0 0 0
206 26 2 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
207 26 2 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
208 26 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 3 1 0 0 0 0
209 26 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
210 26 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
211 26 2 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 0
212 27 4 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 4 0 2 3 0 1 7 0
213 27 3 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 2 4 0 1 10 0
214 28 3 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
215 28 4 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 6 3 0 0 3 0
216 28 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 3 2 0 1 5 0
217 28 8 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 1 7 0 0 2 0
218 28 7 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 3 0 0 1 6 0
219 28 4 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 2 6 0 1 5 0
220 28 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 2 4 0 1 1 0
221 28 6 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 3 3 0 0 0 0
222 28 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 2 2 0 0 3 0
223 29 6 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 4 3 0 9 7 0
224 30 6 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 0 2 0 0 5 0
225 30 6 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 2 2 0 0 0 0
226 31 2 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
227 32 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
228 32 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
229 32 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
230 32 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
231 32 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
232 32 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 0 1 2 0 0 0 0
233 32 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
234 32 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 3 2 0 0 0 0
235 32 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 3 0 0 0 0
236 33 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 4 2 0 0 0 0
237 33 4 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 4 0 3 3 0 4 0 0
238 33 4 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
239 33 3 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
240 33 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 8 1 0 1 2 0
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201 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
202 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
203 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
204 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
205 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
206 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
207 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
208 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
209 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
210 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
211 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
212 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
213 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
214 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 3 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
215 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
216 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
217 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
218 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
219 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
220 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
221 3 8 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
222 1 6 0 0 0 0 5 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
223 2 6 0 9 8 0 0 3 0 6 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
224 2 5 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
225 3 11 0 2 5 0 0 0 0 1 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
226 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
227 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
228 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
229 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
230 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
231 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
232 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
233 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
234 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
235 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 4 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
236 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
237 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
238 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
239 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
240 3 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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201 0 6 0 2 0 0 2 4 1 2.00 0.912
202 0 9 0 2 0 0 2 7 1 1.00 1.085
203 0 16 0 0 0 0 0 16 1 1.00  
204 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1.00 1.036
205 0 4 0 1 0 0 1 3 1 1.50  
206 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0.67 6.877
207 0 3 3 2 2 0 2 1 1 0.67 1.001
208 0 7 0 6 0 0 6 1 2 2.00 1.015
209 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 6 1 2.00 1.142
210 0 8 3 4 0 0 4 4 1 1.00 0.984
211 0 9 0 2 0 0 2 7 2 1.00  
212 0 32 15 8 3 0 8 24 3 1.00 0.956
213 0 24 15 5 2 0 5 19 2 1.00  
214 0 14 2 5 0 0 5 9 3 0.60 1.108
215 0 21 6 11 2 0 11 10 4 1.00 0.997
216 0 24 10 7 2 0 7 17 3 1.25 1.241
217 0 28 12 9 5 0 9 19 3 1.60 0.767
218 0 18 12 6 2 0 6 12 3 1.75 0.825
219 0 17 7 4 1 0 4 13 3 1.00 1.015
220 0 17 5 6 2 0 6 11 3 1.00 0.984
221 0 26 11 10 3 0 10 16 2 1.20 0.959
222 0 23 10 8 1 0 8 15 2 1.00  
223 0 61 41 30 20 0 30 31 3 1.00  
224 0 23 21 2 2 0 2 21 3 1.00 1.049
225 0 32 21 8 5 0 8 24 3 1.20  
226 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1.00  
227 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.67 0.959
228 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.67 0.995
229 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.67 0.992
230 0 2 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.67 0.866
231 0 5 0 2 0 0 2 3 1 0.67 1.398
232 0 5 0 2 0 0 2 3 1 1.00 0.951
233 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1.50 0.984
234 0 8 0 4 0 0 4 4 1 1.50 1.016
235 0 15 0 5 0 0 5 10 1 2.00  
236 0 14 2 9 1 0 9 5 2 1.00 0.852
237 0 13 5 10 5 0 10 3 2 1.00 0.967
238 0 7 0 5 0 0 5 2 2 1.33 0.825
239 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0.75 1.186
240 0 22 7 15 4 0 15 7 2 1.00  
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241 34 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 5 0 4 0 0 3 1 0
242 35 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 2 1 0 0 0 0
243 35 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 1 2 0 0 0 0
244 35 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 0 3 1 0
245 35 6 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 1 2 0 3 0 0
246 35 4 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
247 35 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
248 35 4 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
249 35 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 4 0 1 0 0
250 35 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
251 35 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 1 2 0 2 6 0
252 35 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 4 4 0 0 0 0
253 35 6 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 0 2 1 0
254 36 4 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 5 4 0 5 0 0
255 36 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 4 2 0 1 2 0
256 36 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 3 5 0 2 9 0
257 37 4 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
258 37 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
259 37 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
260 37 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 6 0 0 0 0 0
261 37 3 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 3 0 0 0 0 0
262 38 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 2 1 0 4 2 0
263 38 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 2 3 0 1 3 0
264 38 6 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 5 5 0 5 12 0
265 39 5 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
266 39 6 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 2 3 0 0 1 0
267 39 4 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
268 39 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 2 1 0 0 1 0
269 39 3 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
270 39 4 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
271 39 4 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 4 1 0 0 1 0
272 39 4 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
273 39 4 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
274 39 4 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 0 0 2 0
275 39 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 0 0 5 0
276 39 4 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 2 2 0 0 5 0
277 40 4 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 0 2 2 0 0 0 0
278 40 5 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 0 4 0 0 0 0 0
279 40 4 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 0 4 1 0 0 0 0
280 40 4 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 0 3 0 0 0 0 0
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241 2 2 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
242 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
243 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
244 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
245 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
246 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
247 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
248 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
249 1 2 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 2 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
250 1 4 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
251 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
252 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
253 3 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
254 3 2 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
255 2 4 0 0 0 0 6 6 0 3 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
256 0 5 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 10 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
257 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
258 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
259 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
260 0 0 0 6 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
261 0 0 0 6 3 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
262 1 1 1 11 7 0 0 0 0 7 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
263 0 3 0 0 4 0 2 1 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
264 6 4 0 5 2 0 5 2 0 8 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
265 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
266 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
267 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
268 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
269 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
270 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
271 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
272 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
273 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
274 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
275 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
276 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
277 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
278 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
279 0 1 0 2 3 0 1 1 0 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
280 0 0 0 2 8 0 0 4 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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241 0 16 11 11 7 0 11 5 3 1.00  
242 0 6 2 5 2 0 5 1 3 0.80 0.997
243 0 6 2 3 1 0 3 3 3 1.00 0.981
244 0 7 6 4 4 0 4 3 3 1.00 1.016
245 0 10 7 7 6 0 7 3 3 1.20 1.012
246 0 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 3 0.80 0.770
247 0 9 3 4 2 0 4 5 3 1.00 1.052
248 0 9 3 1 0 0 1 8 3 0.80 1.225
249 0 23 10 7 5 0 7 16 3 1.00 0.978
250 0 19 11 4 3 0 4 15 3 1.00 0.973
251 0 18 12 7 5 0 7 11 2 1.00 0.962
252 0 13 2 5 1 0 5 8 2 1.00 1.000
253 0 16 8 8 5 0 8 8 2 1.00  
254 0 32 10 19 8 0 19 13 3 1.00 0.901
255 0 36 9 16 3 0 16 20 3 1.00 0.915
256 0 39 16 16 2 0 16 23 3 1.00  
257 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1.33 0.997
258 0 4 3 2 1 0 2 2 2 1.00 0.975
259 0 4 3 3 2 0 3 1 2 1.00 1.425
260 0 14 7 13 6 0 13 1 2 1.00 8.199
261 0 16 9 9 6 0 9 7 3 0.50  
262 0 38 27 26 17 1 25 12 3 1.00 1.227
263 0 24 11 5 1 0 5 19 3 1.00 1.052
264 0 64 34 34 16 0 34 30 3 1.00  
265 0 3 0 3 0 0 3 0 3 1.00 1.016
266 0 7 2 2 0 0 2 5 3 1.50 0.904
267 0 2 0 2 0 0 2 0 3 1.00 1.070
268 0 6 2 4 1 0 4 2 3 1.00 0.921
269 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1.00 1.016
270 0 11 0 7 0 0 7 4 3 1.00 0.997
271 0 8 1 6 0 0 6 2 3 1.00 1.064
272 0 4 0 3 0 0 3 1 2 1.00 0.847
273 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 1.00 0.975
274 0 12 4 1 0 0 1 11 3 1.00 1.099
275 0 15 5 2 0 0 2 13 3 1.00 0.997
276 0 22 10 7 0 0 7 15 2 0.80  
277 0 9 0 7 0 0 7 2 3 1.00 1.000
278 0 12 4 6 1 0 6 6 3 1.25 0.918
279 0 20 6 11 2 0 11 9 3 1.00 0.959
280 0 22 10 6 2 0 6 16 3 1.00 1.150
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281 40 3 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 4 3 0 0 0 0
282 40 5 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 0 1 4 0 0 0 0
283 40 5 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 8 1 0 0 0 0
284 40 5 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 2 1 0 0 0 0
285 40 4 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 4 7 0 0 0 0
286 40 3 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 6 0 0 0 0 0
287 40 4 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 1 5 0 0 0 0
288 40 5 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 0 2 1 0 0 0 0
289 41 4 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
290 41 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 2 1 0 0 2 0
291 41 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 5 0 3 1 0 0 0 0
292 41 4 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 5 0 1 2 0 0 0 0
293 41 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 6 0 7 2 0 0 2 0
294 41 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 15 1 0 1 1 0
295 41 3 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 0 3 0 1 1 0
296 41 4 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 1 3 0 2 1 0
297 41 2 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 3 0 2 2 0
298 41 2 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 5 5 0 5 2 0
299 42 6 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 5 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
300 42 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 5 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
301 42 4 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 5 0 3 2 0 1 0 0
302 42 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
303 42 4 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 1 2 0 0 0 1
304 42 3 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
305 42 4 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 1 1 0 0 2 0
306 42 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 4 0 1 1 0
307 42 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 7 1 0 3 3 0
308 42 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 3 3 0 0 4 0
309 42 4 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 0 0 3 0
310 42 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
311 42 7 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 2 3 0 0 10 0
312 43 3 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
313 43 4 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 4 0 0 0 0
314 43 6 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 4 1 0 0 0 1
315 43 4 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 3 0 0 0 0
316 43 3 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
317 43 3 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 0 0 0 0 0
318 43 3 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
319 43 4 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
320 43 6 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 1 3 0 0 3 0
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281 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
282 0 0 0 12 2 0 4 1 0 1 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
283 0 0 0 11 8 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
284 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
285 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
286 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
287 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 6 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
288 0 0 0 12 1 0 3 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
289 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
290 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
291 3 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0
292 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
293 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 3 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0
294 7 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
295 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
296 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
297 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
298 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
299 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 0
300 1 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0
301 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 11 0 0
302 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
303 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
304 1 4 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
305 1 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
306 1 3 0 3 4 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
307 2 6 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
308 1 8 0 5 4 0 0 3 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
309 2 9 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
310 0 0 0 1 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
311 1 9 0 0 1 0 4 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
312 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
313 1 3 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
314 0 0 1 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
315 4 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
316 1 0 0 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
317 0 1 0 13 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
318 1 3 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
319 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
320 0 4 0 5 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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281 0 12 0 8 0 0 8 4 3 1.00 0.981
282 0 35 14 18 12 0 18 17 3 1.25 1.014
283 0 33 19 22 11 0 22 11 3 1.67 1.037
284 0 10 2 5 1 0 5 5 3 1.67 0.995
285 0 25 7 14 7 0 14 11 3 1.33 0.844
286 0 14 3 10 3 0 10 4 3 1.00 1.126
287 0 22 7 7 0 0 7 15 3 1.33 1.034
288 0 21 13 19 12 0 19 2 7 1.25  
289 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0.80 1.166
290 0 14 9 8 4 0 8 6 3 1.25 0.978
291 0 18 8 9 3 0 9 9 3 1.00 0.825
292 0 10 0 2 0 0 2 8 3 0.80 1.015
293 0 25 4 10 0 0 10 15 3 0.83 1.037
294 0 35 12 29 8 0 29 6 3 1.25 2.068
295 0 14 6 6 2 0 6 8 3 0.75 0.863
296 0 17 6 6 4 0 6 11 3 1.00 1.651
297 0 11 7 4 3 0 4 7 2 0.67 1.337
298 0 27 14 15 9 0 15 12 3 0.50  
299 0 8 3 6 2 0 6 2 3 1.20 1.208
300 0 11 5 4 3 0 4 7 3 1.00 0.978
301 0 23 4 8 2 0 8 15 3 0.80 0.634
302 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1.00 0.227
303 0 6 3 3 2 1 2 3 3 1.00 0.978
304 0 11 10 2 2 0 2 9 3 0.75 0.997
305 0 9 7 3 2 0 3 6 3 1.00 0.748
306 0 20 13 5 5 0 5 15 3 1.00 1.168
307 0 29 17 14 6 0 14 15 3 1.00 0.995
308 0 36 22 10 6 0 10 26 3 1.00 0.978
309 0 19 14 3 2 0 3 16 2 0.80 0.137
310 0 12 12 1 1 0 1 11 3 3.00 1.125
311 0 32 21 8 1 0 8 24 3 1.17  
312 0 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 3 1.00 1.016
313 0 11 6 2 1 0 2 9 3 1.33 0.959
314 0 14 9 10 6 2 8 4 3 2.00 1.015
315 0 12 8 6 5 0 6 6 3 1.33 0.962
316 0 10 9 5 5 0 5 5 3 1.00 0.614
317 0 20 17 16 13 0 16 4 3 1.00 1.697
318 0 7 7 3 3 0 3 4 2 1.00 0.956
319 0 6 4 1 1 0 1 5 2 1.00 0.962
320 0 22 15 6 5 0 6 16 3 1.20 2.146
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322 44 4 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 1 3 0 0 2 0
323 44 6 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 6 0 3 2 0 0 1 0
324 45 4 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 0 1 6 0 0 0 0
325 46 4 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
326 46 4 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
327 46 7 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 3 1 0 1 2 0
328 46 3 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 2 1 0 1 0 0
329 46 3 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
330 46 4 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
331 46 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 2 2 0 0 0 0
332 46 6 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 3 1 0 4 3 0
333 46 4 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 3 0 0 0 0 0
334 46 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
335 46 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
336 47 4 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
337 47 4 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 2 4 0 0 0 0
338 47 4 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 5 1 0 0 0 0
339 47 6 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 0 3 2 0 0 0 0
340 48 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
341 48 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
342 49 4 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 4 4 0 1 1 2
343 49 4 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 6 3 0 2 0 0
344 49 4 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 2 2 0 0 0 0
345 49 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 3 3 0 8 2 0
346 49 4 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 4 0 7 1 0 5 0 0
347 49 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 5 1 0 2 0 0
348 49 3 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 6 8 0 4 7 0
349 52 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
350 53 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
351 53 4 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 4 2 0 0 0 0
352 53 4 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 8 3 0 3 5 0
353 54 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 3 2 0 1 0 1
354 54 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 3 2 0 4 1 0
355 54 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
356 54 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
357 54 3 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 3 3 0 1 2 0
358 54 5 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 6 13 0 6 3 0
359 57 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
360 57 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 1 3 0 2 4 1
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322 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
323 1 2 0 9 2 0 2 1 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
324 0 0 0 3 1 0 4 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
325 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
326 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
327 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
328 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
329 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
330 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
331 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
332 5 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
333 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
334 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
335 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 4 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
336 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
337 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
338 0 0 0 7 10 0 5 4 0 1 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
339 0 0 0 15 4 0 1 1 0 6 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
340 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
341 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
342 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
343 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
344 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
345 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
346 4 2 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
347 0 2 0 0 0 0 3 5 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
348 6 3 0 0 0 0 5 5 0 8 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
349 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
350 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
351 1 4 0 3 3 0 2 0 1 4 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
352 2 6 0 3 7 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
353 3 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
354 4 6 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 6 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
355 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
356 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
357 5 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
358 3 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
359 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
360 0 5 0 0 0 0 2 5 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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322 0 15 6 5 2 0 5 10 5 0.80 1.071 
323 0 28 15 17 10 0 17 11 3 1.00  
324 0 18 4 10 3 0 10 8 2 1.00  
325 0 7 4 4 2 0 4 3 2 1.00 0.975 
326 0 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 1.00 1.016 
327 0 12 6 7 2 0 7 5 2 1.40 0.997 
328 0 6 3 4 2 0 4 2 2 1.00 0.997 
329 0 3 3 3 3 0 3 0 3 1.00 0.956 
330 0 8 7 5 4 0 5 3 2 1.33 1.093 
331 0 17 7 6 2 0 6 11 2 1.25 1.153 
332 0 40 16 16 9 0 16 24 2 1.50 1.220 
333 0 14 0 13 0 0 13 1 3 0.80 1.166 
334 0 9 0 7 0 0 7 2 2 1.00 0.641 
335 0 12 1 7 1 0 7 5 2 1.00  
336 0 7 1 5 1 0 5 2 2 1.33 0.995 
337 0 12 1 5 1 0 5 7 3 1.33 0.896 
338 0 40 17 18 7 0 18 22 2 1.33 1.096 
339 0 40 19 25 15 0 25 15 4 1.50  
340 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1.00 1.753 
341 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1.00  
342 0 19 8 9 5 2 7 10 3 1.00 0.975 
343 0 19 6 12 5 0 12 7 3 1.00 0.978 
344 0 13 4 5 1 0 5 8 3 1.00 1.436 
345 0 26 16 18 12 0 18 8 3 1.25 0.849 
346 0 30 11 24 9 0 24 6 3 1.00 0.932 
347 0 22 4 13 2 0 13 9 3 1.00 1.137 
348 0 54 20 29 10 0 29 25 3 0.75  
349 0 3 3 3 3 0 3 0 3 2.00  
350 0 4 0 1 0 0 1 3 2 3.00 0.195 
351 0 29 11 15 4 1 14 14 3 1.00 1.302 
352 0 41 26 17 8 0 17 24 3 1.00  
353 0 21 7 10 5 1 9 11 3 1.00 1.073 
354 0 41 15 23 8 0 23 18 3 1.00 1.518 
355 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 1.50 0.548 
356 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1.00 0.178 
357 0 37 15 20 6 1 19 17 3 0.60 1.034 
358 0 49 17 24 9 0 24 25 3 1.67  
359 0 2 2 2 2 0 2 0 2 1.00 0.499 
360 0 26 12 7 3 1 6 19 4 1.00 0.822 
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361 57 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
362 57 6 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 2 0 0 2 4 0
363 59 4 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 2 0 0 2 0 0
364 59 4 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 3 2 0 1 1 0
365 59 4 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 1 1 0 1 3 0
366 59 3 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
367 59 3 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 6 4 0 2 3 0
368 59 4 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 5 2 0 2 2 0
369 60 4 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 2 4 0 0 2 0
370 60 4 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 10 4 0 8 2 0
371 61 3 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 0 4 1 0 0 0 0
372 61 3 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 3 0 0 0 0 0
373 61 5 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
374 61 5 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 0 1 2 0 0 0 0
375 61 4 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 2 2 0 0 0 0
376 61 4 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 0 3 3 0 0 0 0
377 61 4 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 1 4 0 0 0 0
378 61 4 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 0 9 3 0 0 0 0
379 62 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
380 62 4 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
381 62 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 1 2 0 0 0 1
382 62 4 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 2 1 0 0 0 0
383 62 4 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
384 62 3 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 3 2 0 0 0 0
385 65 4 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 5 0 3 2 0 1 1 0
386 65 3 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 1 0 0 3 2 0
387 65 4 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 12 2 0 1 3 0
388 66 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 2 4 0 0 0 0
389 66 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 4 0 0 0 0
390 66 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 2 0 0 0 0
391 68 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 0
392 69 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
393 69 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
394 69 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 3 0 3 2 0 0 0 0
395 69 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 3 0 7 2 0 0 0 0
396 70 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
397 70 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
398 72 3 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 4 0 5 3 0 0 4 0
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361 3 6 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 3 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
362 9 1 0 0 0 0 14 5 0 6 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
363 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
364 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
365 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
366 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
367 5 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
368 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
369 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
370 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
371 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
372 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
373 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
374 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
375 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
376 0 0 0 1 4 0 4 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
377 0 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
378 0 0 0 11 16 0 1 0 0 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
379 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
380 2 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
381 3 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
382 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
383 0 0 0 6 1 0 0 0 0 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
384 0 0 0 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
385 0 1 0 0 0 0 6 1 0 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
386 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
387 8 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
388 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
389 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
390 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
391 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
392 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
393 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
394 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
395 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
396 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
397 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
398 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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361 0 21 9 9 3 0 9 12 3 1.00 0.729 
362 0 48 16 33 11 0 33 15 3 1.20  
363 0 9 6 5 2 0 5 4 3 1.00 1.093 
364 0 10 3 6 1 0 6 4 3 1.00 0.901 
365 0 9 6 4 2 0 4 5 3 1.00 0.959 
366 0 11 5 6 3 1 5 5 3 0.60 0.995 
367 0 24 14 13 7 0 13 11 3 1.00 2.493 
368 0 23 10 11 4 0 11 12 3 0.80  
369 0 17 2 6 0 0 6 11 3 1.00 0.882 
370 0 39 16 28 12 0 28 11 3 1.00  
371 0 11 3 6 0 0 6 5 3 0.75 0.995 
372 0 11 4 6 2 0 6 5 3 1.00 0.978 
373 0 9 3 5 2 1 4 4 3 1.67 0.978 
374 0 11 3 4 2 0 4 7 3 1.25 1.015 
375 0 9 2 4 1 0 4 5 3 1.33 0.956 
376 0 19 5 11 1 0 11 8 3 1.00 1.153 
377 0 13 6 3 2 0 3 10 3 1.33 1.090 
378 0 47 27 23 11 0 23 24 3 1.00  
379 0 3 2 2 1 0 2 1 3 0.40 0.921 
380 0 8 6 8 6 2 6 0 3 0.80 1.016 
381 0 9 6 6 5 2 4 3 3 1.00 0.995 
382 0 4 1 3 1 0 3 1 3 1.00 1.073 
383 0 16 7 9 6 0 9 7 3 0.80 1.356 
384 0 18 10 8 5 0 8 10 2 1.00  
385 0 20 3 14 1 0 14 6 3 0.80 0.995 
386 0 15 7 8 3 0 8 7 3 0.75 1.074 
387 0 41 16 25 9 0 25 16 3 1.00  
388 0 6 0 2 0 0 2 4 2 0.50 0.970 
389 0 6 0 2 0 0 2 4 2 1.00 1.003 
390 0 5 0 3 0 0 3 2 2 1.00  
391 0 6 0 2 0 0 2 4 2 0.50  
392 0 2 0 1 0 0 1 1 2 0.75 0.978 
393 0 2 0 2 0 0 2 0 1 0.67 0.879 
394 0 7 0 4 0 0 4 3 1 0.67 1.033 
395 0 15 0 9 0 0 9 6 2 0.33  
396 0 3 0 3 0 0 3 0 1 1.00 1.166 
397 0 4 0 3 0 0 3 1 1 1.00  
398 0 17 4 8 0 0 8 9 2 0.75  
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